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1.1. General observations on the criminal justice system and witnesses 
In South Africa the criminal justice system is primarily controlled by the Criminal 
Procedure Act1 and its application in the criminal process. The introduction of a 
justiciable Bill of Rights2 on 27 April 19943 ushered South Africa into a new legal and 
constitutional dispensation, which in tum affected the criminal justice system profoundly. 
In fact the criminal process has undergone an intense metamorphosis as a result of the 
introduction of the Bill of Rights. Witnesses and victims of crime have not escaped the 
impact of the Constitution on the criminal justice system. Their rightful place in the 
criminal justice process is the subject of this thesis. 
Are witnesses really so important as to require special attention throughout the criminal 
process? If the predominant purpose of criminal procedure is to set rules, procedures and 
devices whereby justice can be administered fairly, impartially and expeditiously in the 
interest of the greater society, then undoubtedly witnesses fulfil a pivotal role in the 
process. Without the participation of witnesses there will be no justice in the criminal 
1 Act 51 of 1977. Hereinafter referred to as the CPA. 
2 Under a justiciable bill of rights a court has the power to test not only executive acts on 
the basis that the norms laid down in the Bill of Rights and to annul any such act which is 
contrary to the said norms. See generally M Cappeletti 'Judicial review of 
constitutionality of state action: Its expansion and legitimacy' 1992 TSAR 256; Raymond 
Wacks 'Empire's law: Hong Kong's colonial bill of rights' 1993 TSAR 384; H F E 
Ruppel 'A bill of rights: Practical implications for legal practice - a Namibian 
perspective' (1992) 7 SAPL 51. 
3 It is on this day that the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 
1993, with its Bill of Rights, came into operation. Through the interim Constitution 
South Africa moved from a constitutional framework of parliamentary sovereignty, to the 
present situation where the Constitution with its Bill of Rights, is the supreme law of the 
land. The final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 came into 
























process. Their role in the prosecution of crime must not be underscored and should not be 
neglected in the justice equation. They should therefore not be invisible participants in 
the justice process but should rather be treated with sensitivity and compassion 
throughout the criminal process. It goes almost without saying that any special treatment 
afforded to them should not be effected at the expense of violating the rights of 
offenders. 
Can our justice system survive without the co-operation of witnesses? The answer to this 
question is 'no', which means that government should therefore do everything in its 
power to assure effective citizen participation in the system.4 My preliminary view is that 
until now very little has been done by government in this regard. This research will seek 
to show that the South African criminal justice system has hitherto been offender rather 
than victim5 orientated. This will be illustrated by focussing ori the victimization that 
witnesses have to endure during various stages of the criminal process, to such an extent 
that they could even be punished6 if they do not co-operate with the prosecution. It is 
quite ironic that these very same persons cannot demand just protection or relocation 
from the state to ensure that they will be safe after testifying. 7 As witnesses have a legal 
obligation to testify, government has a duty to protect them from intimidation by an 
accused. Witnesses who co-operate with the state by testifying in court should at least 
receive fair treatment in the very same process that accords an accused a fair trial as of 
right. Necessary assistance should therefore be rendered to witnesses throughout the 
-criminal trial. In other words, threatened witnesses deserve protection for performing a 
4 Two basic criticisms that could be raised at this preliminary stage are that victims are 
not kept informed and that victims who are required to testify as witnesses often find that 
the traditional procedures provided for in the CPA are not victim-friendly. This 
impression was gained by the writer, especially during the time spent as Senior 
Prosecutor at Wynberg Magistrate's Court during the period 1992 to 1995. 
5 This concept encompasses the term witness and will be used interchangeably. It is, 
however, acknowledged that not all witnesses are always victims of crime. 
6 Section 189 of the CPA. 
7 It is foreseen that many changes will be brought about through the implementation of 
the Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998. This Act is, however, not yet in operation. For a 























legal duty that may jeopardise their lives. An absence of protection illustrates clearly that 
the system is not sensitive to the needs of witnesses. 
In addition to the examination of witnesses' protection this study will investigate the 
treatment that witnesses receive at the various stages of the criminal process in order to 
illustrate further the shortcomings of the system. By investigating the various phases of 
the criminal process an attempt will be made to demonstrate that witnesses receive less 
than adequate treatment from the authorities and are, in effect, powerless in the handling 
of 'their' cases. The distinction between the role of offenders and that of victims will 
precisely illustrate this statement: offenders have the choice to actively participate in their 
trials or to be passive spectators, but witnesses and victims of crime do not have that 
same choice when they are chosen by the state to become witnesses in the trial.8 
1.2 The approach of the present study 
While the focus is almost exclusively on the South African procedural and substantive 
law, comparative analysis will be necessary to reveal the deficiencies in the current 
system and legislation. The criminal justice systems of the United States of America, the 
United Kingdom and other countries will be examined where they offer useful solutions 
for the deficiencies in the South African system. The point of convergence will be the 
treatment and protection that the victims of crime receive in these relatively advanced 
systems. 
This study will examine the pre-trial, trial and post-trial stages as well as those sections of 
the CPA that affect witnesses during the different stages of the criminal process.9 The 
substantive law of rape and the provisions of the Sexual Offences Act10 will also be 
evaluated and discussed. With the provisions of the CPA as backdrop, the roles of the 
8 See M Maguire 'The impact of burglary upon victims' (1980) 20 British Journal of 
Criminology 261. 
9 See ss 153, 158, 162, 163, 166, 170A, 179, 185, 185A, 189,203,205,297 and 300 of 
the CPA. 
























(investigative, bureaucratic and/or administrative) will be reviewed. For it 
is primarily the prosecution12 that assists witnesses during a criminal trial. Where 
possible, case study methodology will be used to evaluate the aforementioned roles 13 of 
the prosecution and to evaluate the usefulness of certain statutory provisions. Conclusions 
drawn from the case studies and the discussions will be used to recommend appropriate 
and necessary changes to the law. 
1.3 Protection of victims' rights and securing a better criminal justice system for all 
At this preliminary stage it is the writer's op1mon that there is an inherent tension 
between the rights of the victim and those of the offender. The position of victims is 
inferior to that of offenders, whose rights are guaranteed in both the interim and the final 
Constitutions of the Republic of South Africa. 14 In order to show that the system affords 
inferior protection to witnesses, attention will be focussed on special classes of witnesses: 
rape victims and child witnesses. The final stage of the trial, namely sentencing, will also 
be reviewed from the perspective of victims and the role they play at that stage. 
11 In terms of s 20 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 the prosecuting 
authority has the exclusive right to institute and conduct criminal proceedings on behalf 
of the state and to discontinue criminal proceedings in the courts, superior and lower, 
save for private prosecutions instituted in terms of s 7 of the CPA. This provision should 
be read with s 179(2) of the Constitution, which provides for a single national 
prosecuting authority in the Republic to institute criminal prosecutions on behalf of the 
state. The Prosecuting Authority is headed by a National Director of Public Prosecutions. 
12 The different roles of public prosecutors will be investigated in view of the pivotal role 
that prosecutors fulfil in the administration of justice. 
13 In studying the Annual Reports of the various Attorneys-General in South Africa it is 
quite apparent that prosecutorial duties are often perceived to extend beyond the trial 
phase. See Annual Report of Attorney-General for the Cape of Good Hope 1995/1996 at 
33; Annual Report of Attorney-General for the Free State 1997/1998 at 10; Annual 
Report of the Attorney-General for the Transvaal 199711998 at 4. 
14 The rights of detained and accused persons are enumerated in s 25 of the interim 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and s 35 of the final Constitution, which 
inter alia guarantees the right of an arrested person to be released on bail and to be 
informed upon arrest of the right to remain silent, and most importantly to be afforded the 























Traditional issues will be considered in the chapter on sentencing and the importance of 
· · · 15 victim compensation. 
It is submitted that the imbalance that exists between the rights of the offender and the 
rights of witnesses can be rectified once the rights of victims of crime are properly 
recognised and protected. Special attention will be paid to the protection afforded to 
witnesses in the United States of America, where at least twenty states16 have accepted a 
'bill of rights' for victims. Witnesses in these states are assured of a system that treats 
them with fairness and dignity. It is submitted that until similar procedures are adopted 
for victims in South Africa the words of Erasmus J in N ombewu v S 17 will remain mere 
rhetoric: 
... the Constitution is not a set of high-minded values designed to protect 
criminals from their just deserts, but it is a shield which protects all 
citizens from official abuse. 18 
A fundamental purpose of government is the protection of all its citizens; therefore equal 
justice should be applied to all, whether they be a victim of crime or an offender. Without 
the participation of witnesses in our criminal justice system, the system will cease to 
function. 
Witnesses have varied personalities, backgrounds and information, 
but they all appear in court for the same purpose - to present 
information for the consideration of the court and jury of which 
they have knowledge of. Their function is not to be biased for or 
against one side of the case. They are not on the witness stand for 
the purpose of convicting or acquitting the accused, but as 
impartial bearers of the information. 19 
15 See discussion at 7 .3 infra. 
16 As at 8 February 1996 twenty states had enacted a 'Crime Victims' Bill'. 
17 1996 (4) All SA 621 (E). 
18 Nombewu supra at 648e. (Emphasis added) 





















2. Pre-trial treatment of witnesses 
2.1 Compellability of witnesses 
Any consideration of the treatment of witnesses should begin by examining (1) which 
persons are competent to give evidence and (2) which persons are compellable to do so -
that is, whether giving evidence is an optional activity or one enforceable by the court. In 
order to determine whether giving evidence is an optional activity and therefore one in 
which witnesses may decline to engage, or an obligation enforceable by the court, 
questions of competency and compellability must be considered. 1 Once witnesses are 
determined to be competent and compellable, it would seem that the state might be in a 
position to unduly pressurise them to participate in the proceedings, and to force them to 
testify. A failure to testify may be met by the imposition of a penalty.2 
The general rule of South African law is that all witnesses are both competent3and 
compellable to testify. The prosecution may compel nearly any person4to come to court 
1 Cowen and Carter Essays on the Law of Evidence ( 1956) at 220 explain as follows: 
A competent witness is a person whom the law allows a party to ask, but not 
compel to give evidence. A compellable witness is a person whom the law allows 
a party to compel to give evidence. There are certain questions, which a witness 
may refuse to answer if he so wishes. He is said to be privileged in respect of 
those questions. It should be clear, therefore, that competence without 
compellability ( or bare competence) is not the same as privilege. Compellability 
is concerned with whether a witness can be forced by a party to give evidence at 
all. Privilege is concerned with whether a witness who is already in the witness 
box is obliged to answer a particular question. The protection of privilege is 
exactly the same whether the witness is barely competent and of his own free will 
elected to give evidence or the witness is compellable and was forced to give 
evidence. (Emphasis added) 
See general discussion by Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence (1997) at 279 et seq. 
2 See ss 188 and 170(2) of the CPA. 
3 Section 192 of the CPA provides: 
Every person not expressly excluded by this Act from giving evidence shall, 

















to testify. Attendance of witnesses is procured by the issuing of subpoenas5 to them.6 The 
court may also call upon witnesses if their evidence appears to be essential for the just 
decision of the case.7 Once subpoenas are duly authorised and issued in terms of s 179 of 
the CPA and served on witnesses, they are compelled8 to comply with such subpoenas 
and be present at the appointed time and place. Such persons are required to co-operate 
and attend the court to give evidence or to produce documents when requested to do so.9 
In addition to the subpoena there is a simpler method used by lower courts to secure the 
attendance of witnesses, and that is to warn them by means of written notices. 10 
If witnesses should ignore subpoenas or refuse to answer questions put to them, they may 
be subjected to the sanction of imprisonment provided by the CPA. 11 Not only may 
witnesses be sentenced to imprisonment if they fail to obey such a court document but in 
certain circumstances they may even be detained. 12 
evidence in criminal proceedings. 
4 Certain classes of witnesses are not compelled to testify even though they are 
competent, mainly for the reasons that they enjoy immunity or that they are married to 
the accused. See E Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 2 ed ( 1997) 
at 23-23 to 23-24. Diplomatic personnel are indemnified as witnesses for the prosecution, 
sees 2 of the Diplomatic Immunity and Privileges Act 74 of 1989. 
5 Subpoenas are issued in terms of the rules of each specific court. See Uniform Rules of 
Court, rule 54(5)-(8) for Superior Courts and rule 64 of the Magistrates' Courts Rules. 
6 Sections 179 to 188 of the CPA deal with the attendance of witnesses at court. In terms 
of s 1 79(1 )(a) of the CPA, the prosecutor or the accused may compel the attendance of 
any person to give evidence in a criminal trial. 
7 Section 186 of the CPA, provides the court with the authority to subpoena witnesses. 
8 Witnesses that are competent and compellable to testify, have to comply with the court 
documents served on them. Only once they are in the witness-box, may they claim 
privilege if entitled to do so. 
9 Ackermann Jin Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others 1996 (4) BCLR 449 
(CC) at 479, regards the honouring of a subpoena as a civic obligation recognised in all 
open and democratic societies and not an invasion of the freedom of an individual. 
See Leoni Stander and Linda Jansen van Rensburg 'Die grondwetlikheid van die 
ondervragingsprosedure ingevolge artikels 417 en 418 van die Maatskappyewet 61 van 
1973-Bernstein vBester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC)' (1997) 60 THRHR 348. 
10 Such notice is usually handed to the prospective witness by a policeman, and calls 
upon him or her to attend the criminal proceedings at a time and place stated therein. 
11 Sees 189(1) of the CPA. 
12 Sees 188 of the CPA. 
























2.2 Interrogation pre-trial 
A question that often arises concerning witnesses, is to what extent witnesses can refuse 
to make statements to the police who in the in the course of their investigation of an 
alleged crime ask them to make a statement. More importantly, the question remains 
whether such witnesses could be compelled to co-operate with the state even though they 
do not want to. These questions can be answered by looking at s 205 of the CPA. This 
section provides as follows: 
(1) A judge of the supreme court, a regional court magistrate or a 
magistrate may, subject to the provisions of subsection 4, upon the request 
of an attorney-general or a public prosecutor authorized thereto in writing 
by the attorney-general, require the attendance before him or any other 
judge, regional court magistrate or magistrate, for examination by the 
attorney-general, of any person who is likely to give material or relevant 
information as to any alleged offence, whether or not it is known by whom 
the offence was committed: Provided that if such person furnishes that 
information to the satisfaction of the attorney-general or public prosecutor 
concerned prior to the date on which he is required to appear before a 
judge, regional court magistrate or magistrate, he shall be under no further 
obligation to appear before a judge, regional court magistrate or 
magistrate. 
(2) The provisions of sections 162 to 165 inclusive, 179 to 181 inclusive, 
187 to 189 inclusive, 191 and 204 shall mutatis mutandis apply with 
reference to the proceedings under subsection (1 ). 
(3) The examination of any person under subsection (1) may be conducted 
in private at any place designated by the judge, regional court magistrate 
or magistrate. 
( 4) A person required in terms of subsection ( 1) to appear before a judge, a 
regional court magistrate or a magistrate for examination, and who refuses 





















sentenced to imprisonment as contemplated in section 189 unless the 
judge, regional court magistrate or magistrate concerned, as the case may 
be, is also of the opinion that the furnishing of such information is 
necessary for the administration of justice or the maintenance of law and 
order. 
In view of these provisions it is submitted that the s 205 procedure is aimed primarily at 
the gathering of evidence. What is disconcerting is that this information gathering may in 
certain instances happen at the cost of the witnesses concerned. 13 Witnesses, irrespective 
of who they are, are compelled to disclose the information to the court and if they do not 
co-operate they may face incarceration in terms of s 189 of the CPA, unless they have a 
'just excuse' 14 for their refusal. The constitutionality of the section was challenged in Nel 
v Le Roux 15 but it survived constitutional scrutiny. Ackermann J was satisfied that the 
procedure adopted under s 189 of the CPA is not unique or unknown in other open and 
democratic societies based on freedom and equality. 16 He compared the section with 
grand jury investigations held in the United States of America, whereby information is 
obtained from persons that are unwilling to assist voluntarily in a criminal investigation. 
In the United States of America both civil and criminal contempt procedures 17 are then 
used to coerce recalcitrant grand jury witnesses to testify or to comply with the said 
subpoenas. In accordance with the United Stated Federal Criminal Code, witnesses are 
either sentenced to imprisonment or could pay a fine (which may increase daily), but they 
may purge themselves by complying with the subpoenas. 
Witnesses therefore have due reason to feel vulnerable because, whether they are willing 
or not, they will have to co-operate with the state either by providing the state with the 
necessary information and/or by testifying in court once they are called upon to do so. 18 
13 See DR Khuluse 'Journalistic Privilege' (1993) 9 SAJHR 279. 
14 For a discussion of this concept see chap 3 infra. 
15 1996 (1) SACR 572 (CC). 
16 Ne! supra par 22 p 584. 
17 See Rule 42(a) of the American Federal Rules for Criminal Procedure. 
18 See S v Mahlangu 1999 (7) BCLR 826 (W) where the court held that a person 




















2.3 Detention of witnesses 
2.3.1 Detention of witnesses pre-trial 
Whenever the Attorney-General 19 is of the opinion that there is any danger that potential 
state witnesses may be tampered with, or that such potential state witnesses may be 
intimidated, or that they may abscond, or whenever he deems it to be in the interests of 
such persons or the administration of justice, he may apply to a judge in chambers for an 
order that such witnesses be detained pending the releva~.t proceedings in terms of s 185 
of the CPA. Section 185 of the CPA provides as follows: 
(1) (a) Whenever any person is with reference to any offence 
referred to in Part III of Schedule 2 in the opinion of the attorney-
general likely to give evidence on behalf of the State at criminal 
proceedings in any court, and the attorney general, from 
information before him-
(i) is of the opinion that the personal safety of such person is in 
danger or that he may abscond or that he may be tampered with or 
that he may be intimidated; or 
(ii) deems it to be in the interests of such person or of the 
administration of justice that he be detained in custody, 
the attorney-general may by way of affidavit place such 
information before a judge in chambers and apply to such judge for 
an order that the person concerned be detained pending the 
relevant proceedings. 
witness yet. In rejecting the applicant's contention that he was entitled to information in 
possession of the state in terms of s 32 of the Constitution the court held that in terms of s 
205 of the CPA he was under the obligation to give evidence and had no protectable right 
to information. 
19 It is envisaged that the National Director of Public Prosecutions will fulfil this function 
in future and that the CPA will have to be amended accordingly. See s 20 of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998. 




















(b) The attorney-general may in any case in which he is of the 
opinion that the object of obtaining an order under paragraph (a) 
may be defeated if the person concerned is not detained without 
delay, order that such person be detained forthwith but such order 
shall not endure for longer than seventy-two hours unless the 
attorney-general within that time by way of affidavit places before 
a judge in chambers the information on which he ordered the 
detention of the person concerned and such further information as 
might become available to him, and applies to such judge for an 
order that the person concerned be detained pending the relevant 
proceedings. 
( c) The attorney-general shall, as soon as he applies to a judge 
under paragraph (b) for an order of detention, in writing advise the 
person in charge of the place where the person concerned is being 
detained, that he has so applied for an order, and shall, where a 
judge under subsection (2)(a) refuses to issue a warrant for the 
detention of the person concerned, forthwith advise the person so 
in charge of such refusal, whereupon the person in charge shall 
without delay release the person detained. 
(2) (a) The judge hearing the application under subsection (1) may, 
if it appears to him from the information placed before him by the 
attorney-general-
( i) that there is a danger that the personal safety of the person 
concerned may be threatened or that he may be tampered with or 
that he may be intimidated; or 
(ii) that it would be in the interests of the person concerned or of 
the administration of justice that he be detained in custody, issue a 
warrant for the detention of such person. 
(b) The decision of the judge under paragraph (a) shall be final: 
Provided that where a judge refuses an application and further 
information becomes available to the attorney-general concerning 
11 




















the person in respect of whom the application was refused, the 
attorney-general may again apply under subsection (l)(a) for th.e 
detention of that person. 
(3) A person in respect of whom a warrant is issued under 
subsection (2), shall be taken to the place mentioned in the warrant 
and, in accordance with regulations which the Minister is hereby 
authorized to make, be detained there or at any other place 
determined by any judge from time to time, or, where the person 
concerned is detained in terms of an order by the attorney-general 
under subsection (l)(b), such person shall, pending the decision of 
the judge under subsection (2)(a), be taken to a place determined 
by the attorney-general and detained there in accordance with the 
said regulations. 
(4) Any person detained under a warrant in terins of subsection (2) 
shall be detained for the period terminating on the day on which 
the criminal proceedings concerned are concluded, unless-
( a) the attorney-general orders that he be released earlier; or 
(b) such proceedings have not commenced within six months from 
the date on which he is so detained, in which case he shall be 
released after the expiration of such period. 
(5) No person, other than an officer in the service of the State 
acting in the performance of his official duties, shall have access to 
a person detained under subsection (2), except with the consent of 
and subject to the conditions determined by the attorney-general or 
an officer in the service of the State delegated by him. 
(6) Any person detained under subsection (2) shall be visited in 
private at least once during each week by a magistrate of the 
district or area in which he is detained. 
(7) For the purposes of section 191 any person detained under 


















criminal proceedings in question as a witness for the State during 
the whole of the period of his detention. 
(8) ... 
(9) (a) In this section the expression 'judge in chambers' means a 
judge sitting behind closed doors when hearing the relevant 
application. 
(b) No information relating to the proceedings under subsection (1) 
or (2) shall be published or be made public in any manner 
whatever. 
13 
This is a drastic provision and applicable only to serious offences.20 Du Toit21 maintains 
that the regulations published under s 185(3) of the CPA have the effect of providing that 
the detained witness is to be treated in much the same way as an awaiting trial prisoner 
even though interrogation is not the sole purpose of the detention. To 'detain' witnesses 
under the conditions as set out in sub-ss (5) and (6) seems to be a harsh way of 
'protecting' people who fulfil their civic duty. 
The detention of witnesses in terms of this provision may last until the relevant trial has 
been completed, provided that if the trial has not commenced within six months of the 
date of detention, the witnesses shall be released. This section is a perfect example of 
how little protection witnesses receive in the criminal justice system in contrast to the 
procedural guarantees granted to an offender in terms of the Constitution. It is a severe 
infringement of witnesses' 'rights' that during such a detention they are held 
incommunicado. Only state officials acting in the course of their duty may have access to 
them and a magistrate visits them once a week.22 
Legal representatives, or parents in the case of juveniles, cannot visit detained witnesses 
as of right but must first obtain permission from the Attorney-General to communicate 
20 Some of the offences in respect of which these powers may be exercised are: murder, 
arson, kidnapping, child-stealing, robbery, seduction, public violence and housebreaking. 
21 Du Toit et al op cit 23-10. 






















. h h 23 wit t em. 
14 
A review of the relevant case law demonstrates that witnesses are more victimised and 
traumatised by this piece of legislation rather than 'protected', and that the provision in 
fact does not serve the interests of witnesses. In S v Mhlongo24 the state intended calling 
four youths as state witnesses at the trial. The case concerned an incident that arose from 
the political violence in Natal at that time. The prosecution protected the juveniles by 
placing them in custody in terms of s 185 of the CPA. When called as witnesses, two of 
them said that they knew nothing at all about the matter before the court; the other two 
were not called to testify. In the end, six of the eleven accused charged with murder and 
arson were discharged at the close of the state case, and the other five were acquitted. 
Reflecting on the detention of the youths detained in terms of s 185, Didcott J made the 
following remarks: 
The order (under section 185) to which I referred ... was made about six 
months ago, and the juveniles were in custody as a result throughout that 
period. One of 
them who testified told us that he, and two of the others, were at school 
when they were placed in custody. They therefore, if that is so, lost six 
months' schooling, which may well mean in practical terms a whole year 
of schooling. He said they had no books for either study or recreation, and 
nothing at all with which to occupy themselves, and he spoke of only three 
visits to them by members of their families during the six months. There 
was no evidence to gainsay any of this. That does not necessarily mean 
that it was all true. The absence of evidence to any other effect may be 
explained simply by the fact that nobody who had personal knowledge of 
the circumstances in which the juveniles were kept in custody happened to 
be present at court to instruct the prosecutor. And, if what the one juvenile 
23 This intolerable situation will be changed, once the provisions of the Witness 
Protection Act 112 of 1998 come into operation. Section 12 of the Act specifically makes 
r,rovision for minors that are in need of protection. 























said is true, the explanation for the fact that there were not more frequent 
visits by members of the family may be not that no more were allowed, 
but that none was tried, for example, because the families were too far 
away to get conveniently to Pinetown. We are clearly in no position to 
make any positive finding on these matters. Nor indeed is it relevant to 
this judgement, or to any issue that requires to be decided in the case, for 
us to do so. 
But I wish to say that, when one looks at the section under which the 
juveniles were taken into custody, section 185 of the CPA, I am disturbed 
by what I see. I fear that the legislature may not have fully grasped the 
implications of some of the provisions of the section, especially where 
juveniles are involved. And it seems to me that legislative reconsideration 
of some parts of this section may well be necessary .... Now the whole 
point about the custody of a witness ... is that he is put and kept in custody 
in his own interests, for his own protection. One is therefore taken 
somewhat aback to read in sub-section (5) that, even in the case of such a 
person, nobody but an officer of the State, acting in the performance of his 
official duties, may have access to the person kept in custody, except with 
the consent of and subject to the conditions fixed by the Attorney-General 
or someone deputed by him Then one sees in sub-section (8) that no Court 
has the power to pronounce upon the refusal by the Attorney-General to 
give consent to visits or to any conditions which he imposes in that 
regard. 25 
What on earth, one asks oneself, can be the conceivable point of the 
provisions of sub-sections (5) and (8) in relation to somebody who is 
being kept in custody for his own protection and in his own interests? Is 
the idea behind it, one wonders, to ensure that threats are not 
communicated to a person in custody by someone visiting him, or that 























tampering with him is not attempted by any such person? If that is the 
fear, surely the way to deal with it is not to place an embargo on visits, but 
simply to have a policeman present throughout them. It is particularly 
disturbing to notice that, as the legislation stands, no parent may visit the 
juvenile who is in protective custody without the consent of the Attorney-
General. No doubt a sensible and compassionate Attorney-General will 
grant such consent. But why should the access of a parent to his own child, 
who is in custody for the child's protection, be subject to the consent of 
the Attorney-General? 
I consider that in these respects at least serious consideration ought to be 
given to the section's amendment, perhaps by giving the Court a power 
when it grants an order for custody to do so conditionally, so that the 
mischief to which I have referred may be avoided, for the Court to have 
the power in a case like this, for instance, to authorise the custody of a 
juvenile on condition that he is supplied with books and studying material, 
on condition that he may be visited at all reasonable times by his parents 
and, if necessary, requiring the State to provide transport to get the parents 
to the place where they are held, if they do not reside in the immediate 
vicinity. I would have thought, to confine myself to juveniles, that the 
chances of getting a juvenile witness to give evidence m a relaxed, 
confident, comfortable way, would be greatly enhanced if, instead of 
being kept in the artificial circumstances in which these juveniles were, 
they were protected in an environment which at least approximated more 
to normal living at home and at school. 
One cannot but agree with Didcott J that, in order to assure that fair treatment be given to 
all, the section needs to be amended if not repealed to give effect to the notion of fairness. 























situation that occurred in 1989 could be repeated today.26 Since the judge specifically 
focused on the use of s 185 of the CPA in relation to the protective custody of juvenile 
witnesses the following comments are made with reference to juvenile offenders. Shortly 
after the introduction of the Bill of Rights the legislature adopted legislation to prevent 
the detention of juvenile offenders27 unless very stringent requirements are met. It is 
submitted that this quick response by the legislature to address the rights of offenders is 
indicative of government's priorities. Juvenile witnesses cannot claim the same rights as 
juvenile offenders and have to wait for the Witness Protection Act to come into operation 
to address their concerns.28 If one compares this kind of infringement of witnesses' right 
26 Provision is made in terms of the Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998, for this section 
to be repealed. This Act has, however, not yet come into operation and the state will 
technically be in a position to utilise s 185 of the CPA. 
27 Section 29 of the Correctional Services Act 29 of 1959. 
28 Sees 12 of the Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998 that provides as follows: 
" (1) No minor shall be placed under protection without the consent of his or her 
parent or guardian: Provided that any minor-
( a) who, as a witness, applies for protection in respect of proceedings against his 
or her parent or guardian or in which his or her parent or guardian is a suspect; 
(b) who has no parent or guardian; 
( c) whose parent or guardian cannot be identified or found, notwithstanding 
reasonable efforts to do so; or r, 
( d) whose parent or guardian is unreasonably withholding or is unable to give his 
or her consent, may be placed under protection without the consent of his or her 
parent or guardian if the Director is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so for 
the safety of the said minor. 
(2) (a) If the Director, in the circumstances referred to in the proviso to subsection 
( 1 ), places a minor under protection, he or she must-
(i) within seven days of such placement; or 
(ii) within such further period as the Judge President of the High 
Court within whose area of jurisdiction the minor is domiciled 
or ordinarily resident, may determine in an application made to 
him or her in chambers by the Director, submit to the said 
Judge President-
(aa) a report setting out his or her reasons for such placement; and 
(bb) the draft protection agreement referred to in section 11 (2) (b ), 
for consideration by a judge in chambers. 
(b) The Director must also furnish to the minor concerned and, where applicable, 
to his or her parent or guardian, a copy of the report and the draft protection 
agreement referred to in paragraph (a). 
(3) After consideration of the report and draft protection agreement referred to 

















to liberty with the rights of detained juvenile accused, then it is obvious that the scale is 
tipped in favour of accused persons.29 
The case of Mhlongo supra also raises other concerns. One of them is whether detainees 
held under s 185 of the CPA could oppose such an application by the Attorney-General 
where they are of the opinion that they have no relevant evidence to give, or where they 
want their safety to be assured in other ways than by detention.30 In Singh v Attorney-
General, Transvaai3 1 the court considered this concern in relation to s 215 bis ( 1) of the 
old CPA,32 the predecessor of s 185. The application was brought by the wife of the 
detainee on the ground that he had been arrested on an invalid warrant. She also asked the 
court to order the authorities to permit her to provide him with food from outside. The 
basic difference between s 215 bis of the old Act and s 185 of the current CPA is that 
under the old provision the Attorney-General decided both whether the witness would be 
(a) set aside the placement under protection; 
(b) confirm the placement under protection and thereupon ratify the draft 
protection agreement; or 
( c) confirm the placement under protection and thereupon amend the draft 
protection agreement in the manner which he or she deems-
(i) to be in the best interests of the minor; and 
(ii) necessary to ensure the safety of the minor. 
( 4) If the placement under protection of a minor is set aside in terms of subsection 
(3) (a), the Director must forthwith discharge such minor from protection. 
(5) Any draft protection agreement ratified or amended in terms of subsection (3), 
shall constitute a binding protection agreement. 
(6) The Director shall be the curator ad /item of a minor who, without the consent 
of his or her parent or guardian, has been placed under temporary protection as 
contemplated in section 8 (1) or protection as contemplated in the proviso to 
subsection ( 1 ).(Emphasis added) 
29 See specifically s 28( 1 )(g) of the Constitution that provides: 
Every child has the right-
(g) not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition 
to the rights a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained 
only for the shortest appropriate period of time, and has the right to be-
(i) kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and 
(ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the 
child's age; 
30 Particularly professional people and other people who are self-employed and who 
cannot afford to be detained merely because they have to testify on behalf of the state. 






















detained to give evidence and whether the detention of the witness was also necessary. 
According to s 185 the decision on the first question remains with the Attorney-General, 
but the decision on the second question must be decided by a judge. 
In Singh supra the court held that the section did not prescribe criteria that have to be 
objectively satisfied. In fact the only criterion for the exercise of the power to detain was, 
according to the interpretation adopted by the court, the opinion of the Attorney-General 
that the prerequisites for detention had been met. Mathews33argues, with reference to s 
215 bis, that in order to become a victim of this detention power, you need not be an 
actual witness to an actual offence. But you need only be thought to be a witness to an 
apprehended offence. Part of this argument still holds, but it should be borne in mind that 
s 185 is distinguishable from its predecessor in that it makes provision for the matter to 
be considered by a judge. It also explicitly provides that the decision regarding the 
necessity of the detention, should be based on information placed before the judge and 
provided by the Attorney-General.34 
It is therefore ironic that Steyn CJ should state in S v Heyman and Another35 that the 
primary purpose of the section is to further the interests of justice and those of the 
detainee. On the contrary, it may be said that the primary purpose or effect of the section 
is to assist the state at the expense of witnesses' liberty. 36 It is difficult to accept that such 
deprivation can be seen as conduct in the 'interests' of witnesses when the incarcerated 
witnesses are in fact at the mercy of the state. So even though the section may protect 
witnesses from elements associated with the defence it does not protect them from the 
32 Act 56 of 1955. 
33 See Anthony S Mathews Freedom, State Security and the Rule of Law - Dilemmas of 
the Apartheid Society (1989) at 96. 
34 See sub-s 1 (a) supra. 
35 1966 (4) SA 598 (A) at 605. See also in this regard Gosschalk v Rossouw 1966 (2) SA 
476 (A) at 477. 
36 This is said in the face of the dictum in S v Weinberg 1966 (4) SA 660 (A) at 667, that 
although interrogation during detention is not the purpose of the section, the witness may 
be 'asked' to make a statement. It is submitted that such 'asking' cannot be anything 























state. It would be relatively easy for the state to obtain evidence from detained witnesses 
by overt interrogation. 
Whose 'interests' are served by this piece of legislation? In answer to this question it 
would be appropriate to consider the dictum by Rumpff CJ in S v Mushimba en 
Andere: 37 
The law must strive to reconcile two highly important interests which are 
liable to come into conflict - (a) the interest of the citizen to be protected 
from illegal or irregular invasions of his liberties by the authorities, and 
(b) the interest of the state to secure that evidence bearing upon the 
commission of a crime and necessary to enable justice to be done shall not 
be withheld from courts of law on any mere formal or technical ground. 
Neither of these objects can be insisted upon to the uttermost. The 
protection for the citizen is primarily protection for the innocent citizen 
against unwarranted, wrongful and perhaps high-handed interference, and 
the common sanction is an action for damages. The protection is not 
intended as a protection for the guilty citizen against the efforts of the 
public prosecutor to vindicate the law. On the other hand the interest of the 
state cannot be magnified to the point of causing all the safeguards for the 
protection of the citizen to vanish, and of offering a positive inducement to 
the authorities to proceed by irregular methods. 38 
It is submitted that s 185 of the CPA cannot achieve the reconciliation that the learned 
Chief Justice po~tulates because the two interests are in most instances inherently in 
conflict with each other. In the final analysis it is important to consider the 
constitutionality of s 185 in the face of the Constitution. 
37 1977 (2) SA 829 (A). 


















The question remains whether a detention under s 185 of the CPA does not constitute 
detention without trial? It is my submission that such detention can be classified as 
detention without trial because the 'trial' referred to in the section relates to another 
person being charged with an offence and most certainly does not refer to the 'trial' of the 
detainee. In its current form s 185 of the CPA in all probability is in conflict with s 
12( 1 )(b )39 of the Constitution which provides that everyone has the right not to be 
detained without trial. It could be submitted that the provision concerns the right of an 
accused, but a counter argument would be that specific provision for the rights of the 
accused is made in terms of s 35 of the Constitution. Furthermore, s 12 of the 
Constitution may be claimed by all citizens irrespective of whether they are accused of a 
crime or whether they are detained as witnesses. 40 It is therefore submitted that the 
detainee, being a witness and not an awaiting trial offender, can for this very reason 
challenge the constitutionality of s 185 of the CPA. In addition to s 12 there is s 35(2)41 
which specifically provides for the rights of every detained person. It grants the detained 
person the right to challenge the validity of his/her detention in a court of law and for this 
reason it is submitted that the detained person can now institute action against the state 
and that the courts are now empowered to hear such an application.42 
2.3.2 Detention of prospective witnesses at their request 
In terms of s 185A of the CPA prospective witnesses may at their own request, be placed 
in detention pending the trial. They may continue to stay in custody even after they have 
testified. Protecting witnesses by detaining them in custody is an archaic approach that 
39 Section 12 of the final Constitution corresponds with s 11 of the interim Constitution. 
40 In Nel v Le Roux and Others 1996 (1) SACR 572 (CC) at 574d-e, the court held that 
the 'trial' that is envisaged bys 11(1) of the interim Constitution, does not in all 
circumstances require a procedure which duplicates all the requirements and safeguards 
fp;,bodied in s 25 of the Constitution. 
The specific subsection that is relevant is 35(2)( d) that reads as follows: 
(2) Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced person, has the right... 
( d) to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court 
and, if the detention is unlawful to be released; 
42 Access to the court has also been made easier after s 185(8) was repealed by s 69 of 























places a heavy burden on witnesses in the exercise of their civic duty. Protection of 
witnesses is of fundamental importance to the successful operation of the criminal justice 
system as a whole. The kind of treatment that witnesses receive influences both whether 
they will be prepared to come forward to testify and whether they will do so with 
dedication. The protection afforded to witnesses in terms of s 185 or s 185A of the CPA 
is inadequate and an inappropriate way of obtaining the co-operation of witnesses. It is 
fortunate that this view was shared by the legislature, which has recently acknowledged 
the inadequacy of s 185A and which has legislated to repeal this archaic provision.43 
It is foreseen that the approach to witness protection will change once the Witness 
Protection Act44 comes into operation.45 In terms of this Act all decisions regarding 
witness protection will be taken by the Director of the Office for Witness Protection, 
appointed by the Minister of Justice. 46 The Act is a vast improvement on s 185A. It will 
streamline the protection services and bring about a centralised structure to co-ordinate 
witness protection and set a uniform protection policy for all witnesses. For the sake of 
fairness and certainty it has become essential to have a uniform standard that applies to 
all witnesses and which will ensure that all witnesses in the process will be treated alike. 
In the past exceptions were made for a few witnesses to be protected at 'safe houses' or 
hotels instead of being detained at police cells.47 Hitherto this privilege was mainly 
offered to witnesses that had to testify in political trials. 
The provisions of the Witness Protection Act will remain mere rhetoric unless there are 
sufficient funds to set up the structures provided for by the Act. In 1995 the overall cost 
pertaining to witness protection, including the protection of the witnesses of the 
Goldstone Commission, was R2 011 834.48 This amount had increased to R20 million in 
1997.49 If one considers the fact that in 1995 40 witnesses were protected, and that in 
43 See s 24 of the Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998 that provides for such repeal. 
44 Act 112 of 1998. 
45 See 'Witness protection modernised' The Cape Argus 24 February 1998 at 9. 
46 Sees 3(1) of the Witness Protection Act. 
47 See 'Duisende bestee aan Magnus getuie' Die Burger IO June 1996 at 8. 
48 See Annual Report of the Department of Justice 1994/1995 para 2.157. 

















1997 the number of witnesses increased to a total of 473, then it should be obvious that 
more money will have to be allocated to the Department of Justice to run the programme. 
Witnesses that did not want to enter a protection programme in the past because it would 
separate them from their families and expose their families to danger, no longer need 
have such fears because the Act provides for both witnesses and their relatives to enter 
h · 50 t e protect10n programme. 
It is submitted that the kind of protection afforded by the Witness Protection Act is 
required in order to assure witnesses that they may not have to pay the ultimate price in 
coming forward to testify. 51 
2.4 Protection of witnesses' identity 
During the course of a trial the state may apply, in terms of s 153 of the CPA, for a 
direction that the evidence of certain witnesses be given in camera. 52 In the matter of S v 
Leepile and Others( 4)53 it became evident that even though the section provides for the 
residential addresses of witnesses to be withheld from the accused in certain 
circumstances, the courts are reluctant to make such orders. 
In this case the Court found that there was a high risk of harm to the witness if she was to 
give evidence in an open court and that she should be given meaningful protection by an 
order that the matter be heard in a closed hearing. The Court was however not prepared to 
50 See s 7 of the Witness Protection Act. Section 7 should be read with s 1 (xx) of the Act 
that provides as follows: 
'related person' means any member of the family or household of a witness, or 
any other person in a close relationship to, or association with, such witness. 
51 See 'Man convicted of killing state witness' The Cape Argus 13 June 1996 at 3. 
52 Section 153(1) of the CPA provides for such direction when it is in the interest of the 
security of the State; s 153(2) provides for the direction that such person shall testify 
behind closed doors and that no person shall be present when such evidence is given 
unless his presence is necessary, and that the identity of such person shall not be 
revealed; whereas s 153(3) provides for such a direction when a certain class of offences 
were committed or where the offender is a minor. 






















order that her name be withheld from the accused.54 The Court maintained that it would 
be unconscionable to require a legal representative to withhold from his client 
information, particularly if it were to appear that such information is relevant to the 
proper conduct of the defence. To grant an order under such circumstances would 
seriously harm the relationship between the accuse<l and his legal representative. 
In the matter of S v Leepile and Others(5)55 another application was lodged in terms of 
s 153(2) of the CPA but what was peculiar about the application was that the state 
requested that the true identity of the witness not be disclosed to anyone. In considering 
the request by the state, Ackermann J was of the opinion that what the state was 
requesting was something that had far more consequences for the accused than an in 
camera hearing with its restriction on the publication of the witness's identity. He stated 
that the following consequences might flow from such an order and affect the accused: 
(a) No investigation could be conducted by the accused's legal 
representatives into the witness' background to ascertain whether he has a 
general reputation for untruthfulness, whether he has made previous 
inconsistent statements nor to investigate other matters which might be 
relevant to his credibility in general. 
(b) It would make it more difficult to make enquiries to establish that the 
witness was not at places on the occasions mentioned by him. 
( c) It would further heighten the witness' sense of impregnability and 
increase the temptation to falsify or exaggerate.56 
54 It is important to present the following facts so that there can be a clear picture about 
how little protection was given to the witness, Miss B. In the application Miss B testified 
how she had left the Republic in 1978 and had become a member of the ANC. She stated 
that her studies outside the Republic had been sponsored by the ANC and that she was 
trained, which included military training, by the ANC. She had worked for the military 
wing of the ANC until she was arrested in the Republic on a mission in 1984. Thereafter 
she had acted as an informer for the South African Police. It was for these reasons that 
she was in a high-risk category as far as the likelihood of harm to herself was concerned. 
In the light of these facts the court was convinced that Miss B's safety was at stake and 
ordered that her testimony be heard behind closed doors, but it did not order that her 



















It was decided not to grant the order requested by the state, namely absolute anonymity of 
the witness. The court held that neither the provisions of s 153 nor those of s 65 of the 
Internal Security Act57 could be interpreted to grant witnesses true anonymity. 
Ackermann J in the matter of S v Leepile(l)58 considered the primary object of s 153(2) 
to be to ensure that justice is done and not to protect witnesses. 59 
In another political trial, S v Pastoors, 60 an application was lodged in terms of s 153 (2) 
of the CPA to allow the witness to testify behind closed doors. 61 In his consideration of 
the application Spoelstra J carefully considered the law on this aspect. He considered the 
following principles as important factors in an application of this kind: 
1. All trials are heard in open Court accessible to any member of the 
public who wi~hes to attend. The reasons for this principle are fully 
discussed in the judgment of Ackermann J. 62 
2. A court would encroach upon this general rule only where special 
circumstances are present requiring such an inroad to secure the proper 
administration of justice or where a public trial is prohibited by statute, for· 
instance where minors are involved. 
3. The onus of satisfying the Court that such special circumstances are 
present rests upon the party who alleges such circumstances and who 
brings an application that the basic rule be dispensed with. . 
55 1986 (4) SA 187 (W). 
56 Leepile(5) supra at 189E-G. 
57 Act 74 of 1982. 
58 1986 (1) SA 333 (W). 
59 See S v Sekete and Others 1980 (1) SA 171 (N) for further reference on the factors to 
be considered in an application in terms ofs 153(2). 
60 1986 (4) SA 222 (W). 
61 For purposes of this study emphasis will be placed on the different criteria that played a 
role in the trial of Helene Pastoors and not the political debate that ensued at the time of 
the trial around Pastoors as a foreign national. See C van den Wyngaert 'Criminal justice 
in South Africa: An European perspective. An observer's report on S v Pastoors' (1986) 
2 SAJHR 278. 
62 This is with reference to Ackermann J's judgment in S v Leepile and Others(]) 1986 














4. A court has a discretion in a matter of this kind to dispense with the 
basic rule if an applicant satisfies the Court that the prescribed 
jurisdictional facts for the exercise of a discretion in terms of section 
153(2) are present, that is that there is a likelihood that harm may result to 
a person if he testifies at the proceedings. 63 The harm may take any form 
and the nature thereof is one of the considerations which would be 
considered in exercising the discretion conferred by the section. 
5. The expression 'a likelihood that harm may result' means a reasonable 
possibility of such harm and not a probability on the one hand or a remote 
or far-fetched or fantastic one on the other. 
6. If such likelihood that harm may result to any other person, other than 
the accused, is shown, the Court has a discretion to make a direction in 
terms of s 153 (2)(a) and (b ), or to refuse to accede to the request. 
7. Where a reasonable possibility of harm has been established, and 
whether or not the Court should exercise its discretion in favour of the 
applicant, are questions of fact64 to be decided on the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case.65 
In the matter of S v Baleka(2)66 the state succeeded in its attempt to offer the witness 
some protection in applying s 153(2).67 In Baleka(2) the state applied for an order to be 
63 Cf. S v Madlavu and Others 1978 (4) SA 218 (E) and in particular the passage at 222F-
G, where Cloete JP said: 
I have come to the conclusion after a careful consideration of the section and the 
authorities to which I have referred that in making an order in the terms 
contemplated ins 153(2) the prerequisite is that the harm to any person who 
testifies in these proceedings as envisaged by the section must be a reasonable 
possibility and not a remote far-fetched or fantastic one. The requirement is not to 
be set so highly that a probability must exist that harm will result. 
64 With regard to whether harm might result, Van Dijkhorst J said in S v Baleka(2) 1986 
(4) SA 200 (T) at 2011: 
Whether there is a likelihood that harm might result to a witness will vary from 
case to case and witness to witness. A court can only be guided in its decision on 
this point by the material placed before it. 
65 S v Pastoors supra at 224B-G. 
66 1986( 4) SA 200 (T). 
















made (a) that the evidence of the witness be heard in camera, and (b) that the identity of 
the witness not be made public. The Court in its consideration of the application bore in 
mind the principle set out in s 152 of the CPA (i.e. that the courts are open to the public 
and should always be so, except in exceptional circumstances) as well as the reasons 
underlying that principle. But the Court also considered that justice must be done and that 
when these two principles conflicted with each other the former would have to yield to 
the latter. The Court granted the application in terms of s 153(2) of the CPA and ordered 
that the witness testify in camera and that his identity not be made public.68 
As previously stated, sub-ss 153(4), (5) and (6), provide some safeguards for young 
witnesses not to be adversely affected by criminal proceedings. No person other than the 
accused or his parent or legal guardian or legal representative may be present at the trial 
of a person under 18 years of age without special authority from the presiding magistrate. 
Once the public has been excluded from a trial in terms of s 153, special circumstances 
should exist before such a ruling will be overturned. 69 
In S v Mangina 70 the state applied for an order that four eye-witnesses be allowed to 
testify in camera in terms of s 153(2) and argued that the trial had political undertones 
which, together with threats of harm, justified the granting of such an order. 71 Friedman 
witness could adopt a pseudonym for the purposes of the trial; and that the identity of the 
witness not be revealed. 
68 Van Dijkhorst J held in Baleka supra at 201G, that the following instances are 
exceptional and may dictate that a trial should be heard in camera: 'state security, good 
order, public morals or the administration of justice.' 
69 S v Mothopeng 1979 (4) SA 367 (T). 
70 1994 (2) SACR 692 (C). 
71 The facts of the case are briefly that the three accused were charge with the murder of 
Amy Biehl, an exchange student from the United States of America, in Guguletu on 25 
August 1993. The evidence adduced by the State revealed that as the deceased was 
driving along a public road in Guguletu, a brick was thrown at her car by a group of 
people who were standing at the side of the road and who were stoning the car. She 
managed to stop the car whereafter she was stabbed and attacked by the group and died 
shortly thereafter. The four eye-witnesses who wanted their identity to be protected were 
not passengers in the car of the deceased but saw what happened to her on that day. It 
was submitted during the trial that the accused were members of a political organisation, 





















JP held that the state had not succeeded in proving the necessary jurisdictional facts and 
refused to grant the order. In his interpretation of the different subsections of s 153 of the 
CPA, Friedman JP concluded that the quantum of proof required for establishing the 
jurisdictional facts for the purposes of s 153(1) is far greater than that required under s 
153(2). He finally granted the witnesses the opportunity to testify without revealing their 
identity. They were allowed to testify in camera but in terms of s 153(1) and nots 153(2). 
He exercised his discretion by weighing two important principles against each other: on 
the one hand, the fundamental importance of trials taking place in public, and on the 
other hand, the chief function of the courts, namely to ensure that justice is done. 72 This 
decision .proved that courts could grant. a reasonable amount of protection in terms of this 
section to witnesses in situations of feared intimidation and harm. 
From the above discussion it should be clear that s 153 of the CPA is a useful tool in the 
protection of the identity of witnesses but that the courts are not consistent in affording 
such protection in terms of the provision. Such inconsistency has a negative impact on 
witnesses. The fact that they have to rely on a court's discretion to be exercised in terms 
of this provision leaves them with a certain sense of uncertainty. 
As yet this section has not been challenged on constitutional grounds but it is reasonable 
to suppose that the section is at risk. 73 This view is supported in view of the approach 
adopted in other adversarial systems where there is greater emphasis on the offender's 
right to a public trial. 74 
72 Manqina supra at 704G-I. 
73 Sees 35(3)(c) of the Constitution which provides for the rights of the accused person, 
and reads as follows: 
Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right -
( c) to a public trial before an ordinary court. 
74 For example the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, 
provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed·of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 




















It is also quite evident that the courts are not over-zealous to grant an order in terms of s 
153 75 and that if witnesses have to rely only on this section for their protection or for the 
non-disclosure of their identity then they may very well be without any protection at all. 
Witnesses would be accorded more protection by the system if they 76could claim non-
disclosure of their identity in circumstances of real fear and intimidation as of right. 
75 See S v Yengeni and Others 1990 (2) SACR 248 (C) at 252c-e, for reference to the kind 
of protection that s 153(2) offers. It should however be borne in mind that Selikowitz J 
was dealing specifically with the protection offered to witnesses that no longer wanted to 
testify on behalf of the state. 

























3. The treatment of witnesses in the witness box 
3.1 The vulnerability of witnesses in an accusatorial system 
To understand the vulnerability of witnesses whilst testifying, it should be recognised that 
trials in an overwhelmingly accusatorial system1 involve adversaries and adversity, 
def eats and victories. It is safe to say that the heart of the accusatorial method of truth-
seeking is cross-examination: 
The purpose of cross-examination is to weaken the testimony the witness 
has given, or, at best, negate it, or, less spectacularly but highly useful, to 
do more than clarify ambiguous responses. The cross-examiner seeks to 
show inadequacy of observation, confusion, bias, inconsistency, even 
contradiction. The dramatic interest, of course, arises mainly from the 
contest between the witness bent on maintaining his position and a lawyer 
bent on destroying it. The audience, at a real trial or a fictional one, loves 
the plangent clash and wants to see the witness bleed, or the lawyer bleed, 
or even better, both. The contest can be good-humored, or at least 
courteous, but it is often drenched in hostility. The cross-examined witness 
is typically a cross-examined witness. The fight is fine; it suits the 
1 South Africa follows an accusatorial trial system as opposed to an inquisitorial trial 
system. As regards the principal features of the different systems of legal proceedings see 
J Hermann 'Various Models of Criminal Proceedings' (1978) 2 SACC at 3-19. Cf.CR 
Snyman 'The Accusatorial and Inquisitorial Approaches to Criminal Proceedings: Some 
Points of Comparison between South Africa and Continental Systems' (I 975) VIII 
CILSA at 100-111; M Damaska 'Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of 
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study' (1972) 121 University of Pennsylvania LR 

















adversary system. But it should stay cool, and its function kept in mind. 
Petty triumph is not the goal...2 
On the one side of the battlefield the state will be faced with the task of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a specific crime was committed by a specific person, and in 
fulfilment of the task, the state will have to call upon witnesses to give evidence to that 
effect. On the other side, however, the defence will make it their business to cast doubt 
on the allegations made by the prosecution witnesses in order to discredit them. In a way 
a trial is nothing but a succession of systematic endeavours to test the veracity of 
statements made by witnesses in court. The problem with this contest, however, is that 
the rules of the contest do not always provide sufficient protection to all the players. In 
the matter of Rex v Hepworth3 Curlewis JA defined the role of all parties concerned in 
the following words: 
A criminal trial is not a game where one side is entitled to claim the 
benefit of any omission or mistake made by the other side, and a judge's 
position in a criminal trial is not merely that of an umpire to see that the 
rules of the game are observed by both sides. A judge is an administrator 
of justice, he is not merely a figure head, he has not only to direct and 
control the proceedings according to recognised rules of procedure but to 
see that justice is done.4 
It is in this context that cross-examination5 should be examined. The significance and 
importance of cross-examination in the system can be based partly on our common law 
evidential system that attaches greater value to oral evidence in court than to earlier 
recorded statements.6 
2 Charles Rembar The Law of the Land: The Evolution of our Legal System (1980) at 337. 
3 1928 AD 265. 
4 R v Hepworth supra at 277. 
5 See M N Howard Phipson on Evidence 14 ed (1990) at 245 who describes the object of 
cross-examination as being twofold: 'to weaken, qualify or destroy the case of the 
opponent; and to establish the party's own case by means of his opponent's witnesses.' 




















Before witnesses will be exposed to cross-examination they will have to enter the witness 
box and swear on oath to tell the truth.7 If witnesses do not want to take the oath, they 
may solemnly affirm to speak the truth.8 The vulnerability of witnesses is particularly 
enhanced by the fact that they are exposed and subjected to cross-examination, once they 
have entered the witness box and testify. In this discussion it will be demonstrated that 
cross-examination is indeed necessary and almost indispensable as a tool to show that 
the testimony of witnesses are unreliable and untruthful. Moreover without competent 
and effective cross-examination in a trial, it will be impossible for a court to make any 
credibility findings on the evidence of witnesses.9 In Klink v Regional Court 
Magistrate 10 Melunsky J emphasises this in the following words: 
Cross-examination is a powerful weapon: it may, and often does, play an 
important part in the decision of a trial court. The effect of a telling and 
efficient cross-examination should not, therefore be underestimated. 11 
3.1.1 Witnesses' liability to be cross-examined 
Once state witnesses are in the witness box, the defence is entitled to cross-examine 
them. 12 Although cross-examination is regarded as an essential method to ensure a fair 
7 See s 162 of the CPA. As regards the purpose of administering the oath to a witness in a 
criminal trial Van Winsen Jin S v L 1973 (1) SA 344 (C) at 347H said that its purpose is: 
' ... om deur 'n beroep op 'n persoon se gewete en sy godsdienstige oortuiging en 
met behulp van strafregtelike sanksies te probeer verseker dat slegs die waarheid 
in die volle sin van die woord deur getuienis in die howe verkondig word.' 
See also S v Bothma 1971 (1) SA 332 (C) at 336H-337A; S v Munn 1973 (3) SA 734 
(NC) at 736H. 
8 See s 163 of the CPA. It is submitted that s 163 and 162 can apply only in instances 
where a witness has the capacity to understand and assume the religious obligations of 
the prescribed oath. Moreover, the capacity to distinguish between the truth and falsity is 
considered to be a prerequisite for the making of an affirmation or an admonition in terms 
of s 163 and 164 of the CPA. See Henderson v S (1997) 1 All SA 594 (C) at 597d-g. 
9 See SA Law Commission Project 73: Interim Report on the Simplification of Criminal 
Procedure (1995) at 103. Cf. R v Witbooi 1960 1 PH Hl00 (ECD); R v Khuzwayo 1961 1 
PH Hl 18 (N). 
10 1996 (3) BCLR 402 (SE). 


















trial, it is the application of the procedures adopted during the trial that are not above 
criticism. To put it in context: witnesses are compelled to answer each and every question 
put to them in cross-examination, provided that the question is relevant13 to the issue. The 
only time that witnesses will be excused from answering questions of the defence is when 
they are protected by privilege. 14 
3.1.2 The role of cross-examination in criminal proceedings 
The right to cross-examination and the various rules regulating cross-examination can be 
traced back to the emergence of legal representation in the English trial in the 18th 
century. 15 What is cross-examination?16 It is submitted that it can be defined as the 
12 See s 166 of the CPA, which grants the prosecutor and the accused the right to cross-
examine any witness. The accused is also protected bys 35(3)(i) of the Constitution, 
which grants him the right to adduce and challenge evidence. 
13 To put the vulnerability of witnesses in perspective: their character is something that is 
always relevant to their credibility and which may be attacked by the defence during 
cross-examination. For a discussion of the examination of a witness's character during 
cross-examination, see also J P Pretorius Cross-Examination in South African Law (1997) 
at 208. 
14 See Howard op cit at 242. 
15 See GA Barton 'The Effect of the English Revolution on Criminal Procedure' 1984 
De Rebus 200. 
16 The most famous definition given is certainly that of Wigmore who defined it as the 
greatest legal engine ever invented in discovering the truth. See Wigmore op cit para 
1367. Cf. S v Magwanyana and Others v Standard General Insurance Co Ltd. 1996 (1) 
SA 254 (D) for reference, and discussion of Wigmore's view. Broome DJP in 
Magwanyana deals with it as follows: 
The effectiveness of cross-examination in the search for the truth is something 
which has been proclaimed by a number of writers. Wigmore referred to cross-
examination as the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the 
truth'. Hoffmann and Zeffertt The South African Law of Evidence 4th ed at 456 
observed tersely that Wigmore probably never saw the engine in action in a South 
African Court in a case in which the witness speaks in Afrikaans counsel English 
and the accused understands nothing but Xhosa. I would add to this that Wigmore 
certainly never saw in action some of the pathetic and often unduly protracted 
attempt at cross-examination that courts in this country have all too often to 
endure.(At 257H-258B) 
Another opinion regarding the function of cross-examination is stated by Coleman. He 
considers it to be the method of eliminating and reducing any false conclusion at the end 





















method by which a party to an action probes the knowledge, recollection, bias and 
credibility of an adverse witness. 17 More in context, it is the process whereby the defence 
seeks: (a) to test the veracity and accuracy of the evidence in chief, given by the witness 
for the state; and (b) to elicit from the witness any relevant facts which may be favourable 
to the case for the defence. 18 
Witnesses may therefore be led and to a certain degree pushed or persuaded into positions 
contradicting their previous testimony or previous statements made to the police. The 
techniques used by cross-examiners to obtain a desired result are many and varied. 19 In 
fact any question may be asked in cross-examination as long as it is directed at exposing 
the errors, omissions, inconsistencies and improbabilities in their testimonies.20 This is 
not a difficult task if one bears in mind that much depends on the witness's knowledge of 
the facts, his intelligence, his interest or disinterest at the time of the event, his integrity 
d · 21 an veracity. 
One universal technique used by conscientious cross-examiners which illustrates that 
witnesses are at risk of contradicting themselves by merely getting into the witness box is 
the technique of 'fencing'. By using this technique a witness is led into the area of attack 
and surrounded with his own answers until he has no opening through which to escape 
when the critical question is finally asked.22 If this is done thoroughly and if the witness 
17 Paul B Weston et al Criminal Evidence for Police (1995) at 54. 
18 See Peter Murphy Murphy on Evidence 5 ed (1995) at 470-479. 
19 According to expert cross-examiners there are three primary areas of attack: 
perception, memory and candour. See generally Paul B Weston et al The Administration 
of Justice (1980) Chapter 9. 
20 See I M Hoffmann Handy Hints on Legal Practice South African ed (1997) at 1 70 
stating the following as the main objectives of practitioner's cross-examination: 
1. To destroy or weaken the force of the evidence against your client by the 
witness. This assumes that the witness's evidence is incorrect or incomplete but 
not deliberately false. 
2. To elicit something in your client's favour which the witness has omitted. 
3. To discredit the witness by showing him or her to be untrustworthy of belief. 
This assumes that his or her evidence is deliberately false. 
21 See generally Howard op cit at 251. 


















is insecure, the question will call for an answer which clearly shows the witness's lack of 
perception, or recollection. 
In an attempt to depict the vulnerability of witnesses in this 'gladiator's contest' I will 
refer specifically to those witnesses and victims that have to give testimony concerning 
an offence that is sexual in nature. 23 In the first instance the victim is required to relate in 
open court, in graphic detail, the particular abusive acts perpetrated upon him or her. This 
occurs in the presence of the alleged perpetrator. Thereafter the victim of the abuse is 
subjected to intensive, and at times protracted and aggressive, cross-examination by an 
accused or his legal representative. Experience has shown that this process instils fear, 
anxiety and high levels of stress amongst witnesses. Witnesses are on their own once they 
are cross-examined by the defence because neither the prosecutor nor_ the presiding 
officer can intervene or curtail the cross-examination exercised by the defence unless it 
exceeds the boundaries of justifiable cross-examination. Witnesses are isolated and very 
vulnerable in the circumstances. Studies24 have shown that witnesses experience this 
questioning as a further victimisation which may, consequently, be as traumatic and as 
damaging to the emotional and psychological well-being of these witnesses as the 
original victimisation. It is for these very reasons, that various jurisdictions, including 
South Africa, have introduced procedures and mechanisms to facilitate the reception of 
the evidence25 of young witnesses26 in proceedings like sexual offences and other 
offences . 
3.1.3 Control of cross-examination 
Can an abuse of the process be limited or controlled? A review of the case law 
concerning the control of cross-examination reveals ironically that unfair cross-
examination is primarily aimed at accused persons. This does not mean that witnesses 
other than the accused are not subjected to aimless, lengthy, rude and sometimes tedious 
23 Offences like rape, incest, indecent assault, sodomy and crimen iniuria. 
24 See A Allan 'Psigiese Gevolge van Verkragting' (1993) 6 SACJ 186 at 186. 
25 See s 170A of the CPA. 












cross-examination.27 Wigmore28 mentions with regard to the abuses of cross-examination 
that it can be remedied by proper control. In our criminal justice system this control can 
be exercised only by presiding officers. 
Presiding officers have a discretion to properly control and protect29 witnesses whilst 
being cross-examined. No party should therefore be permitted to intimidate any 
witness.30 In an accusatorial system, like South Africa's criminal justice system, it is 
expected of presiding officers to play a neutral role during the trial which, in conjunction 
with the principle that every accused person has a right to challenge evidence31 in court, 
leaves little room for such officers to restrain 'undue' cross-examination. Whilst in 
theory32 officers may limit offensive, humiliating and tormenting cross-examination, in 
practice it is no easy task to do so. There is a fine line between admissible harsh cross-
examination and inadmissible abusive cross-examination. Hence the cautious approach of 
presiding officers not to limit the defence in the exercise of their right to cross-
examination. A denial of this fundamental procedural right will, almost without exception 
lead to the finding being set aside33 on appeal. 34 It goes without saying that once an 
officer is exercising his/her discretion that it should be exercised judiciously and with due 
consideration of the important function of cross-examination throughout the process. 35 
27 See Wigmore op cit para 1367 in which he refers to the 'abuses, the mishandlings and 
the puerilities which are so often found associated with cross-examination'. 
28 Ibid. 
29 See S v Booi 1964 (1) SA ~24 (E) at 227H; S v De Vos 1964 2 PHO 20(0); S v Azov 
1974 (1) SA 808 (T); S v Gidi and Another 1984 (4) SA 537 (C); S v T 1986 (2) SA 112 
(O); S v Tswai 1988 (1) SA (C) at 858-859. 
30 See S v Hendricks 1997 (1) SACR 174 (C) at 177g-j. 
31 Sees 35(3)(f) of the Constitution. 
32 For the powers of the court see s 166(3) of the CPA. 
33 It is submitted that such a ruling must first be considered as irregular before an appeal 
court will intervene. Cf. Distillers Korporasie v Kotze 1956 (1) SA 557 (A); R v 
Ntshangela 1961 (4) SA 592 (A); Sv Green 1962 (3) SA 886 (A); SvNomtwana 1961 
(4) SA 174 (E); SvMakaula 1961 (4) SA 600 (E); Sv Cele 1965 (1) SA 82 (A). 
34 For appeals see generally sections 309-320 of the CPA. 
35 See R v Hepworth 1928 AD at 265: 
A criminal trial is not a game where one side is entitled to claim the benefit of any 
omission or mistake made by the other side and a Judge's position in a criminal 
trial is not merely that of an umpire to see that the rules of the game are observed 



















In S v Hendricks36 Van Reenen J relied on S v Gidi and Another37 in setting the limits 
of cross examination: 
A prosecutor should not bully an accused by insulting him, brow-beating 
him or adopting an overbearing attitude which admits of no contradiction 
by the accused of what is put to him. A prosecutor should not 
unnecessarily ridicule an accused or taunt him or offend his sensibilities or 
provoke him to anger, or play upon his emotions in order to place him at 
an unfair disadvantage and incapacitate him from answering questions to 
the best of his ability. In the case of many a witness it calls for no skill to 
intimidate or confuse or distress a witness who does not have the resources 
of intellect, language or personality to defend himself against a bullying 
prosecutor. Conduct of this kind offends against good manners, politeness 
and humanity. That is sufficient reason for refraining from such unseemly 
behaviour. 38 
One need not be a lawyer to know and understand that the tactics mentioned in the case 
of Hendricks are in fact a negation of the object and purpose of cross-examination. 
Bullying interrogation is not directed at an enquiry into the true facts, but is calculated to 
intimidate a witness into fearful or hopeless concessions or admissions, which may be 
untrue. Such examination may even prevent a witness from having an opportunity to 
supply a plausible explanation of some circumstance or circumstances for which there 
may be a logical or mitigating reason. Justice demands that witnesses be given a fair 
opportunity to answer questions put to them and courts should intervene if their answers 
are interrupted from the bar. Fair and just conduct of the trial should dictate that 
he has not only to direct and control the proceedings according to recognised rules 
of procedure but to see that justice is done. 
36 See supra n30. 
37 1984 (4) SA 537 (C). 
38 In S v Gidi and Another supra Rose-Innes J considered the duties of a cross-examining 



















subsequent questions not be posed before previous ones have been fully answered. In this 
regard it might be helpful to bear in mind the remarks made by Snyman J in S v Azov: 39 · 
I think it must be made clear to him, and perhaps to others, that witnesses 
who come into court, be they police witnesses or any other kind of 
witnesses, are entitled to the ordinary courtesy one extends to decent 
people. Witnesses who give evidence are assisting the court in arriving at 
the truth and carrying out the administration of justice. No cross-examiner 
is entitled to insult a witness or to treat him in the manner in which these 
witnesses were treated, without there being a very good reason for it. 
Witnesses must be treated with courtesy and respect. They are doing their 
public duty in coming to court. That must be borne in mind by cross-
examiners and by presiding officers. It was clearly the duty of the 
magistrate here to protect these witnesses. I do not wish to be understood 
to say that a witness may never be attacked, but before you can attack a 
witness you must at least lay a foundation to the satisfaction of the 
presiding officer that you have grounds for attacking the witness. 
Otherwise witnesses must be treated with respect and with the same 
courtesy that you would extend to a man in a civilised society.40 
Considering the nature of cross-examination and the limited protection afforded to 
witnesses it is regrettable that witnesses have to rely on the goodwill of presiding officers 
in deciding whether the line of cross-examination is fair towards them.41 The passive 
conduct demonstrated in the past by presiding officers when dealing with abuses in the 
system does not encourage witnesses to come forward and testify. The report of the 
Hoexter Commission42 pointed out that abuses in the system continue to exist and were 
on the increase: 
39 1974 (1) SA 808 (T). 
40 S v Azov supra at 810-811. 
41 See S v Nkilmine 1989 (2) SA 421 (NC). 
42 See Fifth and Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Structure and 



















Many witnesses drew the attention to the abuse of cross-examination in 
trial cases. Rambling, pointless and repetitious cross-examination not only 
considerably prolongs the trial, but if the decision of the trial court is 
appealed against, also makes the record of proceedings voluminous and 
exorbitantly expensive. The Commission is convinced that in the face of 
an increasing tendency towards inordinate and improper cross-
examination trial courts display altogether too much forbearance. 43 
It is submitted that despite' the findings of the Commission the abuses still occur and 
witnesses are not in an improved position despite the enactment of s 166(3) of the CPA.44 
The subsection provides as follows: 
(3)(a) If it appears to a court that any cross-examination contemplated in 
this section is being protracted unreasonably and thereby causing the 
proceedings to be delayed unreasonably, the court may request the cross-
examiner to disclose the relevancy of any particular line of examination 
and may impose reasonable limits on the examination regarding the length 
thereof or regarding any particular line of examination. 
( c) The court may order that any submission regarding the relevancy of the 
cross-examination be heard in the absence of the witness. 
The amendment addresses some of the concerns raised by the Commission but fails to 
protect witnesses sufficiently. Some protection is also given to witnesses through the bar 
rules45 of advocates, which are rules that are binding upon them as members of the 
profession.46 Non-compliance can be sanctioned by removal from the roll of advocates. 
43 Op cit Part II para 6.3.5.5 at 173-174. (Emphasis added.) 
44 Subsection (3) has been added bys 8 of Act 86 of 1996. 
45 These rules are rules of professional conduct as adopted by the General Council of the 
Bar. See WA Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa Vol 14 First Re-issue (1999) para 
258-262 for a discussion of the rules applicable to advocates. 
46 England and Wales, for example, have similar codes to regulate cross-examination. 
Thus the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales lays down the rules for the 











Important for the purposes of this discussion is that where an advocate has no belief in 
the truth of an assertion and has no evidence to support an assertion that he wants to 
make to a witness, then he is not entitled to put such an assertion to a witness during 
cross-examination.47 In a similar vein, questions regarding a witness's character should 
not be asked unless relevant to the actual enquiry.48 These rules are, however, only 
binding on members of the bar and do not bind the majority of legal practitioners that 
22.4.1. A barrister must exercise personal judgement upon the substance and 
purpose of questions asked and statements made. He is personally responsible for 
the conduct and presentation of his case in Court. 
22.4.2. A barrister must guard against being made the channel for questions or 
statements which are only intended to insult or annoy either the witness or some 
other person. 
22.8.1. A barrister may only suggest that a witness is guilty of fraud, misconduct 
or crime if such allegations go to a matter in issue which is material to the client's 
case. Where the only such matter is credibility of the witness the barrister must be 
satisfied as to the reasons for such allegations being made and that they are 
supported by reasonable grounds. A barrister may regard instructions from his 
professional client that such allegations are well-founded as reasonable grounds to 
support such allegations; but he may not only rely on a statement from any other 
person unless he has ascertained so far as is practicable that the person can give 
satisfactory reasons for his statement. 
22.8.2. A barrister may not in cross-examination attribute to another person the 
crime with which his client is charged unless he can do so in accordance with the 
principles set out in par 22. 8 .1. Neither may he do so in any other part of the trial, 
unless there are facts or circumstances which reasonably suggest the possibility 
that the crime may have been committed by the person to whom the guilt is 
imputed. 
22.9. A barrister may not impugn a witness by assertion in a speech unless in 
cross-examination he has given the witness the opportunity to answer the 
allegation 
47 See Bar rule 3.3.4 that reads: 
Such questions, whether or not the imputations they convey are well-founded, 
should only be put if, in the opinion of the cross-examiner, the answers would or 
might materially affect the credibility of the witness; and if the imputation 
conveyed by the question relates to matters so remote in time or of such a 
character that it would not affect the credibility of the witness, the question should 
not be put. 
48 See Bar rule 3.3.1 that reads: 
Questions which affect the credibility of a witness by attacking his character, but 
are not otherwise relevant to the actual enquiry, ought not to be asked unless the 
cross-examiner has reasonable grounds for thinking that the imputation is well-





















conduct cases in lower courts, namely attorneys. Attorneys have to obey the rules of their 
respective law societies, which are empowered to make rules that bind attorneys within 
the respective provinces. These rules, however, are not all the same: they vary in the 
extent and manner in which misconduct is prescribed by each law society.49 The rules of 
the Cape Law Society for example, do not regulate cross-examination in as much detail 
as the Bar Council rules do. so 
Witnesses cannot be assured that conduct by an attorney, regarded as improper in the one 
province will necessarily be regarded similarly in another province. Not only are the two 
branches of the profession governed by different rules, but also the different law societies 
are entitled to issue different rules for practitioners in each of their jurisdictions. It is 
submitted, from the perspective of witnesses, that their interests would be better served if 
only one code of conduct existed, binding all members of the legal profession51 and 
prescribing to all practitioners, irrespective of whether they practice as advocates or 
attorneys, proper conduct towards witnesses in court. 
Finally, one has to look at the constitutional implications of curtailing the accused's right 
to challenge evidence in court. It is foreseeable that an accused may allege that his fair 
trial rights have been violated if a presiding officer hampers him in the manner that he 
conducts his cross-examining. Should this occur, it is contended that it should not be 
open to an accused person to aver that his right to a fair trial has been infringed if the 
49 See WA Joubert op cit para 393 -400 for a discussion of professional misconduct of 
attorneys. 
50 The Cape Law Society Rules in terms of Rule 14.3, for example, provides that 
members should at all times conduct themselves in the following ways: 
14.3.1 maintain the highest standards of honesty and integrity; 
14.3.2 treat the interests of their clients as paramount, provided that their conduct 
shall be subject always to-
14.3.2.1 their duty to the court; 
14.3 .2.2 the interests of justice; 
14.3.2.3 the observation of the law; 
14.3.2.4 the maintenance of the ethical standards prescribed by this rule 
and generally recognised by the profession. 






















court intervenes to prevent his representative from conducting a bullying or intimidating 
form of cross-examination nor if it appears that his line of questioning is calculated to 
confuse the witness. It seems to be reasonably clear that a determination of whether a 
curtailment or limitation of cross-examination has resulted in the negation of the right to 
a fair trial, will depend upon the circumstances of each case.53 This proposition brings me 
to the submission that although witnesses may not be entitled to any rights in terms of s 
35 of the Constitution, they may as ordinary citizens claim their right to human dignity.54 
Abusive cross-examination may indeed impair witnesses' rights to dignity. Courts 
therefore need to be more considerate of the fact that a number of rights come into play 
when they regulate the exercise of cross-examination, and should not be overeager in the 
protection of only the offender's rights. Justice requires that magistrates and judges 
should overcome their present reluctance to exercise 'control' over abusive cross-
examination in order to make the trial process more fair for witnesses. 
3.1.4 Privilege attaching to witnesses' statements 
One method that was until very recently employed by the state in protecting state 
witnesses was to claim privilege in respect of the statements of these witnesses. The state 
could at least endeavour to protect witnesses called upon to testify in a criminal trial, by 
not disclosing the statements made to the police by these witnesses.55 Such non-
52 Howard op cit at 248. 
53 See Douglas v Alabama 380 US 415 (1965). In the aforementioned matter the state 
submitted a statement made by the co-accused even though the witness refused to 
acknowledge the correctness of the statement. The witness exercised his privilege against 
self-incrimination and refused to co-operate with the state. This conduct in essence 
denied the defence the opportunity to challenge his testimony and was considered to be 
an infringement of the defendant's right to confront the testimony as provided for in terms 
of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 
54 See s 10 of the Constitution that provides as follows: 
Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected. 
55 Prior to constitutionalisation, it was generally accepted that the state had a 'blanket 
docket privilege' in terms of which statements obtained for purposes of a criminal trial 
were as a rule privileged from disclosure. See R v Steyn 1954 (1) SA 324 (A) and 




















disclosure has been referred to as docket privilege.56 The effect of the privilege was to 
afford some protection in not disclosing their statements to the defence.57 Such non-
disclosure can no longer be claimed in respect of state witnesses' statements due to the 
fair trial provisions enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 58 Once again witnesses are 
in a disposition vis-a-vis the offender, because defence counsel will have the opportunity 
to study the statements made by them for purposes of the cross-examination, whereas no 
reciprocal duty of disclosure exists in respect of statements made by the off ender. 
A series of judgments59 has considered the constitutionality of 'docket- privilege' ,60 but 
Nortje and Another v Attorney-General and Another61 is of particular importance for 
this discussion because the state in its argument dealt with the most important reasons for 
upholding the docket privilege of state witnesses. The reasons forwarded by the state 
56 Privilege can be defined as a right that is vested in a juristic person to prevent the 
disclosure of admissible evidence. See generally Hoffmann and Zeffertt op cit at 236-
23 7; Schmidt op cit at 516 and Van Niekerk, Van der Merwe and Van Wyk Privilegies in 
die Bewysreg (1984) at para 1 2. Cf. S v Lwane 1966 (2) SA 433 at 438; S v Heyman 
1966 (4) SA 598 (A) at 610F. 
57 An exception existed where a witness for the state gave evidence, which differed from 
his statement made to the police in a material respect. In such a case the prosecutor was 
under an obligation to disclose the discrepancy to the court and to make the statement 
available to the defence for purposes of cross-examination. See S v Xaba 1982 (1) SA 
717 (A) at 728E-730D. 
58 In the matter of Shabala/av Attorney-General of Transvaal and Others 1995 (2) SACR 
761 (CC) the Court held that such a privilege conflicted withs 25(3) of the interim 
Constitution. 
59 See the following cases in which access to these statements was allowed: Qozeleni v 
Minister of Law and Order 1994 (3) SA 625 (E); S v Majavu 1995 (4) SA 265 (Ck); 
Khala v Minister of Safety and Security 1994 ( 4) SA 218 (W); Shabala/a v Attorney-
General Transvaal 1995 (1) SA 608 (T). Access was denied in the following cases; S v 
James 1994 (3) SA 881 (E); SvFani 1994 (3) SA 619 (E); SvKhoza 1994 (2) SACR 
611 (W); S v Dontas 1995 (1) SACR 473 (T); S v Thobejane 1995 (1) SACR 329 (T). Cf. 
S v Smile and Another 1998 ( 5) BCLR 519 (SCA) in which the court a quo ordered 
access to the contents of the police docket pursuant to the judgment of Shabalala and 
Others v Attorney-General of Transvaal and Another supra even though access was 
initially denied. 
60 See P J Schwikkard 'Access to police dockets - confusion reigns' (1994) 3 SA CJ 323; 
W du Plessis 'Toegang tot polisiedossiere' (1994) 3 SACJ 307. 
61 1995 (1) SACR 446 (C). See also in this regard Khala v Minister of Safety and Security 
1994 (2) SACR 361 (W); Phato v Attorney-General Eastern Cape and another 1994 (2) 




















included: (a) the danger that an accused might manufacture evidence or tailor his case so 
as to fit that of the state; (b) the fact that he would be in a better position to tamper with 
witnesses; ( c) the fact that inadequacies and inaccuracies that tend to be found in 
witnesses' statements provide targets for cross-examination, with the result that the truth 
is obscured rather than revealed; and ( d) the fact that witnesses might be reluctant to 
make statements if they knew that these statements would be handed to the accused. 
Marais J held: 
The risks presented in (a) and (b) existed but had to be seen in perspective 
and were in any event risks that were present in all those cases in which 
preparatory examinations were held in the past. Courts were aware of the 
problems arising in ( c) and could make allowance for them. As to ( d) the 
potential witness would in the majority of cases appreciate that he would 
eventually have to give evidence in a court and that he would not be 
deterred from making a statement by the mere fact that his statement 
would be handed over to the defence. Furthermore, the privilege, which 
operated as a blanket exclusionary mechanism, could not be saved by the 
limitation section, section 33 of the Constitution. 
The confusion that existed with regard to the accused's right to a fair trial, has been 
finally settled by the Constitutional Court. The Court held that the privilege was not 
strong enough to be saved by the limitation clause. Mahomed DP, as he then was, 
decided in Shabalala & Others v Attorney-General Transvaal & Another62 that the 
privilege was not consistent with the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial, as 
embodied ins 25(3) of the Constitution.63 
62 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC). 
63 Sees 25(3) of the interim Constitution that provided as follows: 
Every accused person shall have the right to a fair trial, which shall include 
the right-






















It was held further that the accused has the right of access to witnesses' statements but 
that the state may refuse to disclose these if disclosure is not required in order to afford 
the accused a fair trial. Several factors may be taken into account in considering a request 
for the disclosure of the statements, for example, 'the simplicity of the case, either on the 
law or on the facts or both, the degree of particulars furnished in terms of s 144 of the 
CPA or in terms of s 87 of the CPA. '64 The accused may have access to the relevant parts 
of the police docket even in cases where the particulars furnished might be sufficient to 
enable the accused to understand the charge against him or her but in the special 
circumstances of the case it might not enable the defence to prepare its own case 
sufficiently.65 The court held that the accused does not have the right to consult with state 
witnesses if they themselves object, or if the state can prove that it has reasonable 
grounds to believe such consultation might lead to the intimidation of the witness or 
tampering with his evidence or that it might lead to the disclosure of state secrets or the 
identity of informers or that it might otherwise prejudice the proper ends of justice. 
In a review of the judgment it would be appropriate to infer that in certain instances the 
state would be entitled to oppose a disclosure of the witnesses' statements.66 Yet, 
Mahomed DP went further in his judgment, stating that even if the prosecution succeeds 
in its assertion that there is a reasonable risk that the disclosure of statements at a 
particular stage might impede the proper ends of justice and the court grants such non-
disclosure, it does not follow that the relevant statements or documents will necessarily 
remain forever protected throughout the course of the trial.67 He used the example of the 
intimidated witness who will refuse to testify if his or her identity becomes known to the 
defence. The judge maintained that such objection does not necessarily apply once the 
witness has given evidence in chief, because by that time his identity will obviously be 
known to the defence. He found that: 
64 Shabala/a supra at 743E-F. 
65 Shabala/a supra at 743F-G. 
66 It is conceivable that disclosure might be withheld where a disclosure of the 
information would prejudice the police's investigation methods or in instances where 



















There might in such circumstances be no justification for refusing to allow 
the defence to have access to the statement of the witness for the purpose 
of enabling it to test the consistency of that statement with his or her 
evidence in chie/8 or any other assertions the witness might make during 
cross-examination. 69 
It is appreciated that a 'blanket' denial to information in possession of the State might 
infringe upon the rights of the accused to a fair trial, but in the face of no reciprocal duty 
on the defence, such disclosure just adds to the vulnerability of state witnesses in the 
witness box. Once more witnesses have to rely on the court exercising its discretion70 in 
their favour if they do not want their statements to be disclosed and that can only happen 
once there are sufficient grounds not to disclose those statements. 
3.2 Penal powers of the court with regard to recalcitrant witnesses 
In an analysis of the state's artillery that may be utilised when dealing with witnesses 
who are unwilling to testify when called upon, it is of paramount importance to 
distinguish between recalcitrant witnesses and witnesses impeached in terms of s 190 of 
the CPA.71 A recalcitrant witness is a witness who becomes unwilling to testify for the 
67 Shabala/a supra at 752B-C. 
68 This part of the judgment is emphasised because it so clearly reflects the reason why 
witnesses are at such a disadvantage when testifying in court. In reality the defence is 
armed with their statements to test their recollection of the events sentence by sentence 
whilst little attention is paid to the circumstances under which such statements were made 
to the police. 
69 Shabala/a supra at 785F-G. 
70 It is submitted that the discretion referred to by Mahomed DP is not a true exercise of 
discretion against which there are only limited grounds of appeal. Cf. Du Toit et al op cit 
at 23-420. 
71 Section 190 of the CPA provides as follows: 
( 1) Any party may in criminal proceedings impeach or support the credibility of 
any witness called against or on behalf of such party in any manner in which and 
by any evidence by which the credibility of such witness might on the thirtieth 
day of May, 1961, have been impeached or supported by such party. 
(2) Any such party who has called a witness who has given evidence in any such 















state for a variety of reasons, whilst the latter gives testimony that is inconsistent with a 
previous statement. 72 The procedure applied by the state once it is proved that a witness 
has made a previous inconsistent statement, would be to discredit the witness. Witnesses 
would, however, be given the opportunity to advance credible reasons 73 to the court so as 
to explain the inconsistency in their testimony and the court might still accept their 
evidence after such explanation. 
Recalcitrant witnesses are, however, dealt with in terms of s 189 of the CPA. The 
provision finds application when witnesses refuse to be sworn or where witnesses having 
been sworn refuse to co-operate and answer questions put to them. Should witnesses fail 
to co-operate in any of the aforementioned ways they may be imprisoned in terms of the 
section. 74 Section 189 75 of the CPA empowers the court to institute a summary 76 enquiry 
to the party calling him), may, after such party or the court has asked the witness 
whether he did or did not previously make a statement with which his evidence in 
the said proceedings is consistent, and after sufficient particulars of the alleged 
previous statement to designate the occasion when it was made have been given 
to the witness, prove that he previously made a statement with which such 
evidence is inconsistent. 
72 Generally a party calling a witness may not cross-examine his own witness but once a 
witness has been discredited by the party calling him and declared hostile, that party 
would be entitled to cross-examine him. See S v Dolo 1975 (1) SA 641 (Tk); S v Steyn 
1987 (1) SA 353 (W). 
73 It is envisaged that the following would be considered to be a credible reason, i.e. that 
the witness wanted to protect the accused or that he was a co-accused but has since been 
granted immunity and now wants to tell the truth. 
74 Similar provisions are to be found in the Companies Act 61 of 1973 vide s 418( 5); the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1963 vide s 66(3 ); and s 11 of the Constitutional Court 
Complementary Act 13 of 1995. Cf. De Lange v Smuts NO and Others 1997 (11) BCLR 
1553 (C) in which the court held that the provisions of s 66(3) of the Insolvency Act 24 
of 1963 constitute an impermissible limitation on the right contained in s 12( 1 )(b) of the 
Constitution and therefore are unconstitutional. 
75 In S v Wessels 1966 (3) SA 737 (C), Van Zyl J considered the development and the 
rationale behinds 189, previously s 212 of Act 56 of 1955. He held that the provision 
could be traced back to the Roman Dutch law as well as the English Law. He further 
surmised that under Roman Dutch law the procedure that existed for a witness to be 
brought before the court was through the obtainment of a 'mandamus van tuygen'. If the 
person cited then failed without a just excuse to attend the court or attended the court but 
refused to testify, he was imprisoned for contempt of court with the object of compelling 
him to testify. Furthermore, English law recognised the duty to testify and by means of a 

























into the refusal of such witness to testify. Should the court find that such a person does 
not have a 'just excuse' for his refusal, it may sentence the witness to a maximum 
imprisonment of 2 years or where the criminal proceedings relate to an offence referred 
to in Part III 77 of schedule 2 of the Act, to a maximum of five years imprisonment. 
Section 189 deals with three types of person, namely: 
(i) a person who refuses to be sworn or to make an affirmation as 
a witness; 
(ii) a person who has sworn or has made an affirmation as a witness, 
but refuses to answer a question put to him; or 
(iii) a person who has been sworn or has made an affirmation as a witness 
but refuses or fails to produce any book, paper or document required 
to be produced by him. 
It should be apparent that there may be many reasons why persons refuse or fail to 
answer questions in any of the aspects set out above. The law, however, only pardons 
those who have a 'just excuse'. It is not a witness's prerogative to determine whether he 
has sufficient justification for refusing to testify or for failing to submit the necessary 
documents.78 For instance: as regards category (i) an obvious reason why a person may 
the Roman Dutch law by the use of the 'mandament van tuygen' and contempt 
proceedings where the proposed witness failed to obey the mandament. See Wessels 
supra at 739B-E. 
76 A summary enquiry occurs where witness is not formally charged but the proceedings 
still remain judicial proceedings, even though it does not constitute a criminal trial. 
77 Offences mentioned in part III are sedition, public violence, arson, murder, 
kidnapping, childstealing, robbery, housebreaking, contravention of the provisions of 
section 1 and IA of the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982; or any conspiracy, incitement or 
attempt to commit any of the aforementioned offences. 
78 Cf. Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) O'Regan J 
at 514A-C: 
All modem societies require the assistance of members of the community in 
facilitating the administration of justice. Inevitably the obligations thus placed on 
witnesses can be inconvenient and at times unpleasant. In certain circumstances 
giving evidence to a court or commission may even put the witness at risk of 
some disadvantage such as civil liability. The overwhelming interest of society is 























refuse to testify, recognised since early days, is his state of health. Thus a person who is 
required to be a witness may show that it would be severely detrimental to his health to 
testify. This would amount to a Just excuse'. In addition the book, paper or document 
which the witness is required to produce under category (iii) may be of very slight 
relevance, and the cost or trouble involved in obtaining it and bringing it to court 
extensive. Can it be supposed that the legislature would have intended that such 
circumstances, however extreme, could never amount to a just cause? I do not think so. It 
is possible to imagine many circumstances in which the failure of a person to comply 
with his testimonial duties would be generally regarded as blameless, and his punishment 
for such failure as unjust. A Just excuse'79 in terms of s 189 should therefore not be 
confined to matters of privilege, compellability and admissibility alone. In S v Heyman80 
the purpose of the section was fully explained by Steyn CJ: 
In deciding whether or not to be sworn or to affirm, he would have to 
consider whether or not to he would have a just excuse for refusal. 
Although technically, if he should refuse, he would not be an accused, his 
refusal without a just excuse would there and then expose him to 
punishment. In the decision he has to take, he is face to face with 
consequences ordinarily attached to serious offences, namely a sentence of 
imprisonment of up to twelve months, without the option of a fine. To 
avoid this penalty, he must either take the oath or affirm and give 
evidence, or else he must tender a just excuse. The latter is not a self-
explanatory concept, not even to a lawyer and certainly not to a layman. If 
he refuses he is called upon to present the equivalent of a defence to a 
charge in a criminal case. It goes without saying that he is entitled to be 
heard, and, if he is entitled to be heard in person, I know of no ground 
upon which he could be denied the right to assistance by his counsel or 
justice is not prevented. 
79 As to what will constitute a 'just excuse', see Hoffmann and Zeffertt The South African 
Law of Evidence 4 ed (1988) at 369-370; Schmidt Bewysreg 2 ed (1989) at 221-223; Du 
Toit et al op cit at 23-15 to 23-16A. 





















attorney accorded to every person entitled to be heard in judicial 
proceedings which may result in a judgment imposing a punishment. 81 
The following requirements would have to be met before witnesses may be sentenced to 
imprisonment in terms of this section:82 the witness must have refused to take the oath or 
to testify, the presiding officer must have held an enquiry into the refusal; and there must 
have been no 'just excuse' 83 for the witness's failure to do so. 
A presiding officer is afforded a discretion to determine whether an excuse advanced by a 
witness for his or her refusal is just or not. What is quite significant about this section is 
that 'just excuse' does not include fear of being branded as a traitor84 by friends nor 
refusal to testify because of strict religious or political convictions. It is submitted that 
although the aforementioned reasons may be regarded by the general public as 'lawful 
excuses', it should not to be considered as 'just' in terms of this provision. In determining 
the meaning of the term Just excuse', it is accepted that courts interpret the term to mean 
more than just an 'lawful excuse'.85 
Because human affairs are so unpredictable in their diversity, it will be required of a 
court, when asked to apply s 189, to decide each case on its own merits, having regard to 
the general principles underlying this section. Section 189 of the CPA is applied both to 
enquiries and to trials. In ascertaining its meaning, regard must be had accordingly to its 
role in both sets of circumstances. If there is a greater chance of acceptable excuses 
existing for a refusal to testify before an enquiry, it would widen the ambit of 
circumstances in which an injustice would be done. If a restricted meaning is accorded to 
a Just excuse' at a trial rather than at an enquiry, an increased likelihood exists that the 
legislature would not have intended such a meaning. 
81 S v Heyman supra at 604A. 
82 S v Seals 1990 (1) SACR 38 (C). 
83 The concept 'just excuse' is not defined in the CPA. 
84 See S v Govender and Others 1967 (2) SA 121 (N). 






















For the reasons set out I contend that the expression 'just excuse' in s 189 has a wider 
connotation than merely embracing excuses arising from the rules of evidence. It is, 
however, not possible to define the term 'just excuse'. Courts should therefore not use the 
'humanly intolerable' formulation as a general test only, even though it is useful as a 
factor in determining whether a recalcitrant witness had a 'just excuse' not to testify. The 
enquiry should be a factual enquiry based on the special reasons forwarded by the 
particular witness. 
Prime examples of the unsatisfactory position witnesses have to face are reflected by 
reviewing the case law. One case in particular, namely the case of S v Nkosi86 reveals the 
vulnerability of a witness confronted with the penal powers of the court by virtue of s 189 
of the CPA. In Nkosi the witness was illiterate and unlikely to be aware of a right to legal 
representation or to request an adjournment to obtain such and the magistrate failed to 
advise the witness of such a right. The witness was called as a witness for the 
prosecution, and at a point during the trial, declined to answer a proper question put to 
him by the prosecutor, and thereafter remained silent. Consequently the magistrate 
conducted an investigation in terms of s 189 of the CPA whereupon the witness remained 
silent throughout the enquiry proceedings. 
For his pains, the witness earned himself a two-year prison sentence. On appeal, the issue 
was whether the Court was under a duty to inform a recalcitrant witness such as the 
appellant of his right to be legally represented before going on to try him for a 
contravention of s 189 of the CPA and whether such intimation vitiated the proceedings. 
On appeal it was held that there was no reason in logic or fairness for depriving a witness 
facing an enquiry under s 189 of the CPA of the right to legal representation afforded to 
an accused in terms of s 73 of the CPA and that the witness under the circumstances 
should have been informed of this right. 
The arguments put forward by the state in Nkosi warrant closer scrutiny, particularly in 
light of recent case law. The state argued that the court was justified in not informing the 
























witness of his right to legal representation by pointing to the differences between a person 
charged in the ordinary way and a witness whose conduct is summarily investigated. 
According to counsel for the state an ordinary accused is brought to court by arrest or 
warning and a witness was not. An accused is entitled to a properly formulated charge; a 
witness not. An accused is confronted by evidence; a witness not. An accused's guilt must 
be established beyond reasonable doubt; a witness is deemed to have made himself liable 
to imprisonment unless he can advance a 'just excuse' for his refusal. An accused is 
opposed by a prosecutor and tried by the court, whilst a witness has to face inquiry by the 
court only. An accused cannot be punished more than once for his offence; a recalcitrant 
witness if he persists in his refusal can be sentenced again and yet again in terms of s 
189(2) of the CPA. A convicted accused sentenced to imprisonment serves out his 
sentence, subject only to interference on appeal or review; a witness in terms of s 189(3) 
of the CPA can earn remission of his sentence from the very court sentencing him. All of 
this then goes, according to the state, to show that the witness does not fall into the same 
category as an accused person. 
It was submitted that a recalcitrant witness is sui generis and as such is not entitled to 
avail himself of the rights conferred bys 73 of the CPA. The nub of the state's argument 
is to be found in the words of the section. It provides: 
73 Accused entitled to assistance after arrest and at criminal proceedings. 
( 1) An accused who is arrested, whether with or without warrant, 
shall, subject to any law relating to the management of prisons, be entitled 
to the assistance of his legal adviser from the time of his arrest. 
(2) An accused shall be entitled to be represented by his legal adviser at 
criminal proceedings, if such legal adviser is not in terms of any law 
prohibited from appearing at the proceedings in question.87 
Counsel acting on behalf of the state argued that the witness is demonstrably not an 
accused in terms of s 73 of the CPA. Should any doubt still exist regarding the status of 
87 Emphasis added. 
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the witness, it was argued that the phrase 'criminal proceedings' contemplates a trial in 
only the conventional sense and not a summary procedure under s 189 of the CPA. 88 
What makes this argument so attractive is that the Constitutional Court in the matter of 
Nel v Le Roux and Others89 made the same distinction between accused persons and 
examinees in terms of s 205 of the CPA but for different reasons.90 
Turning back to Nkosi, counsel acting on behalf of the accused made the cogent point 
that, on the State's argument, a witness facing an enquiry under s 189 of the CPA would 
be gravely disadvantaged compared with an ordinary accused. The ordinary incidence of 
criminal onus is subverted and the burden is on the witness to offer a 'just excuse' for his 
conduct. After consideration of counsel's arguments, as set out above, the court held that 
the need to advise a witness of his rights is greater in matters like the one before the court 
where no reason whatever can be seen for the witness's actions. A failure to inform a 
witness of his right to legal representation would render the right nugatory.91 Fortunately 
Alexander J held that there is no reason in logic or fairness for depriving a witness facing 
an enquiry under s 189 of a right that may be claimed by an accused, namely the right to 
legal representation. 
The matter of Nkosi illustrates how the courts may fail witnesses. In the case the court 
was confronted with a witness with an inexplicable attitude and a situation that seemingly 
cried out for something to be done on the witness's behalf. Yet the court proceeded to 
exercise its penal power without even informing the witness of a right to legal 
representation and sentenced the witness to two years imprisonment._ It is trite that in any 
community, whatever its composition, the proper administration of justice requires that 
the dignity and authority of the courts be upheld. To permit witnesses to refuse to answer 
88 See R v Hlengwa 1958 (4) SA 160 (N) at 164; S v Heyman and Another 1966 (4) SA 
598 (A) at 6010; S v Sexwale and Others (I) 1978 (2) SA 363 (A) at 365D-H; S v 
Swanepoel 1979 (1) SA 478 (A) at 489H et seq. 
89 1996 (1) SACR 572 (CC). 
9° For a discussion of this case see infra. 
91 See S v Radebe 1988 ( 1) SA 191 (T); S v Rudman and Others 1989 (3) SA 368 (E); S v 
Mthwana 1989 ( 4) SA 361 (N) and for a more recent approach see S v Lombard 1994 (3) 



















questions without good reason is to make a mockery of justice but to incarcerate them to 
a maximum of two years of imprisonment is not an inducement to testify. 
The following propositions made by Wigmore92 in support of courts punitive powers 
when dealing with recalcitrant witnesses are to be considered. First, it is extremely 
important from society's point of view that potential witnesses should give relevant 
evidence on matters within their knowledge.93 Secondly, all privileges arising from the 
duty to testify are exceptional, and must be discountenanced. Thirdly, a duty rests on 
each member of society to make his knowledge available to courts of law even if this 
means a sacrifice of his privacy or would have other disagreeable consequences for 
h
. 94 1m. 
In consideration of the liability under this section of witnesses to co-operate and testify, it 
is argued that courts should not overemphasise the interests of the community in holding 
the witnesses liable for not testifying. It goes almost without saying that the public 
interest in the availability of evidence must be weighed up against the inconveniences 
which the witness is likely to suffer if he has to testify. It is questionable whether the 
public interest should be accorded more weight than that of the individual in striking a 
balance.95 
Any court holding any enquiry should bear in mind the words of Chief Justice Steyn in S 
v Weinberg,96 namely that the excuse tendered would have to be of sufficient cogency, 
taking all the circumstances into consideration, for the witness to be absolved from the 
duty not to withhold the truth from the court.97 It follows that, if this was not so, the 
92 See J H Wigmore Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law 3 ed Vol 8 (1940) para 2285 at 527. 
93 Schermbrucker v Klindt NO 1965 (4) SA 606 (A) at 615G-H. 
94 S v Maduna 1978 (2) SA 777 (D) at 783E-H and S v Leepile and Others(6) 1990 (3) 
SA 988 (W) at 995D-G. 
95 See R v Packer 1966 (2) SA 56 (RA). 
96 1966 (4) SA 660 (A) at 666A. 
97 The dictum of Steyn CJ was endorsed by Grosskopf JA in Kader supra at 737D-F: 
For the reasons set out above I consider that the expression 'just excuse' ins 189 













underlying statutory intention of the aforesaid s 189 of the CPA would simply be 
defeated. Moreover, a court should not lose sight of the principle stated by Wigmore and 
quoted with approval in Schermbrucker v Klindt No98 that: 
The vital process of justice must continue unceasingly: a single cessation 
typifies the prostration of society: a series would involve its dissolution.99 
In the present context, it seems wrong to describe the duty to testify as 'paramount' in 
each and every case because this would suggest that it would always, and in all 
circumstances, prevail over any excuse which an unwilling witness might offer. That 
would, of course, not be correct. This section would not be seen as so unjust by witnesses 
if they could as of right demand witness protection from the state. Such protection would 
be a more balanced approach, than to expect of witnesses to testify under circumstances 
where they really fear for their lives. The words of Eloff DJP eloquently summarise the 
basis for such an approach: 
On the facts of the present case I do not think that appellant No 1 had a 
just reason not to testify. Even if he had reason to fear for his safety and 
for that of his family, the demands of society and the interests of the 
' 
administration of justice require that he should nevertheless give evidence. 
I share the feeling of sympathy of the regional magistrate with appellant 
No 1 who may, after giving evidence, have to rely on possible inadequate 
police protection, or, as he said, have to leave the Witbank area. But more 
is at stake than the allayment of the fears of appellant No 1. 100 
privilege admissibility and compellability. And for the purposes of the present 
case it seems to me that we should follow as the Court a quo did the suggestion 
by Steyn CJ in Weinberg's case supra and hold that it would amount to a 'just 
excuse' if a witness were to find himself in circumstances in which it would be 
humanly intolerable to have to testify. This seems to me the type of circumstance 
which the Legislature must have had in mind in speaking of a 'just excuse'. 
98 1965 (4) SA 606 (A). 


















. The Constitutional Court has had cause recently to consider the meaning of the term 'just 
excuse' .101 The Court was called upon to decide the constitutionality of s 205 102 of the 
CPA. It held that the answer to any question put. to an examinee at an examination in 
terms of s 205 of the CPA, would infringe upon the examinee' s fundamental rights, only 
if such infringement would constitute a 'just excuse' for the purposes of s 189 of the 
CPA, unless the compulsion to answer the question would, in the circumstances, 
constitute a limitation on such right which is justified in terms of the limitations clause. It 
is submitted that, in view of the decision of the court in Nel, courts should in future 
consider the meaning of 'just excuse' by having regard to the provisions of s 39(2) of the 
Constitution, i.e. by considering 'the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights', in 
interpreting 'just excuse'. Greater certainty could, however, be brought about for 
witnesses if the concept were to be defined in terms of the CPA. 103 
100 S v Moloto and Others 1991 (1) SACR 617 (T) at 621. 
101 In Nel v Le Roux supra. 
102 This section is very relevant to any discussion of s 189 of the CPA, in thats 205(3) of 
the CPA provides for the same summary incarceration procedure, ass 189 of the CPA. 
See discussion 2.2 supra. 

























4.1 Bail - and its implication for victims and witnesses of crime 
Since the adoption of a new constitutional order in 1994 a perception has arisen amongst 
the public that bail is granted too easily, and that those accused that are released on bail 
commit serious offences once they are released from custody. 1 Bail has become a 
controversial issue for a number of reasons. One of these is that victims and witnesses are 
not sufficiently protected in the system, and that unless accused persons are incarcerated 
before the trial these witnesses will remain vulnerable to intimidation and pressures from 
the accused. Bail becomes even more complex if one bears in mind that one is dealing 
with two competing and opposing interests. On the one hand there is the interest of the 
accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and on the other hand there are the 
rights of witnesses and society at large to be protected against hardened criminals and to 
see that each case reaches its conclusion without any undue delay. 
Wide-ranging criticisms were levelled at bail practices by the public soon after the 
interim Constitution came into operation. One of the most repeated criticisms was that the 
Constitution was to be blamed for the fact that bail was being granted too readily by the 
courts. It was claimed that the granting of bail could indirectly be blamed for the crime 
wave that had struck the country. This perception of 'easy bail' was also shared by 
practitioners, like the Western Cape Attorney-General, Adv Frank Khan, who said with 
reference to bail: 
We are subject to a system weighing heavily in favour of the liberty of the 
individual. The Constitution, in the process of protecting individual 
1 See South African Law Commission Report entitled Bail Reform in South Africa Project 


















liberties, might depending on court interpretation favour criminals to the 
detriment of the very society it seeks to serve. 2 
In an address that dealt with certain problems relating to bail that existed after the interim 
Constitution had come into operation, the former Attorney-General of the Witwatersrand, 
Adv Klaus von Lieries und Wilkau, said that the following problems were being 
experienced by his office with regard to bail cases. First, that prosecutors had insufficient 
time to investigate relevant facts pertaining to the accused. This fact was exacerbated by 
the situation that an accused could also virtually demand an instantaneous bail hearing.3 
The second problem was that prosecutors needed orientation and training4 concerning 
bail matters. Thirdly, he maintained that presiding officers needed to be better informed 
as to what was expected of them. 
One of the criticisms levelled at the Constitution was that the degree of protection 
afforded to accused persons was responsible for the disarray in the justice system, 
especially since it resulted in bail being granted too easily. The legislature responded 
rapidly to this criticism by enacting new bail legislation in the form of the Criminal 
Procedure Amendment Act,5 which came into operation on 21 September 1995. The 1995 
Act not only improved the position for victims of crime, but also changed the bail law 
quite extensively. The Act came at a time when it was very much needed to balance the 
rights of victims and witnesses with those of the accused. These amendments came into 
2 See 'Easy Bail' The Citizen 6 September 1994 at 6. 
3The following matters need to be investigated and are cited by him: the question of the 
true identity of the accused, the question of the criminal bureau checking outstanding 
warrants, the question of investigating any possible previous jail breaks by the accused, 
bail breaches and so forth, a nationality check - question whether the accused is South 
African citizen and/or whether he could obtain asylum in a foreign country, the mobility 
of the accused, his access to overseas travel, his list of previous convictions, his 
personality type and his personal circumstances. The investigation of these matters 
requires time. See paper delivered at the National Consultative Legal Forum, Cape Town, 
11 -13 November 1994, by Adv K von Lieries und Wilkau. 
4 As for the perception that prosecutors lack training see a more recent view by H 
Combrinck 'Access to justice and the prosecutorial authority' ( 1996) 21 Journal for 
Juridical Science 128. 
























operation after a thorough investigation by the South African Law Commission, which in 
its discussion of the problems concerning bail,6 stated inter alia that any invasion of the 
freedom of the individual had to be weighed up against the sound administration of 
justice and the interests of the community. The Law Commission in its report emphasised 
that the collection of information should form an important part of a bail application, and 
that bail proceedings should therefore be conducted in an inquisitorial manner. These 
concerns as stated and identified by the Law Commission relate to the core issue which 
will be discussed in this chapter, viz whether the system can sufficiently protect witnesses 
without compromising the accused's right to liberty. 
The controversy regarding bail did not stop after 1995, despite the fact that adequate 
legislation was in place to protect the rights of witnesses. The public remained convinced 
that the right to bail was to be blamed for the increase in crime, and this belief was 
strengthened by one case in particular, concerning a victim called Mamokgethi 
Male bane. 7 This case sparked an outcry from the community that courts failed to protect 
innocent victims, by granting bail to hardened criminals without recognising the rights of 
victims. 8 Questions were asked why suspects, like the murderer of Mamogethi Male bane, 
and others, were being granted bail by the courts. Suggestions were made that the bail 
law should be tightened to make it more difficult for accused persons to be released on 
bail. Government's response to these calls for vengeance, however, was to amend the bail 
law. This change to the law was effected by the enactment of the 1997 Criminal 
Procedure Second Amendment Act.9 This legislation will be examined together with 
other reforms to determine whether the legislation was reasonable and in the interest of 
victims and witnesses. 
6 See op cit chap 2. 
7 The victim in this case, Mamogethi Malebane, was killed by the accused, Dan Mabote, 
shortly before she had to testify against him. The accused was released by the court on 
bail of R2000 despite the fact that the police were investigating two other matters of rape 
against him and that the police had opposed the bail application in the matter. 
8 See 'Justice betrayal of innocence' The Weekly Mail and Guardian 9 May 1997 at 9; 
'Selmaats slaan manna moord op kind' Die Burger 2 August 1997 at 4. 











Whether there has ever been a legitimate reason for the public to lose faith in the bail 
system can only be assessed once the law relating to bail has been examined. 10 However, 
it must be acknowledged that the South African public and victims of crime without a 
doubt had sufficient reason to be disappointed in the justice system as a whole. 11 
I shall now consider the concept of bail, the statutory provisions governing bail and 
finally the case law pertaining to bail. In an analysis of the statutory provisions I shall 
examine all reforms to the bail legislation over the past ten years to determine whether 
the legislation sufficiently protected the rights of witnesses and victims and whether these 
reforms impacted positively or negatively on the system as a whole. The final aspect to 
be discussed will be other more innovative ways and means of addressing the 
10 It is submitted that the real reason for bail being granted too readily was not inadequate 
bail legislation but rather inadequate application of the law by prosecutors and 
magistrates. See Memorandum on the objects of the Criminal Procedure Second 
Amendment Bill 84 of 1997. Specifically para 2, which reads as follows: 
Although the present bail system works reasonably well and a balance is struck 
between the interests of the offenders and those of the victims and society as a 
whole, there is still vehement criticism against the bail system. There is a 
perception, as well as indications, that persons who have committed serious 
offences are released on bail too easily, or that persons who are released on bail 
commit serious offences whilst on bail. There are also allegations that police 
officials, prosecutors and magistrates are not properly trained or that they do not 
show the necessary understanding during the consideration of bail applications. 
(Emphasis added). 
11 IDA SA, in a survey amongst people of the Cape Flats, confirmed that South Africa's 
criminal justice system carries a predominantly negative image amongst the people of the 
Cape Flats. Those that had actually been victims of crime had much more negative 
evaluations of the courts and the police because of their direct experiences. The following 
perceptions are important for purposes of this critique. First, regarding the courts: 43% of 
the people thought that the courts are giving appropriate sentences, whilst 32% of the 
people thought that the courts are giving the right decisions. More disturbing than the 
perceptions just mentioned is the perception of the very same people, on the treatment 
they received from the courts in particular: 23% were of the view that the courts treated 
them fairly and 59% were of the opinion that no fair decisions are made by the courts. 
Furthermore, 68% of the people participating felt that they would not be safe even whilst 
testifying in court. Finally, only 27% of the people participating in the survey approved 
of the courts' performance. See IDASA's Report on Community Responses to Crime on 


















inadequacies of the bail system and the advantages that these innovations and 
recommendations may hold for witnesses and victims of crime. 
4.2 Historical overview 
Bail can be defined in our law as the practice of releasing an accused before a trial on the 
accused's promise to return. 12 Such promise is then secured by some form of collateral, 
such as money, that the accused pays to the court and which the court can retain if he 
does not appear for trial. Van der Berg13 explains that bail developed out of English law 
which provided that an accused had to pay an amount of money to the complainant as 
temporary damages to prevent family feuds and self-help. The money was then given 
back to the accused if he was acquitted. It was only later that the emphasis shifted to bail, 
in that the accused had to pay money for his freedom with an undertaking that he would 
attend the trial at the appointed time. Other scholars, like Terblanche, 14 argue that bail is 
sui generis and not analogous to any other concept in our law. 
One can therefore say that the rationale underlying the right to bail derived from the 
principle that every person has a right to personal freedom and liberty. Such personal 
freedom is acknowledged in all Western democracies. 15 Our bail process is also 
12 See R v Wilson alias Gannon 1914 TPD 5 at 6. 
13 J van der Berg Bail -A Practitioner's Guide (1986) at 2. 
14 See S Terblanche 'Borgtog 'n labirintiese doolhof (1988) 2 SACJ280 at 287. 
15 The right to bail is recognised in article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Article 11 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is the 
perhaps the most important international provision as it is widely seen as a statement of 
the international law rules governing a fair trial. For this reason its provisions have been 
adopted by the international tribunals established to try persons for human rights 
violations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and by the International Law 
Commission in its proposals for a permanent International Criminal Court. Article 14 
provides: 'Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law.' The right to bail before trial is rooted 
ultimately in chapter 39 of the Magna Carta, which states: 'No free man shall be taken, 























consistent with the presumption of innocence. This is a substantive principle of 
fundamental justice which protects the fundamental rights of liberty and human dignity of 
any person accused by the state of committing a crime. 16 It should be borne in mind, even 
at the baii application that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the accused is guilty of the offence with which he or she is charged and that, 
until the prosecution so proves, 17 the accused must be presumed to be innocent. 18 This 
presumption of innocence19 is a fundamental principle recognised in most criminal justice 
systems.20 This then explains why courts will generally grant bail whenever possible and 
why courts will even lean in favour of the liberty of the accused,21 provided that it is in 
the interests of justice to do so. 22 
against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the 
land.' See A E Dick Howard Magna Carta: Text and Commentary (1964) at 43. 
16 See S v Fourie 1973 (1) SA 100 (D). 
17 See Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 481-482. 
18 Sees 35(3)(h) of the Constitution. This section provides as follows: 
(3) Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right -
(h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the 
proceedings; 
19 It is important to note that this presumption has been recognised since 1 789. Article 9 
of the French Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen for example began with the 
words: 'Every man being counted innocent until he has been pronounced guilty, if it is 
thought indispensable to arrest him, all severity that may not be necessary to secure his 
person ought to be strictly suppressed by law.' Scholars, like HJ Berman, maintain that 
this French doctrine was originally intended to operate, primarily, at the stage of 
investigation. See HJ Berman 'The Presumption oflnnocence: Another Reply' (1980) 28 
American Journal of Comp Law 615 at 622. See Krause v Switzerland (7986/77) DR 13 
at 73. In this matter the European Commission of Human Rights stated almost in a 
similar vein that the principle of the presumption of innocence is in the first instance a 
procedural guarantee applying in any kind of criminal procedure, its application reaches 
therefore much further than just the trial. 
20 It is my contention that the right to be presumed innocent should be broadly interpreted 
so as to relate to all the stages of the trial process. Others, like Steytler, consider the right 
to be presumed innocent as a 'trial' right. Steytler relies in support of his argument on 
Canadian jurisprudence, more specifically the dictum of the Canadian Supreme Court in 
R v Pearson (1992) 77 CCC (3d) 124. The court in Pearson found that the rigbt.to be 
presumed innocent and the right to be released on bail find application at different stages 
of the proceedings and in different forms. See N Steytler Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure (1997) at 134. 
21 See Stack v Boyle 342 US 1 (1951). Vinson CJ stated with reference to the right of bail 
'this traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of 
















It was, however, inevitable that the South African criminal process would transform as a 
result of the introduction of our Bill of Rights. 23 Bail was no exception to this rule. 24 
4.3 Current statutory provisions governing !Jail 
Bail is presently defined in s 5 825 of the CPA and regulated by ss 5 8 to 71 of the CPA. It 
should however be borne in mind that bail is also regulated bys 35 of the Constitution.26 
this right to bail before the trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only 
after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning. '(At 6) See S v Acheson 1991 (2) SA 
805 (Nm). 
22 S v Smith 1969 (4) SA 175 (N) at 177E-F. 
23 The fundamental rights of the individual are enunciated in Chapter 3 of the interim 
Constitution and Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
24 Sees 25(2)(d) of the interim Constitution ands 35(1)(f) of the Constitution. 
25 Section 58 of the CPA provides as follows: 
The effect of bail granted in terms of the succeeding provisions is that an accused 
who is in custody shall be released from custody upon payment of, or the 
furnishing of a guarantee to pay, the sum of money determined for his bail, and 
that he shall appear at the place and on the date and at the time appointed for his 
trial or to which the proceedings relating to the offence in respect of which the 
accused is released on bail are adjourned, and that the release shall, unless sooner 
terminated under the said provisions, endure until a verdict is given by a court in 
respect of the charge to which the offence in question relates, or, where sentence 
is not imposed forthwith after verdict and the court in question extends bail, until 
sentenced is imposed: Provided that where a court convicts an accused of an 
offence contemplated in Schedule 5 or 6, the court shall, in considering the 
question whether the accused's bail should be extended, apply the provisions of 
section 60(1 l)(a) or (b), as the case may be, and the court shall take into account-
(a) the fact that the accused has been convicted of that offence; and 
(b) the likely sentence which the court might impose. 
26 Section 35 of the Constitution provides for the rights of arrested, detained, and accused 
persons: 
(1) Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has the right-
( d) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonable possible, but not later than 
48 hours after the arrest, but if that period expires outside ordinary court hours, to 
be brought before a court on the first court day after the end of that period; 
( e) at the first court appearance after being arrested, to be charged or to be 
informed of the reason for the detention to continue, or to be released; and 
(f) to be released from detention if the interests of justice permit, subject to 
reasonable conditions. 
(3) Every accused has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right -


















It should also be observed that the law regarding bail is not exclusively regulated by 
legislation but also by judicial decisions relating to bail. The most important provision is 
considered to be section 60 of the CPA. 27 
27 Section 60(1)- (4) of the CPA provides as follows: 
(l)(a) An accused who is in custody in respect of an offence shall, subject to the 
provisions of section 50(6) and (7), be entitled to be released on bail at any stage 
preceding his or her conviction in respect of such offence, unless the court finds 
that it is in the interests of justice that he or she be detained in custody. 
(b) Subject to the provisions of section 50( 6)( c ), the court referring an accused to 
any other court for trial or sentencing retains jurisdiction relating to the powers, 
functions and duties in respect of bail in terms of this Act until the accused 
appears in such other court for the first time. 
( c) If the question of the possible release of the accused on bail is raised by the 
accused or the prosecutor, the court shall ascertain from the accused whether he or 
she wishes that question to be considered by the court. 
(2) In bail proceedings the court-
(a) may postpone any such proceedings as contemplated in section 50(3); 
(b) may, in respect of matters that are not in dispute between the accused and the 
prosecutor, acquire in an informal manner the information that is needed for its 
decision or order regarding bail; 
( c) may, in respect of matters that are in dispute between the accused and the 
prosecutor, require of the prosecutor or the accused, as the case may be, that 
evidence be adduced; 
( d) shall, where the prosecutor does not oppose bail in respect of matters referred 
to in subsection (1 l)(a) and (b), require of the prosecutor to place on record the 
reasons for not opposing the bail application. 
(3) If the court is of the opinion that it does not have reliable or sufficient 
information or evidence at its disposal or that it lacks certain important 
information to reach a decision on the bail application, the presiding officer shall 
order that such information or evidence be placed before the court. 
( 4) The refusal to grant bail and the detention of an accused in custody shall be in 
the interests of justice where one or more of the following grounds are 
established: 
(a) Where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were released on 
bail, will endanger the safety of the public or any particular person or the public 
interest, or will commit a Schedule 1 offence; or 
(b) where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were released on 
bail, will attempt to evade his or her trial; or 
( c) where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were released on 
bail, will attempt to influence or intimidate witnesses or to conceal or destroy 
evidence; or 
( d) where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were released on 
bail, will undermine or jeopardise the objectives or the proper functioning of the 






















4.4 Impact of the Constitution and the 199528 and 199?29 amendments 
It is important to look at the decisions of our courts to determine the impact of the 
Constitution and the new bail laws introduced over the past five years. When the interim 
Constitution came into operation in 1994 it spelled out a detained person's rights. It is 
these rights, and the interpretation of these rights adopted by the courts, that caused 
confusion amongst members of the judiciary regarding certain issues, such as who bears 
the onus in a bail application and how much weight should be attached to the 'interests of 
justice'. 
4.5 Onus 
In the past a bail application was regarded as a sui generis application and the onus was 
on the accused to show on a balance of probabilities that he should be released. 30 After 
the commencement of the interim Constitution a host of decisions followed, all 
considering the onus of the parties in a bail application. In Ellish en Andere v 
Prokureur-Generaal, Witwatersrandse Plaaslike Af deling31 the court attempted to 
move away from the question of onus. Van Schalkwyk J decided that there can be no 
question of an onus of proof in a bail application but that the state has to commence with 
the leading of evidence. The judge stated that if at the end of the enquiry there was still a 
balance between the interests of the accused and those of justice, then the accused had to 
be released on bail. What is even more significant about this judgment is the emphasis 
found therein that judicial officers should change their role from being passive onlookers 
to more active inquisitorial adjudicators. 
( e) where in exceptional circumstances there is the likelihood that the release of 
the accused will disturb the public order or undermine the public peace or 
security. 
28 Section 60, as amended bys 3 of the Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 75 
of 1995. 
29 Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 85 of 1997. 
30 See S v Hlongwa 1979 (4) SA 112 (D). 


















In Magano and Another v District Magistrate, Johannesburg and Others (1)32 the 
approach was adopted that the onus rests on the state to prove why the accused should not 
be released from custody. In determining the implications of the Constitution and the 
1995 amendments on bail, it is perhaps wise to look at the judgment of Levenson J in S v 
Mbele and Another.33 The judge maintained that there is really nothing new ins 60(4) 
of the CPA and that the question of granting bail still remains within the four broad 
categories of risks relating to uncertain future events. 34 
Levenson J held, further, that there was a tendency to avoid the use of the expression 
'burden of proof. Bail applications were not criminal proceedings and the court was not 
required to weigh proved facts but to speculate on future conduct on the basis of 
information laid before it. It was clear from the cases though that 'onus' was a well-
known concept in bail proceedings and there was no purpose in being coy about the use 
of the word. Courts should therefore not shrink from using it, simply because of the 
nature of the proceedings.35 Leveson J held that the legislation, after the 1995 
amendments, squarely placed the onus where it has always belonged - on the accused.36 
He then, finally, considered the impact of the interim Constitution and more specifically 
32 1994 (2) SACR 304 (W). 
33 1996 (1) SACR 212 (W). 
34 At 223d-f he remarked as follows: 
There is nothing new in that subsection. For example, before its enactment the 
learned authors of Du Toit, De Jager and Others, in their Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act at 9-8B to 9-1 0C, had summarised the principles 
governing the decision to grant or refuse bail as being concerned with four broad 
categories of risks relating to uncertain future events. These were: 
(1) the risk of whether the accused would stand his trial, which is now dealt with 
bys 60(4)(b); 
(2) the risk of whether the accused would interfere with State witnesses or the 
police investigation, which is now dealt with bys 60(4)(c) and (d); 
(3) the risk that the accused might commit other crimes, which is now dealt with 
bys 60(4)(a) and (d); 
(4) the risk that the release of the accused might endanger law and order or public 
safety or national safety, which is now dealt with bys 60(4)(a). 
35 Mbele supra at 220h-j. 
36 Cf. Prokureur-Generaal van die Witwatersrandse Plaaslike Afdeling v Van Heerden en 
Andere 1994 (2) SACR 469 (W) where the court held that the state should not be saddled 





















s 25(2)( d) of the Constitution: 
I now turn to consider the new legislation. The starting point, m my 
opinion, is that for reasons already given, the essence of s 25(2)( d) is that 
it merely recites the right of the individual to his liberty and does not 
prescribe any procedural provisions for the determination of that right. 
Thus there is nothing in the section which prohibits the enactment of 
legislation, the purpose of which is to cast the burden on one party or the 
other. The section is neutral. It neither empowers nor prohibits.37 
In contrast to Mbele supra is the decision of Edeling J in Prokureur-Generaal, 
Vrystaat v Ramokhosi38 holding that there is a burden of proof on the state to submit 
information showing that it is in the interests of justice that bail be refused. It is submitted 
with regard to the question of onus in bail applications, that courts should interpret the 
statutory provisions regarding bail having due regard to 'the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution' .39 In doing so, logic dictates that the state in each 
bail application will bear the onus of proving that a detention is 'in the interests of 
justice'. The court in S v Vermaas 40 held, with reference to the interpretation of s 60 as 
amended by the 1995 Act, that the amendment of the CPA had been passed amidst a full-
blown debate about bail, bail conditions and the onus in bail cases. In view of this, one 
had to accept that the wording of s 60 as a whole, and s 60(11) as amended by the 1995 
Act in particular, had been well chosen. The Court held that it is clear from the wording 
of s 60 of the CPA that the general rule set out in s 60(1 )(a) is that the accused was 
entitled to be released on bail unless a court finds that it is not in the interests of justice 
that he be detained in custody. That wording created an onus. The onus rested upon the 
party who asserted that the accused should not be released, i.e. the state. The converse 
37 Mbele supra at 218a-b. 
38 I 997 (1) SACR 127 (0). 
39 Sees 39(2) of the Constitution that provides as follows: 
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
the objects of the Bill of Rights. 















was the case where s 60(11 ), as amended by the 1995 Act, applied. It was expressly 
worded as an exception by the use of the phrase 'notwithstanding any provision of t].J.is 
Act'. It was also limited to only the crimes stated in Schedule 5 and if an accused person 
again committed a crime set out in Schedule 1, while out on bail. It was imperative: 'the 
court shall order the accused to be detained'. The accused was called upon to satisfy the 
court that the 'interests of justice' did not require his detention in custody. Clearer 
wording could not be sought for imposing an onus on the accused. 
Section 60(11) as introduced by the 1995 Act, placed a reverse onus on the accused. In 
such cases it is for the accused to satisfy the court that the 'interests of justice' do not 
require his or her continued detention. In view of the fact that the provision did not affect 
all accused people but only those again committing a Schedule 1 offence or committing a 
serious Schedule 5 offence, it is submitted that the provision was defensible as a 
permissible limitation41 of the accused's right to be presumed innocent.42 In my view the 
1995 bail legislation was sound and good law. The law offered sufficient protection to all, 
including victims and witnesses, provided that the courts fulfilled their functions by 
applying the law as required. Moreover the 1995 amendments were also constitutionally 
sound. 
It has been stated in this chapter that the intentions of the legislature in introducing new 
bail provisions by virtue of the Second Criminal Procedure Amendment Act of 1997 may 
have been noble. It wished to show victims of crime and the public that they would be 
afforded better protection through further legislation and that crime would be combatted 
successfully by its application. In an attempt, however, to make it more difficult for an 
accused to apply for bail, government, in my view, overstepped the boundaries of 
41 In terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
42 Such interpretation is supported by the judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Salabiaku v France (1988) 13 EHRR 379 at 388 E para 28 where the Court 
stated: 
Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms does not therefore regard presumptions of fact or of law provided for in 
the criminal law with indifference. It requires States to confine them within 























constitutional criminal justice. It is doubtful whether the law will succeed in its objective. 
Frustrating from the perspective of witnesses is the fact that many hopes and expectations 
have been raised by this legislation whereas all factors point to it being unconstitutional. 
Those sections that are most at risk are subsections 60(11), 60(1 lA) and 60(1 lB) of the 
CPA as amended, which in essence require that an accused adduce evidence that 
'exceptional circumstances'43 exist which in the 'interests of justice' permit his release, 
or require that an accused adduce evidence which will satisfy the court that the 'interests 
of justice' permit his release.44 Because the term 'exceptional circumstances' is not 
defined in any way, it could be interpreted as covering a broad range of circumstances. 
This term has already created interpretation problems for the courts. It is submitted that 
unless the legislature intervenes these problems will just multiply in future. For instance, 
in the matter of Jonas v S45 the court held that the incarceration of an accused for an 
offence he claimed he did not commit, and which were not contradicted by the state by 
way of any evidence - should be considered as 'exceptional'. It is doubtful whether the 
legislature ever intended that such a circumstance be labelled as exceptional under this 
Act. It is my contention that the circumstance proffered by the accused in the case of 
Jonas is rather the norm than the exception in criminal trials. I can therefore not agree 
with the finding by Horn J as to what constitutes an exceptional circumstance. I do, 
maintain the rights of the defence. 
43 Sees 60(1 l)(a) of the CPA that provides as follows: 
(11) Notwithstanding any provision of this Act, where an accused is charged with 
an offence referred to-
( a) In Schedule 6, the court shall order that the accused be detained in custody 
until he or she is dealt with in accordance with the law, unless the accused, having 
been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, adduces evidence which satisfies 
the court that exceptional circumstances exist which in the interests of justice 
permit his or her release; 
44 Sees 60(1 l)(b) of the CPA that provides: 
(11) Notwithstanding any provision of this Act, where an accused is charged with 
an offence referred to-
(b) In Schedule 5, but not Schedule 6, the court shall order that the accused be 
detained in custody until he or she is dealt with in accordance with the law, unless 
the accused, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, adduces 
evidence which satisfies the court that the interests of justice permit his or her 
release. 
45 























however, support the judgment on the basis that it demonstrates concern for the rights of 
h · 46 t e greater society. 
The 1997 Act also brought with it changes to the scheduling of offences in the CPA. The 
most important offences are those listed in Schedules 6 and 5.47 Schedule 6 of the CPA 
lists four very serious offences, by qualifying each of these offences with reference to 
either a particular victim or a specific circumstance surrounding the particular offence. 
Schedule 5 contains almost the same kind of offences, including the offences of murder 
and rape, but without adding any qualification to these offences. The list of offences 
contained in Schedule 6 and Schedule 5 is important because of the onus created by s 
60(11) of the CPA. This section, as it now reads, with reference to Schedule 5 and 
Schedule 6 offences, places an onus on the accused, similar to the onus that existed under 
s 60(11) of the 1995 Act. The difference between these two subsections, however, is that 
the 1995 amendment only burdened a specific group of accused persons,48 to convince 
the court that their detention is not needed, whereas the 1997 Act has spread the net much 
wider to include almost every accused person charged with a serious offence. In terms of 
this subsection it is further required of an accused charged with a Schedule 6 offence to 
satisfy the court that 'exceptional circumstances' exist to permit his or her release. This 
concept of 'exceptional circumstances' has been discussed earlier on and remains a 
. l 49 controvers1a concept. 
46 It is ironic that despite the fact that the appeal of the accused against the denial of bail 
succeeded, the Court did not set the accused free. In light of the seriousness of the 
offence and in the interests of justice the court referred the matter back to the magistrate 
for hearing of further evidence to decide on the issue of bail. See Jonas supra at 581h-j. 
47 Another new schedule that was introduced by the legislation is Schedule 7 that refers to 
offences for which the prosecution may set bail in terms of section 5 9 A of the CPA. 
48 See S v Tshabalala 1998 (2) SACR 259 (C). The Court held, with reference to the 
reverse onus in cases of s 60( 11) of the 1995 Act, that the net set by the subsection is not 
too wide and affects only a specific group of people, namely those that have committed 
serious offences, which does not mean that the section is per se in conflict with s 35(1 )(f) 
of the Constitution. 
49 Since the amendment came into operation there has been a spate of cases reported and 
unreported, all relating to the interpretation and the meaning of 'exceptional 
circumstances'. This in itself is indicative of the uncertainty created by the introduction 
of this concept. See S v C 1998 (2) SACR 720 (C); S v H 1999 (1) SACR 72 (W); S v 





















The 1997 Act has further effected changes which, from the perspective of the offender, 
most probably offend against many of his fair trial rights; but these changes will not be 
discussed because they are not closely related to the rights of witnesses and victims. It is 
contended that the amendment to the CPA has unfortunately complicated the practice of 
law on issues that were clearly defined by past judgments and which required no 
transformation. My main criticism of the 1997 legislation is that it is a complex piece of 
legislation, with vague and undefined concepts, that will in all likelihood be struck down 
as being unconstitutional. 50 It does little to improve the position of witnesses in the 
criminal justice system. In fact, witnesses are adversely affected by the Act in that the 
question of bail now takes a considerable amount of time, which could have been more 
productively used to finalise cases, and which would have been in the interest of 
witnesses. 51 
My contention that the amendments to the bail legislation will not pass constitutional 
muster, has received some support from the High Court. The Cape High Court recently in 
the judgment of S v Schietekat52 held that ss 60( 4) to (9) and ss (11 B )( c) of the CPA, as 
amended by Act 85 of 1997, are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution and 
referred the matter to the Constitutional Court for a final order on the constitutionality of 
these provisions in terms of s 172 of the Constitution. In S v Joubert53 the Cape High 
Court also held that the very same subsections are unconstitutional and invalid in their 
entirety. Although the matter of Schietekat has been argued before the Constitutional 
Court the decision of that Court is still awaited. 
cases of the Cape High Court Hendricks v State (Case No A714/98 decided 1 October 
1998); Adams v State (Case No A781/98 decided 6 October 1998); Baron and Another v 
State (Case No A830/98 decided 22 October 1998). 
5° For·more comment on the new bail legislation, see BJ King 'Comment on the new bail 
legislation' (1998) 1 The Judicial Officer 54. 
51 See Annual Report of Attorney-General for the Witwatersrand Local Division, 
1997/1998 at 14. It has been reported that 5 out of 14 regional courts in the Johannesburg 
Magistrates' Court are occupied on a full time basis with bail applications, which in turn 
caused an increase in the number of cases per court per month, as well as an increase in 
the number of awaiting trial prisoners. 



















4.6 Interests of justice 
In establishing whether the granting or refusal of bail is in the 'interests of justice' it is 
imperative to consider the meaning of this concept. To a certain extent the meaning has 
been clarified by the legislature in s 60 of the CPA and it is recommended that judicial 
officers should use these guidelines as a point of departure in their assessment of whether 
a detention or release of an individual will be in the 'interests of justice'. Judicial officers 
should bear in mind, however, that the list in terms of s 60 of the CPA does not contain a 
numerus clausus, 54 and that the meaning of 'interests of justice' should be left to judicial 
interpretation. Bail decisions since the 1995 amendments emphasise that presiding 
officers should acknowledge their new roles and new functions in dealing with bail 
applications. 55 Every presiding magistrate or judge is duty bound to consider what effect 
the release of the detainee will have on the 'interests of justice'. They should not merely 
act as neutral umpires in bail matters but have a duty to investigate each matter.56 
In S v Dhlamini57 the Court held that it was in the 'interests of justice' not to grant bail 
even though the state's case was weak. It was, however, held that there was prima facie 
evidence that the accused had participated in a shooting and that he was an extremely 
dangerous man, and that if he was released the risk existed that he would rejoin the taxi 
war and imperil others. The effectiveness of the 1995 Act was also demonstrated in the 
matter of S v Tshabalala,58 where bail was denied on the sole ground59 that the appellant 
would 'interfere' with prosecution witnesses. The Court, after a consideration of all the 
facts, held that there was a strong likelihood that the appellant would attempt to interfere 
with witnesses and that no stringent bail conditions could afford adequate protection to 
53 1998 (2) SACR 717 (C). 
54 PM Bekker 'Interpretation of the right to bail and the limitation clause of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa' (1994) 57 THRHR 490. 
55 See Ellish en Andere v Prokureur-Generaal, Witwatersrandse Provinsiale Afdeling 
1994 (2) SACR 579 (W). 
56 This approach is confirmed by section 60(3) as introduced by the Second Criminal 
Procedure Act 75 of 1995. 
57 1997 (1) SACR 54 (W). 
58 1998 (2) SACR 259 (C) 
























the witnesses.60 It was held by the Court that in such circumstances the 'interests of 
justice', also in a constitutional sense, did not permit the appellant to be released on bail. 
4.7 Witnesses and bail 
It is not surprising that witnesses feel that in most instances they are powerless in the 
handling of 'their' cases.61 It is primarily the prosecution62 that renders assistance to 
witnesses during a criminal trial; but prosecutors have many other duties and have until 
now failed to render sufficient assistance to witnesses before the trial. Prosecutors should, 
however, not solely be blamed for the neglect of witnesses before the trial. With regard to 
bail it is clear that judicial officers are also not fulfilling their duties in terms of the Act. 63 
They have failed to act more inquisitorially by investigating all the facts in a bail 
application, and have forsaken their duty towards the victims of crime. Judicial officers 
could be more innovative in setting bail conditions to protect the victims of crime. The 
mere fact that the court is granting the offender his/her liberty does not mean that the 
protection of the victims of the relevant crime should be abandoned. 
I shall demonstrate the problem with the following example: In a serious assault or 
domestic violence case the presiding officer will find it difficult to order that the offender 
should move out of the family home but could afford protection to the victim of such 
violence by setting bail conditions: that the offender move out of the family home, stay 
away from the victim, attend counselling sessions and refrain from drinking etc. In doing 
so the interests of the greater society as well as those of the individual witness will be 
served. 
60 Tshabalala supra at 273f-g. 
61 A distinction between the role of the offenders and that of the victims will precisely 
illustrate this statement, i.e. that offenders have the choice to actively participate in their 
trials or to be passive spectators, but victims don't have that choice unless they are 
chosen by the state to become witnesses in the trial. See M Maguire 'The impact of 
burglary upon victims' ( 1980) 20 British Journal of Criminology 261. 
62 To be more specific the different roles of public prosecutors will be investigated due to 




















If one were to assume that the experience level of prosecutors has diminished, it becomes 
even more important that presiding officers should treat all parties fairly and justly. It is 
contended that in an attempt to grant such just treatment to victims of crime it is essential 
that the presiding officer acts inquisitorially to get all information on record before 
deciding upon the issue of bail. 64 
Bail conditions, other than financial incentives, may also be imposed by the presiding 
judge or magistrate, and should be imposed. The following are examples of conditions 
that do not involve financial incentives: 
• a condition that the accused report at specified intervals to a nominated 
police station. 
• a condition that the accused reside at a specific place. 
• a condition that the accused undergo psychiatric treatment or psycho therapy. 
• a condition that the accused participate in a program of rehabilitation or 
a counselling programme. 
• a condition that the accused does not commit an act of violence and/or commit 
any act similar to that being charged with. 
• a condition that the accused does not contact/communicate with the 
victim or any other state witness. 
• a condition that he accused does not go to specific premises frequented 
by a specified person. 
• a condition that the accused does not enter a specific district or area. 
• where the accused resides with another person - a condition that the accused 
does not enter or remain in the place of residence whilst under the influence 
of intox1cating liquor or a drug. 
• a condition that the accl\sed surrender all existing passports to the authorities. 
63 Section 60(2)(b)-(c) and 60(3) of the CPA, to name a few. 



















4.8 Addressing the dissatisfaction of victims and witnesses 
It is submitted that other practical steps should be considered in addressing the 
dissatisfaction of victims and witnesses in dealing with bail. The following proposals are 
aimed at making the bail system more witness-friendly: 
• Public prosecutors should be more involved in dealing with witnesses, and 
consult with these witnesses also with regard to their safety should 
the accused be granted bail. 
• Steps should be taken to ensure that there is better communication between 
witnesses and public prosecutors at both the pre-trial phase as well as the 
trial phase. 
• Enough resources to prosecute criminals more vigorously should be allocated 
to the Department of Justice. Funds should be allocated to prosecutors 
to enable them to develop initiatives such as special gang courts and special 
bail courts. It is also important that throughout the criminal process, special 
waiting65 rooms be provided for witnesses. 
• A special data basis is needed which would enable the Department of Justice and 
the Police Services to share information about criminals. The provision of such 
a database would assist the state to properly oppose bail in matters which require 
the detention of the accused. 
4.9 Pre-trial services 
Pre-trial services may assist witnesses in various ways. One way would be to take care of 
their interests before bail is considered. An example of such a service is that offered by 
the Pre-trial Service Office at Mitchells Plain Court. The service, which is a practical, 
65 Witnesses do not have special waiting rooms at the courts and in most instances they 
have to wait, for their matters to be heard, in the passages or some drab place to which 
the accused and his family and friends have access. Courts like those at Wynberg and 
Cape Town are an exception to the general practice. At these courts provision is made for 
























court based bail project, was unveiled by the Minister of Justice on the 29 August 1997. 
This service was the first ever in South Africa and was launched at the Mitchells Plain 
Court where the office of the project is also located. The project is a joint undertaking 
between the Department of Justice and the Vera Institute of Justice. The aim of the 
service is to create a system in which every accused person appearing at court is 
evaluated for bail at his or her first appearance. Where possible it will be recommended 
that offenders be released but at the same time it is aimed at ensuring that dangerous 
offenders be detained, and that if they are released that the release does not imperil 
witnesses. This is clearly a project from which witnesses can benefit. The Office informs 
witnesses about bail decisions and witnesses are invited to contact the bail officer if they 
experience any intimidation. Those witnesses that are intimidated can contact the Office 
immediately on a 24-hour telephone number. 
The director of the project, Michelle Baird, has stated that 'if the Pre-trial Services Office 
is successful, more witnesses and more accused persons will return to court when 
expected. Cases will be resolved more quickly; and justice and police officials will have 
more time to dedicate to investigation of serious cases and collecting the evidence 
neclssary for convictions. Pre-trial Services means increased access to justice for 
everyone. '66 
It is submitted that projects like the Pre-trial Service Office are the kind of practical tools 
needed in the system. In addition to its practical advantages, the Office has the potential 
to improve the system by taking care of the needs of witnesses, and by offering them 
protection when intimidated, and by keeping witnesses informed of the progress of their 
cases. A recent study amongst 915 victims in Scotland showed that it is important to 
provide victims with information at the time of the bail decision, since they fear for their 
safety; and in most cases the absence of notification can heighten their fear and affect 
accused and his family must wait. 




















them adversely.67 Some of the victims indicated that the uncertainty of not knowing was 
worse than the knowledge that the accused had been released on bail. 
Without having done an empirical study it is difficult to say whether witnesses in the 
South African context share the same fears, but it has been my experience as a prosecutor 
that witnesses want to be informed throughout the process about the progress of their 
cases. If projects like the Pre-trial Service Office succeed in giving this information to 
them, then consideration should be given to an expansion of the project on a national 
level.· 
4.10 Concluding remarks 
Bail is not an absolute right but it is a very important right to an individual who has not 
been convicted of any crime and who is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Witnesses 
can be protected in the system without infringing upon any constitutional right of the 
accused.68 Tightening the laws, more specifically the bail laws, is not the solution to 
South Africa's crime problem. An effective criminal justice system will rather have the 
desired effect. This means that the interests of law enforcement and the wider community 
should be carefully weighed against the fundamental rights of the accused. It is not too 
late for the Department of Justice to address the deficiencies in the system that obstruct 
the proper utilisation of bail provisions, i.e. a lack of resources, a lack of trained and 
experience magistrates and prosecutors, and a good police service to enforce the law, to 
name a few. 
Crime is much too serious a matter to be solved by merely adopting draconian legislation 
in areas such as bail. Such legislation may appear to be addressing the crime problem and 
affording better protection to victims of crime, whilst in fact it fails to achieve either 
objective. It is often said that one cannot change practices simply by changing the law. I 
want to venture the view that the system will only improve for witnesses and victims 
67 See SR Moody 'Victims and Scottish Criminal Justice' 1997 Juridical Review 1. 























once the Department of Justice changes the practices in the courts and offers better 
services to victims, such as the service offered by the Pre-trial Service Office.69 Whilst it 
is highly important that victims, like Mamogethi Malebane and others, be protected 
against barbaric criminals, it is submitted that such protection should not' be achieved by 
infringing upon the hard-won human rights of individual citizens. 



















5. Rape, Rape Victims and the Criminal Justice System 
5.1 The subject of the inquiry 
Rape is the most vicious and reprehensible crime in the criminal 
calendar. Every individual possesses a core persona which makes 
up the essence of their being. It is an intensely personal and private 
self which necessarily includes the individual's sexuality and 
autonomy. Rape shatters a woman's sexual integrity and personal 
autonomy. Victims suffer acute trauma and endure lifelong 
psychological and emotional scars. 1 
The study of witnesses in the criminal justice system will certainly be incomplete 
without a focus on rape victims and the treatment that they receive in the criminal 
justice system. One may ask why a distinction is drawn between rape victims and 
victims of other crimes and whether victims of rape should receive special attention in 
the present study. In answering these questions it is important to consider the public 
disquiet that has been vehemently expressed in the past decade regarding the handling 
of rape cases and the treatment meted out to rape victims who seek recourse through 
the criminal justice system. Furthermore it must be borne in mind that the position of 
rape complainants is not to be compared with that of victims of other crimes. Being 
held at gunpoint and forced to relinquish a valuable item cannot be compared validly 
with the violation of something as personal as one's sexual integrity and autonomy. It 
is because of these well-founded concerns that a review of the treatment of rape 
victims and the law relating to rape wili be conducted as a matter of necessity. 
Comments expressed regarding rape and rape victims have also added to the need to 
examine the problems created by the offence and the problems encountered by the 
victims due to the shortcomings of the substantive law and to evaluate existing 
1 Justice E W Thomas in 'Was Eve merely framed; or was she forsaken?' 1994 New 














evidential rules that impact on rape victims. Finally, some practical solutions to these 
problems will be considered and evaluated. 
This chapter is, however, not concerned solely with public opinion but also with the 
concerns expressed by scholars such as Estrich, Brownmiller and Hall.2 Statements 
made by these scholars are highly critical of the treatment given to complainants in 
rape cases; in fact they go so far as to state that the justice system discriminates, at 
every stage, against rape victims.3 Whether these accusations levelled at the system4 
are correct remains to be seen. In order to investigate whether these accusations hold 
true for the South African experience, it is necessary to consider legal issues raised by 
the common law definition of the offence of rape and also to evaluate the treatment 
meted out to those testifying in our courts. 
Whilst a plethora of material exists on this topic, most of it is based on feminist 
jurisprudence.5 In order to remain objective while analysing the issues, it is important 
to exercise caution when relying on these writings as part of this analysis. Suffice it to 
mention that these, admittedly subjective views, serve as sufficient impetus to warrant 
a re-examination of the need for rape victims to be treated as a special category in the 
2 See e.g. Susan Estrich Real Rape (1987); Susan Brownrniller Against Our Will: Men 
Women and Rape (1976); Colleen Hall Sexual Politics and Resistance to Law Reform: 
A Critique of the South African Law Commission Report on Women and Sexual 
Offences in South Africa (unpublished LLM Dissertation University of Cape Town 
1987). 
3 See e.g. David P Bryden and Sonja Lengnick 'Rape in the Criminal Justice System' 
(1997) 87 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1194. 
4 The treatment given to rape victims has been dubbed a 'second assault' on the 
victims. See generally E Williams and K A Holmes The Second Assault: Rape and 
Public Attitudes (1981). 
5 See generally Susan Estrich Real Rape (1987); C Smart Feminism and the Power of 
Law (1989); Susan Brownmiller Against Our Will; Men, Women and Rape (1976); Z 
Adler Rape on Trial (1987); Lisa Frohmann 'Discrediting Victims' Allegations of 
sexual assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections' (1991) 38 Social Problems 
213; Pamela L Wood The Victim In a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View in Leroy 
G Schultz ( ed) Rape Victimology (1975) 194; V Bronstein 'The cautionary rule: an 
aged principle in search of contemporary justification' (1992) 8 SAJHR 558; P 





















criminal justice system, as does the prevalence6 of the crime and the fact that sexual 
· complainants constitute a special grouping of victims. 
The prime areas of concern addressed in this chapter are the procedural difficulties 
that rape victims have to face in court, the treatment meted out to them, and the 
impact of the definitional limits of the crime itself on these victims. Much of the 
distress 7 suffered by rape victims is influenced by factors such as: the manner in 
which the police handle a complaint and a complainant, the manner in which medical 
personnel handle the medical examination, the manner in which the prosecution 
service handle a case, the trauma experienced throughout a rape trial and the 
accountability of the court personnel for these rape cases. It is factors like these, 
coupled with the knowledge of high acquittal rates for these offences, which make the 
prosecution of rape cases an unattractive proposition for the victims of the crime. 
Through the exploration of the topic, it became apparent that a critical assessment of 
the functions fulfilled by all role-players is required in order to make useful 
recommendations regarding the handling of these victims in the court process. 
While experience has shown that a number of the aforementioned shortcomings could 
be eliminated by changing certain perspectives and attitudes of the role-players, which 
can be seen in the discussion of the pilot project at Wynberg Court that will follow, 
other changes, however, should and could only be brought about by legislative 
reform. Through the research of this study it became apparent that a review of this 
area of the law must attempt to decipher influences, born of another age and era, 
6 Recent national statistics on rape in South Africa received from the South African 
Police Services reflect that rape has been more prevalent than in previous years. In 
1994, 42 429 cases of rape and 18 801 cases of attempted rape were reported. In 1997 
the number increased to 52 160 cases of rape and 24 805 cases of attempted rape that 
had been reported. Because much of this study will concern itself with the incidence 
of rape in the Western Cape I considered the statistics for the region. In 1994, for 
example, 5 3 71 cases of rape and 2 441 cases of attempted rape were reported; the 
1997 figures show that 6 558 cases of rape and 3 179 cases of attempted rape were 
reported. (Statistics released by the Area Commissioner of the West Metropole in a 
letter dated 7 December 1998.) 
7 The view expressed by Christopher Corns that sexual complainants in particular 





















which have moulded and shaped the law that is now no longer in harmony with 
current societal attitudes and views. 
5.1.1 The law governing rape 
Rape is defined in our law as intentional unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman 
without her consent. 8 In short, the common law definition of rape centres on the 
penetration9 of a specific part of the female's body, which excludes other forms of 
forced sexual conduct. 10 This definition is considered unduly restrictive in its 
application and it demonstrates a particular male bias. 11 
This anomaly and others that surround the definition of rape deserve discussion 
because these limitations of the definition of rape may exacerbate the trauma and in 
addition add to the anxieties experienced by rape victims in turning to the criminal 
justice system for recourse. An examination of the definition demonstrates that other 
non-consensual 'sexual' acts, like anal sexual intercourse, 12 which have the same 
reprehensible features as rape, cannot be charged as rape, even though the female or 
male victim may have experienced the very same trauma as an 'ordinary' rape victim. 
Another objection to the definition, and one which is closely related to the previous 
objection, is that the definition excludes male victims. Forms of 'male rape' have 
been treated in our law as either sodomy 13or indecent assault. Although reform is 
therefore required, it is, however, not my intention to discuss all the shortcomings of 
suffered is far more personal than that of other victims. See W F McDonald ( ed) 
Criminal Justice and the Victim Vol VI (1976) 23. 
8 See CR Snyman Criminal Law 3 ed (1995) at 424; Burchell and Milton Principles 
of Criminal Law 2 ed (1997) at 487; P M A Hunt South African Criminal Law and 
Procedure Vol II Common Law Crimes 2 ed (1988) at 435. 
9 The slightest penetration of the vagina suffices in proving the offence. See Snyman 
op cit at 425. Cf. R v Botha 1916 (T) 365 at 366; R v V 1960 (1) SA 117 (T) at 117-
118. 
1° Cf. S v M(2) 1990 (1) SACR 456 (N); S v F 1990 (1) SACR 238 (A). 
11 Colleen Hall 'Rape: The Politics of Definition' (1988) 105 SALJ 67 at 71-73. 
12 See S v M(2) 1990 (1) SACR 456 (N). 
13 The offence sodomy as known under our common law is no longer an option in our 
law since the offence has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court 
in a judgment delivered on 9 October 1998. See National Coalition for Gay and 














the definition. What should however be emphasised is the fact that these shortcomings 
lead to immense frustration experienced by victims of sexual assault. They are either 
precluded from laying a charge of rape either because the injury suffered does not 
suffice for a charge of rape or because of their specific gender. The elimination of 
these shortcomings can only be brought about through legislative refom1, which is 
required as a matter of urgency. 
In 1982 the South African Law Commission investigated the definition of rape as part 
of its investigation of sexual offences committed against women. 14 In its report the 
Law Commission concluded that the law of rape as presently constructed is sound and 
that the offence need not be redefined. 15 It is submitted that the Law Commission in 
its evaluation failed to consider the social dynamics 16 or, even more importantly, the 
constitutional implications of the current definition. In its findings it appears that the 
difficulties that the offence poses for the criminal justice system were also 
overlooked. 
First, the approach followed by the Law Commission seems to be extremely legalistic 
in that it concerned itself mostly with the prevailing law without considering the 
relationship 17 that the criminal law has to other laws of a similar kind. 18 Secondly, the 
14 See South African Law Commission Project 45 Report on Women and Sexual 
Offences in South Africa (1985) para 2.1-2.21. 
15 See Report op cit para 2.21 for its recommendation. 
16 See Colleen Helen Hall Sexual Politics and Resistance to Law Reform: A Critique 
of the South African Law Commission Report on Women and Sexual Offences in 
South Africa (unpublished LLM Thesis University of Cape Town 1987) at 68-70. 
17 Another important issue that was not dealt with satisfactorily by the Law 
Commission was the common law position that a husband cannot rape his wife. Under 
the common law it was held that a married woman could not charge her lawful 
husband with rape in circumstances where he forcibly had sexual intercourse with her 
without her consent. By marrying him she irrevocably consented to afford him all the 
marital privileges in the future, including the right to have sexual ~ntercourse with her 
without her consent at all times. The untenable situation that existed for married 
victims has fortunately changed and it is now unlawful for a man to rape his own 
wife. Should he force her to have intercourse with him in circumstances where she 
refuses to consent to the act he could be charged with a contravention of s 5 of the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993. See Burchell and Milton op cit at 
491. 
18 The Law Commission in its evaluation merely disregarded the views held by other 
interested parties, like Rape Crisis, and placed too much reliance on the collective 





















investigation conducted by the Law Commission seemed to overlook the factors that 
influence the way sexual offences are processed through the justice system. 
As a result of the Law Commission's recommendations, the offence has remained an 
archetypal gendered 19 crime: the victims are female and the perpetrators are 
overwhelmingly male. This brings me to the point that our rape law, as it is presently 
defined, is discriminatory,20 in that all sexes do not receive fair and equal protection 
before the law. It discriminates21 on the basis of a person's sexual orientation, which 
in turn affects one's right to be equal22 before the law. In fact it is my submission that 
19 See JI Welch 'Verkragting, met spesifieke verwysing na die transseksueel wat 'n 
"geslagsverandering" operasie ondergaan het' (1991) 4 SACJ 164. 
20 Sees 9(1) of the Constitution which prohibits 'unfair discrimination'. In Prins loo v 
Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) at para 31 the Court considered what 
constitutes 'unfair discrimination': 
Given the history of this country we are of the view that 'discrimination' has 
acquired a particular pejorative meaning relating to the unequal treatment of 
people based on attributes and characteristics attaching to them. We are 
emerging from a period in our history during which humanity of the majority 
of the inhabitants of this country was denied. They were treated as not having 
inherent worth; as objects whose identities could be arbitrarily defined by 
those in power rather than as persons of infinite worth. In short they were 
denied recognition of their inherent dignity... In our view unfair 
discrimination ... principally means treating persons differently in a way which 
impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings who are inherently equal in 
dignity.(Emphasis added) 
21 See President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 112 
for an examination of s 8(2) of the interim Constitution (now s 9(3) of the 
Constitution): 
The more vulnerable the group adversely affected by the discrimination, the 
more likely the discrimination will be held to be unfair. Similarly, the more 
invasive the nature of the discrimination upon the interests of the individuals 
affected by the discrimination, the more likely it will be held to be unfair. In 
determining the effect of the discrimination, the reasons given by the agency 
responsible for the discrimination will be only of indirect relevance. However, 
should the discrimination in any particular case be held to be unfair, the reason 
for the discriminatory act may well be central to an investigation into whether 
the discrimination is nevertheless justified in terms of s 33 of the interim 
Constitution. 
22 See s 9 of the Constitution that provides as follows: 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. 
To promote the achievement of equality legislative and other measures 
designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged 




















the Law Commission should re-examme the offence, but this time within a 
constitutional frame. Consideration should be given to other jurisdictions that have 
succeeded in treating all sexes fairly before the law. Canada, for exam'ple, has 
reformed its rape offences so as to be sex neutral and to cover both homosexual and 
heterosexual conduct. The crime as defined under the Canadian system views the 
offence as a crime of violence and not a sexual offence.23 
The Canadian Criminal Code provides as follows: 
Sexual Assaults24 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds including race gender sex pregnancy marital 
status ethnic or social origin colour sexual orientation age disability religion 
conscience belief culture language and birth. 
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must 
be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is 
unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. 
23 See J Temkin Rape and the Legal Process (1987) at 101. 
24 The offence assault is defined in terms of the Canadian Criminal Code as follows: 
265. (1) A person commits an assault when 
(a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that 
other person, directly or indirectly; 
(b) he attempts or threatens, by an act or gesture, to apply force to another 
person, if he has, or causes that other person to believe on unreasonable 
grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; or 
( c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof, he 
accosts or impedes another person or begs. 
(2) This section applies to all forms of assault, including sexual assault, sexual 
assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or casing bodily harm and 
aggravated sexual assault. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, no consent is obtained where the 
complainant submits or does not resist by reason of 
(a) application of force to the complainant or to a person other than the 
complainant; 
(b) threats or fear of the application of force to the complainant or to a person 
other than the complainant; 
( c) fraud; or 
( d) the exercise of authority. 
(4) Where an accused alleges that he believed that the complainant consented 
to the conduct that is the subject-matter of the charge, a judge, if satisfied that 
there is sufficient evidence and that, if believed by the jury, the evidence 

















271. (1) Every one who commits a sexual assault is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding ten years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to 
imprisonment for a te1m not exceeding eighteen montl1s. 
Sexual Assault with a weapon, threat to a third party or causing bodily harm. 
272. (1) Every person commits an offence who, in committing a sexual 
assault, 
(a) carries, uses or threatens to use a weapon or an imitation of 
a weapon; 
(b) threatens to cause bodily harm to a person other than the 
complainant; 
( c) causes bodily harm to the complainant; or 
( d) is a party to the offence with any other person. 
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection ( 1) is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable 
(a) where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years and to a 
minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years; 
and 
(b) in any other case, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
fourteen years. 
Aggravated Sexual Assault 
273. (1) Every one commits an aggravated sexual assault who, in committing a 
sexual assault, wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers the life of the 
complainant. 
evidence relating to the determination of the honesty of the accused's belief, to 





















(2) Every person who commits an aggravated sexual assault is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable 
(a) where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to 
imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of four years; and 
(b) in any other case, to imprisonment for life. 
87 
It is submitted that whilst the Canadian model is easy to follow in that it creates a 
single three-tier offence,25 which replaces offences like rape, attempted rape, sexual 
intercourse with a feeble-minded, 26 and indecent assault on a male or a female, it in 
reality offers no improvement to our existing rape laws. The only positive 
achievement through reform along the lines of the Canadian example would be the 
equal treatment of all sexes. Offences like assault and indecent assault could, if 
suitably modified serve the same purpose in our law, without any changes to the law. 
In South Australia law reformers succeeded in broadening the offence of rape to 
include most forms of physical penetration of the female body. In New South 
Wales,27 the definition in s 61 of their Crimes Act 1900 provides that 'sexual 
intercourse' means-
(a) Sexual connection occasioned by the penetration of the vagina of any 
person or anus of any person by 
(i) any part of the body, or 
(ii) an object manipulated by another person, except where the 
penetration is carried out for proper medical purposes; 
(b) sexual connection occasioned by the introduction of any part of the penis 
of a person into the mouth of another person; 
( c) cunnilingus; or 
(d) the continuation of sexual intercourse as defined in paragraph (a), (b) or 
(c). 
25 J Temkin op cit at 102. 

















The reform in Australia once again treats males and females alike before the law but . 
at the same time it broadens the definition sufficiently to include penetration of 
orifices other than the vagina. The reform however leads to the fact that the crime is 
graded by providing different degrees of 'rape' .28 Furthermore certain statutory 
. . 29 1 • h 1 . l 'k 1 30 d . prov1s1ons over1ap wit some common aw cnmes 1 e assau t to o gnevous 
27 For a discussion of the law reform in Australia, see Jocelynne A Scutt Women and 
the Law (1990) at 469-471. 
28 In New South Wales the four levels of gradation of the offence are set out in section 
61B-E of the Crimes Act 1900. The section reads as follows: 
61B (1) any person who maliciously inflicts grievous bodily harm upon 
another person with intent to have sexual intercourse with the other person 
shall be liable to penal servitude for 20 years. 
(2) Any person who maliciously inflicts grievous bodily harm upon 
another person with intent to have sexual intercourse with a third person 
who is present or nearby shall be liable to penal servitude for 20 years. 
61C (1) Any person who-
(a) maliciously inflicts actual bodily harm upon another person; or 
(b) threatens to inflict actual bodily harm upon another person by means 
of an offensive weapon or instrument 
with intent to have sexual intercourse with the other person shall be 
liable to penal servitude for 12 years ... 
61 D (1) Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person with the 
consent of the other person and who knows that the other person does not 
consent to sexual intercourse shall be liable to penal servitude for seven years 
or if the person is under the age of 16 years to penal servitude for 10 years ... 
(2) For the purpose of subsection ( 1) a person who has sexual intercourse 
with another person without the consent of the other person and who is 
reckless as to whether the other person consents to the sexual intercourse 
shall be deemed to know that the other person does not consent to the 
sexual intercourse ... 
61 E ( 1) Any person who assaults another person and at the time of or 
immediately before or after the assault commits an act of indecency upon or in 
the presence of the other person shall be liable to imprisonment for 4 years or 
if the other person is under the age of 16 years to penal servitude for 6 years ... 
(2) Any person who commits an act of indecency with or towards a 
person under the age of 16 years or incites a person under the age to an 
act of indecency with that or another person shall be liable to 
imprisonment for 2 years ... 
(3) For the purposes of this Act a person who incites a person under the 
age of 16 years to an act of indecency as referred to in subsection (2) 
shall be deemed to commit an offence on the person under the age of 16 
years. 
29 See criticism by Jocelynne A Scutt op cit at 473. 
30 Sees 61B(l) of the Crimes Act 1900. 




















bodily harm and indecent assault. 31 Again, it offers no solution to the South African 
problem. 
One final comment is necessary regarding the definition of the offence. In its report 
the Law Commission32found the following argument against reform of the crime io be 
persuasive: that a shift in the emphasis from a sexual act to a violent act would not 
divert the attention from the element of consent. This is because the Law Commission 
found that rape and assault are fundamentally different: 'the essential element of rape 
is sexual intercourse without consent while the essential element of assault is the 
application of violence without consent'. 33 It is my submission that in taking such a 
stance the Law Commission overlooked the fact that a shift of focus, from a crime of 
sex to a crime of violence,34 may indeed divert attention from the element of consent. 
It may even solve most of the problems encountered with the element of consent. I 
shall try and explain briefly without digressing into a new field of research.35 If the 
offence is treated as an offence of violence, then absence of consent36 need no longer 
remain an element of the crime. A shift in emphasis will mean that mere submission 
to sexual intercourse by the complainant, in instances of fear and intimidation, will no 
longer be used as proof of consensual sexual intercourse. It is submitted that consent37 
will then no longer serve as a ground of justification and that the question of consent 
would be circumvented in treating the offence as a violent crime rather than a sexual 
crime. It is conceivable, however, that such a proposal may be too controversial to 
adopt without a thorough research of all the common law sources.38 
31 Sees 61E of the Crimes Act 1900. 
32 See South African Law Commission Report op cit para 2.15. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Scholars like Bryden and Lengnick, in support of this view, argue that changing the 
name of the crime from rape to sexual assault, or some similar term, could help to 
change the public's perception, i.e. that the crime is motivated by a desire to have sex 
when it is in fact motivated by a desire to dominate. See David P Bryden and Sonja 
Lengnick 'Rape in the Criminal Justice System' (1997) 87 Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology 1194 at 1197. 
35 For a more detailed discussion of the Law Commission's inattention to redefine the 
offence as an offence of violence, see Hall's discussion op cit supra at 67-69. 
36 For a discussion of the concept of consent in our Criminal Law, see Snyman op cit 
at 117-118; Burchell and Milton op cit at 198-215. 
37 See 5 .1.3 infra for an in depth discussion of this element of the crime. 


















Another obstacle, which should be recognised when dealing with the formulation of 
the definition of the offence, is that rape victims have to endure the trauma of 
disclosing their most intimate experiences when testifying in court. An examination of 
the definition shows that the nature of the offence is extremely intimate and private, 
which inevitably intensifies the trauma of witnesses giving evidence in court.39 The 
fact that a woman is required to specify the specific body part penetrated by the 
'rapist' for the purposes of proving the offence, adds to her feeling of vulnerability. 
Carol Smart puts the extreme intimacy of the offence, which distinguishes it from 
other offences, in perspective when she says that, in giving evidence in a rape trial, 
the witness's body becomes the primary focus of her testimony. She states: 
Bits of female anatomy are heavily encoded with sexual messages and 
women are aware, whether consciously or not, of the sexual meaning 
of parts of their bodies or the movement of their bodies. In a rape trial 
she knows that she must name parts of her body, parts which in the 
very naming overtly reveal their sexual content. She must talk in public 
of her breasts, her vagina, her anus, and of course what the accused did 
to those parts of her sexualized body, and with what parts of his 
body.40 
Until recently the only protection that could be claimed by adult sexual victims was to 
request41 to give their testimony in camera.42 They would, however, be much better 
protected if s 153 of the CPA stipulated that all sexual offence cases should be 
conducted in camera as a matter of course and without exception. 
39 This view is supported by the Heilbron Committee's Report The Adviso,y Group on 
the Law of Rape cited by J Temkin 'Sexual History Evidence - the Ravishment of 
Section 2' 1993 Criminal LR 3 at 3-4. The Committee held that one of the worst 
aspects for complainants to deal with is the routine of delving into their private lives, 
personal habits and sexual history. 
40 See C Smart op cit at 38-39. Cf. V Bronstein 'The rape complainant in court: an 
analysis of legal discourse' in C Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 
Legal Order (1994) at 210-211. 
41 A prosecutor in terms of s 153(3) of the CPA lodges this request. 
42 See 2.4 supra for a discussion of the procedure applied to protect witnesses' 

















Such a proposed amendment would strip presiding officers of their discretion to grant 
an in camera hearing; instead, an in camera hearing would automatically be held for a 
sexual offence case. A recent amendment to s 15843 of the CPA can perhaps be seen 
as an improvement in the trial process, in that it has the potential to alleviate the 
burden cf victims that have to testify about intimate and personal details in court. This 
provision provides for testimony of witnesses to be relayed to the court, via closed 
circuit television.44 A careful examination of the section demonstrates, however, that 
there is no substantial difference between this provision and s 153, as both sections 
give the presiding officer the ultimate say in deciding upon the application of both 
these provisions. 
43 Section 158 of the CPA as amended might be of use in cases ofrape but the 'special 
protection' afforded by the provision still depends on a discretion exercised by the 
presiding officer. The amendment to s 158 reads as follows: 
(2)(a) A court may subject to section 158 on its own initiative or on 
application by the public prosecutor order that a witness or an accused if the 
witness or accused consents thereto may give evidence by means of closed 
circuit television or similar electronic media. 
(b) A court may make a similar order on application of an accused 
or a witness. 
(3) A court may make an order contemplated in subsection (2) only if facilities 
therefor are readily available or obtainable and if it appears to the court that to 
do so would-
(a) prevent unreasonable delay; 
(b) save costs; 
( c) be convenient; 
( d) be in the interest of the security of the State or of public safety or 
in the interests of justice or the public; or 
( e) prevent the likelihood that prejudice or harm might result to any 
person if he or she testifies or is present at such proceedings. 
( 4) The court may in order to ensure a fair and just trial make the giving of 
evidence in terms of subsection (2) subject to such conditions as it may deem 
necessary: Provided that the prosecutor and the accused have the right by 
means of that procedure to question a witness and to observe the reaction of 
that witness. 
44 It is too soon to tell whether s 158(3) would afford protection to those victims who 
are older than 18 years but fear the accused's presence in court. Considering the 
interpretation that the Cape High Court adopted in the unreported case of S v Francke 
(Case No SS 22/98 decided 5/05/98 - Butterworths judgements on line [ 1999] JOL 
4451 (C)) it is doubted that the provision can be used to give such protection to 
witnesses. Albertus AJ held thats 158(3) of the CPA makes severe inroads into an 
accused's procedural rights and for that reason ought to be restrictively interpreted. 
The Court held that in order to succeed with an application in terms of s 158(3) of the 
CPA, the party requesting such order from the court needs to prove that subsections 




















5.1.2 Focussing on the element of consent 
Consent45 forms such an integral part of the definition of rape and plays such an 
important role in proving the offence that it justifies special discussion. In analysing 
the definition it should be obvious that much of the success in proving the offence 
against the accused depends on the woman's unwillingness to have sexual intercourse 
with the offender. In principle, her non-consent is viewed as the most important 
element of proving the crime. If, after her testimony, any doubt exists regarding the 
non-consent to sexual intercourse, the required mens rea and probably the required 
actus reus would not have been proved and the accused will in all probability be 
acquitted on the rape charge. A defence of consent raised by the offender immediately 
places a burden on the victim to prove that she did not consent to the act.46 
Once again the focus is on the victim and the way she behavel'7 at the time of the 
offence. Historically this has led to the belief that she must have demonstrated some 
45 In dealing with the element of consent, in his discussion of the rape victim, Justice 
Thomas maintains that the social meaning of consent is perceived to be inherently tied 
to a system of unequal sexual relationships in which the man actively initiates the 
sexual encounter and the woman is relegated to the more passive role of responding to 
his initiatives. Like many feminist scholars, he supports the notion that the approach 
adopted by the criminal law to the offence of rape reflects a male-dominated culture. 
See Justice E W Thomas op cit at 369. 
46 The Tasmanian Law Reform Commission (1982) expressed the same view in its 
Report but in a more forceful way: 
The present focus on consent virtually demands that a defence counsel who is 
doing his job properly must challenge the sexual conduct and personal 
integrity of the complainant and attempt to present her in the most 
unfavourable light. 
(Para 44) 
The Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia in a 
Special Report: Rape and Other Sexual Offences (1976) also noted at 24: 
Lack of consent of the victim as one of the key external elements of rape is 
clearly a problem. It creates difficulties for the jury (in interpreting its 
meaning), for the victim (in focusing the trial on her behaviour) and for the 
Crown (in endeavoring to overcome the stereotyped notions of consenting 
sexual relations from which the jury is likely to derive its interpretation of 
consent). 
47 See HA Snelling 'What is Non-Consent (In Rape)' in Leroy G Schultz (ed) Rape 
Victimology (1975) at 160 who advocates that a jury's task would be much simplified 
if the legal criterion determining consent was only the woman's behaviour and not her 
























physical resistance48 to prove non-consent at the time of the rape.49 Moreover, this 
expectation led to the fact that when a defence was based on consent, it was invariably 
accompanied by an attempt to demonstrate that the complainant was of bad character · 
or even a prostitute, a woman of easy virtue, and that she had consented to the act. 
Defence counsel have argued over lhe years that this kind of character evidence is 
relevant to the issue of consent, it being contended that certain kinds of women would 
be more likely to consent to sexual intercourse than others. 
The issue of consent received pertinent attention in 1976 with a decision of the 
English House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan.50 This case 
concerned the accused Morgan and three others who were convicted of forcibly 
raping Morgan's wife. Morgan's liability was based on the fact that he assisted the 
other three to rape his wife. The Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions but 
certified the following question to the House of Lords: 
Whether in rape the defendant can properly be convicted 
notwithstanding that he in fact believed that the woman consented, if 
such belief was not based on reasonable grounds. 
What made this decision so controversial is that the court held that as long as a man 
honestly believes that a woman is consenting to sexual intercourse, then it is irrelevant 
whether the belief is reasonably held, in other words it is irrelevant whether he is 
actually mistaken in his belief.51 Morgan, and three of his friends, had intercourse 
with Morgan's wife. According to Mrs Morgan she never consented to have 
intercourse with any of the men and protested and struggled throughout the act. The 
defence however claimed that the three appellants believed that she was consenting to 
the intercourse because Morgan told them that she was 'kinky' and that she got turned 
on by a struggle. The trial court convicted the appellants despite their assurance that 
48 S Estrich op cit at 29. 
49 Ann V Mayne and Ann Levett in their article 'The Traumas of Rape - Some 
Considerations' (1977) 1 SACC 165 at 165 attribute the blame for such perception to 
the fact that the crime is incorrectly emphasised as a crime of consent versus non-
consent and not as one of violence. 























they honestly believed that she consented to the act. The appeals of the appellants 
were dismissed, but the majority of the House of Lords decided the question in the 
negative. In other words, negligence was not sufficient to establish the required mens 
rea for rape. This decision caused a furore among the public and some critics have 
gone so fa1 as to call the Morgan decision a 'rapist charter'. 52 Despite the public 
outcry, the case was nevertheless welcomed by criminal law academics.53 The 
untenable situation that prevailed after the Morgan decision was fortunately promptly 
met by legislative reform54 to prevent further injustices of the same kind in the United 
Kingdom. Since the law in South Africa requires that a man must intend to have 
sexual intercourse with a woman knowing or foreseeing that she has not consented to 
the intercourse,55 it is submitted that an accused charged with rape in South Africa 
will in all likelihood not succeed with a defence of mistaken belief to escape liability. 
Another aspect of consent that requires discussion is that, in the absence of physical 
injuries or physical violence, the trial becomes even more focussed on whether the 
woman would have said 'yes' to the offender. The perception that an 'ideal' rape is 
committed through force is also closely tied to the traditional perception that an 
'ideal' rape is committed by a stranger rather than a known person.56 Despite the fact 
51 For a discussion see Simon Gardner 'Reckless and Inconsiderate Rape' 1991 
Criminal LR 172 at 172. 
52 See G Fletcher as quoted by .Richard Singer and Martin R Gardner Crimes and 
Punishment: Cases Materials and Readings in Criminal Law 2 ed (1996) at 511. 
53 See letters to The Times 7 May and 8 May 1975 by Professor J C Smith and 
Professor Glanville Wiliams as quoted by Sanford H Kadish and Stephen J Schulhofer 
Criminal Law and Its Processes - Cases and Materials 6 ed (1995) at 322 and 323. 
54 Parliament enacted s 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act (1976) which 
provided: 
A man commits rape if (a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman 
who at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it; and (b) at that time he 
knows that she does not consent to the intercourse or he is reckless as to 
whether she consents to it. 
55 See Burchell and Milton op cit at 497. 
56 Susan Estrich in her autobiography Real Rape states as follows: 
In many respects I am a ve,y lucky rape victim if there can be such a thing. 
Not because the police never found him: looking for him myself every time I 
crossed the street as I did for a long time may be even harder than confronting 
him in a courtroom. No I am lucky because everyone agrees that I was 'really' 
raped. When I tell my story no one doubts my status as a victim. No one 
suggests that I was 'asking for it.' No one wonders at least out loud if it was 





















that there are other crimes57 for which consent is just as important a defence, it is only 
in rape charges that lack of consent remains insufficient to prove non-consent. 58 
Notwithstanding the fact that resistance is not required to prove that the woman did 
not consent to the rape, it remains a yardstick used by the courts to determine whether 
the complainant consented to the rape or whether she was forcibly raped by the 
offender. 59 Some of the most important problems have been highlighted and should be 
re-considered in any reformulation of the definition in the future; these problems, 
however, should not been seen as the only problems that exist regarding the element 
of consent. 
probably makes my account more believable to some people as it did certainly 
with the police. But the most important thing is that he was a stranger; that he 
approached me not only armed but uninvited; that he was after my money and 
car, which I surely don't give away lightly as well as my body. As one person 
put it: 'You really didn't do anything wrong. '(At 3)(Emphasis added) 
57 Consent also plays an important role in the following common law offences: 
assault, theft and robbery. 
58 For an interesting discussion of the different standards of proving consent in a rape 
charge see Lani A Remick 'Read Her Lips: An Argument for Verbal Consent 
Standard In Rape' ( 1993) 141 University of Pennsylvania LR 1103 at 1103 et seq. 
Consent as a central issue in the law of rape is also discussed by Robin D Wiener 
'Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape' 
(1983) 6 Harvard Womens Law Journal 143. 
59 The mere fact that a woman has submitted to sexual intercourse due to fear or 
retribution does not mean that she consented to the act. This is eloquently stated by 
Murray AJA in R v Swiggelaar 1950 (1) PHH 61 (A) at 110: 
The authorities are clear upon the point that though the consent of a woman 
may be gathered from her conduct apart from her words it is fallacious to take 
the absence of resistance as per se proof of consent. Submission by itself is no 
grant of consent and if a man so intimidates a woman as to induce her to 
abandon resistance and submit to intercourse to which she is unwilling he 
commits the crime of rape. All the circumstances must be taken into account 
to determine whether passivity is proof of implied consent or whether it is 
merely the abandonment of outward resistance which the woman while 
persisting in her objection to intercourse is afraid to display or realises is 
useless. 


















5.2 Evidential problems 
An evaluation of the existing rules of evidence regarding sexual victims truly reflects 
that the law has been slow in recognising and responding to societal changes. 60 This 
phenomenon could be ascribed to the fact that the rules of evidence, even though they 
are adjectival61 in nature, are perhaps more fermented by policy than we have 
recognised. Ignorance of societal changes has led to the fact that the rules of evidence 
and procedure place the victims of sexual offences62 and their conduct as much, or 
even more, on trial as the accused. In a rape trial it is the law of evidence that 
demarcates the different interests that come into play, i.e. on the one hand the 
protection granted to complainants in sexual offences, and on the other hand the 
attempt to balance all rights so that the offender receives a fair trial. I have already 
discussed the impact of cross-examination63 on witnesses but contend that any study 
of rape victims should also include an evaluation of the following evidentiary rules: 
the rule governing previous consistent statements; the cautionary rule; and the 
procedural rule governing the disclosure of complainants' previous sexual history. 
These rules of evidence, which have hitherto impacted negatively on rape victims as 
witnesses in court, should be re-examined in order to determine their use in future. 
5.2.1 Previous consistent statements 
The rule that permits the admissibility of a prev10us statement by a sexual 
complainant as evidence in court is strictly an exception64 to the general rule against 
self-corroboration. The origin of this exception can be traced to the Middle Ages 
60 Scholars, like Armstrong, maintain that one of the most contentious evidential 
rules, namely the cautionary rule, is still based on Victorian notions from the 
nineteenth-century regarding a woman's behaviour and not on notions from the 
twentieth-century. See Alice Armstrong 'Evidence in Rape Cases in Four Southern 
African Countries' (1989) 33 Journal for African Law 172 at 172. 
61 The law of evidence forms part of adjectival law. See generally Schwikkard et al op 
cit at 29 for the distinction between adjectival and substantive law. 
62 The following offences could be classified as sexual offences: rape, indecent 
assault, incest, crimen injuria and certain contraventions of the Sexual Offences Act 
23ofl957. 
63 See chap 3 supra. 



















when it was essential for a victim of rape to raise a 'hue and cry'.65 It provides that a 
previous consistent statement made by a victim of a sexual offence is permissible as 
evidence during the trial. Effectively it meant that if a woman complained about the 
sexual intercourse, the complaint served as a rebuttal of any suspicion of 
untruthfulness of her statement. This rule is so unusual that it has been considered as a 
recognised exception to the general rule66governing the admissibility of evidence.67 
The importance of the previous consistent statement given by a complainant in a 
sexual offence case is described by many scholars68 as relevant to the establishment of 
the consistency of the witness and not as corroboration of the complainant's 
testimony.69 To be admissible, the following requirements should be met: the 
65 J MT Labuschagne 'Die klagte by seksmisdade' (1978) 11 De Jure at 18-20. 
66 The general rule governing the admissibility of evidence is embodied in our CPA. 
In terms of s 210 of the CPA no evidence as to any fact matter or thing shall be 
admissible if it is irrelevant or immaterial in the sense that it cannot conduce to prove 
or disprove any point or fact at issue in criminal proceedings. 
67 For a discussion of this rule see Schwikkard et al op cit at 98-101; Schmidt op cit at 
378-386; Hoffmann and Zeffertt op cit at 118; Du Toit et al op cit at 24-18 to 
24-19; Kriegler op cit at 515-516. It seems that a similar practice existed in the 
Netherlands by which the victim was supposed to shout 'wapen wapen'. For a 
discussion of this practice see Van den Heever J in R v Ellis 1936 SWA 10. 
68 See Schmidt op cit at 385; Hoffmann and Zeffertt op cit at 118-120. 
69 See the judgment of Satchwell J in H oltzhauzen v Roodt 1997 ( 4) SA 7 66 (W) 
where the court emphasised that the purpose of admitting previous consistent 
statements in sexual offence cases, is only to show that a complainant has been 
consistent in her complaint. In this case the evidence of a psychologist who had 
placed the complainant under hypnosis where she had repeated her evidence was 
excluded as irrelevant. The defence had sought to introduce the expert testimony of 
the psychologist to prove that the statement of the complainant had to be true if it was 
repeated in such circumstances. The Court ruled that the admission of such testimony 
would usurp the function of the court in determining the truth or falsehood of the 
complainant's testimony. In Holtzhauzen v Roodt it was also held that there is in our 
law no numerus clausus of circumstances in which previously consistent statements 
can be admitted as evidence. It is submitted that the court erred in finding that no 
closed list of circumstances exists governing the admissibility of previous consistent 
statements. Our law has always recognised only a specified number of circumstances 
in which previous consistent statements will be permitted as admissible evidence. See 
Schwikkard et al op cit 97 and generally Schmidt and Zeffertt op cit par 50. See also 
D Zeffertt 'Law of Evidence' 1997 Annual Survey of South African Law 718 at 739 

















statement must have been made voluntarily and it must have been made within a 
reasonable time 70 after commission of the sexual offence. 
Although this rule no longer applies in the original form 71 in which it was introduced 
to the law of evidence, it is still applied by our courts today. Proponents of the rule 
claim that the rule favours rape victims in that it supports the testimony of the 
complainant. Such arguments cannot be supported because not all rape victims 
respond in the same way after being raped. 72 The effect of the rule may very well be 
to affect a complainant's credibility adversely if she did not complain to someone 
shortly after being raped. 73 Burgess and Holstrom 74 found that, whilst it is commonly 
supposed that in the aftermath of the rape the victim will be hysterical and tearful, 
many victims have a controlled response in which they mask their feelings and appear 
to be calm and composed. Research has shown that silence is part of a series of post-
traumatic responses, which are caused by crimes such as rape. 75 So the perception that 
a recent complaint may still favour a rape victim's credibility is quite unjustified. 
What makes this rule even more controversial is that, although it cannot be used as 
corroboration of the complainant's testimony, the absence or lateness of a previous 
70 Reasonable time has been interpreted by the courts as being the first reasonable 
opportunity. See R v C 1955 (4) SA 40 (N). See generally the discussion by 
Schwikkard et al op cit at 100. 
71 See S E van der Merwe 'Die Toelatingsgrond en Bewyswaarde van Klagtes in 
Seksmisdade' 1980 Obiter 86 at 86-92; more specifically regarding the development 
of the rule at 87. 
72 It seems that the rule is based on another myth, namely that the natural reaction of 
any sexual complainant is to immediately tell someone about the offence. Research by 
Temkin inter alia has shown that most victims are too embarrassed to tell anyone, let 
alone to do so spontaneously and early, as is required by the rule. See J Temkin op cit 
at 145-146. 
73 It appears that this view is shared by the South African Human Rights Commission 
which stated in a submission to the Justice Portfolio Committee in a public hearing on 
Violence Against Women that in instances where a 'first report' is not made, 
complainants' credibility is challenged on the grounds that they should have 
complained. See submission W28 para 3.1. 
74 A Burgess and LL Holmstrom Rape Crisis and Recove,y (1979) at 36. Cf. 
Holtzhauzen v Roodt 1997 (4) SA 766 (W) at 779B where expert testimony was 
admitted with regard to the different responses demonstrated by rape victims after 
being raped. 
75 Morrison Torrey 'When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair 
Trial in Rape Persecutions' (1991) 24 UC Davis LR 1013 at 1015-1016. 





















statement can be used by the defence to cast doubt on the credibility of the rape 
victim. The South African courts have held that lateness of a complaint about the rape 
can be considered an adverse factor in determining the trustworthiness of a 
1 . t 76 I R M 77 1 . . . f comp aman . n v , an appea agamst a conv1ct10n o rape, Schreiner ACJ 
made the following remarks: 
In his judgment Snyman AJ, after summarising the evidence said that 
if the complainant had made a report immediately after the incident the 
case would have presented very little difficulty. He then said that the 
Court had gone very carefully into the question whether the absence of 
an early report by the complainant was not perhaps due to the fact that 
she had not been raped, as she stated, but had intercourse by consent 
with some person other than the appellant. In particular the learned 
Judge said that the Court had examined the possibility that she had had 
connection with Willem, with whom she had been alone in the veld for 
something like half an hour. The Court found that Willem gave his 
evidence very well and was truthful; his denial that he had had 
connection with the complainant was accepted. And the Court was 
satisfied that the complainant's delay in reporting the matter was due 
to her being shy and sensitive, and also possibly to her mother's being 
over-emotional and on that account a person to whom her daughter 
76 See S v De Villiers en 'n Ander 1999 (1) SACR 297 (0). In this matter the 
complainants made reports one year after they were raped. On appeal the Free State 
High Court held that such lateness of these reports would affect their credibility 
adversely; and Cillie J held with reference to this delay as follows: 
Die feit dat die klaagsters, volgens die getuienis so lank gewag het voordat die 
aangeleentheid openbaar is, is 'n verdere faktor teen die aanvaarding van hulle 
getuienis. Die datums waarop hierdie gebeure sou plaasgevind het, was 
volgens alle aanduidings aan die begin van 1995. Die klagtes is eers in 1996 
gemaak nadat daar tugtiging op van die klaagsters uitgeoefen is. Die beginsel 
is dat die klaagster in 'n seksuele mid1yf by die eerste geleentheid wat dit 
redelikerwys van haar verwag kan word, haar klagte behoort te opper. Hoe 
!anger die tydsverloop hoe grater die moontlikheid dat die verhaal 'n versinsel 
is. Trouens, die feit dat die klaagsters eers na verloop van 'n lang tydperk en 
'n aantal vorige geleenthede daartoe kla kan juins die teenoorgestelde effek as 
die normale he, naamlik dit kan dien as bewys van die onbetroubaarheid van 
die klaagsters;'(At 306b-d) 
· (Emphasis added) 














might find it difficult to unburden herself. So regarding the matter the 
Court did not find that the complainant's delay in reporting provided a 
sufficient reason for doubting her truthfulness. 78 
In other jurisdictions ~lso it becomes apparent that rape victims have had to bear the 
risk of appearing untruthful if they did not complain about the rape shortly after it 
occurred. In Kilby v The Queen,79 Barwick CJ in the High Court of Australia said 
the following: 
It would no doubt be proper for a trial judge to instruct a jury that in 
evaluating the evidence of a woman who claims to have been the 
victim of a rape and in determining whether to believe her, they could 
take into account that she had made no compliant at the earliest 
reasonable opportunity. Indeed in my opinion, such a direction would 
not only be proper but, depending of course on the particular 
circumstances of the case, ought as a general rule be given. 80 
It is submitted that there is no longer a sound basis for retaining this exception81 to the 
general rule of admissibility in our law and that it should be discarded. It has become 
necessary to re-consider the use of this rule in our law, particularly since the 
cautionary rule in sexual offence cases has now been abolished. 82 
Ultimately if one considers the concept of corroboration83 as applied in our law of 
evidence then one cannot but be convinced by the view expressed by Chief Justice 
78 M supra at 357B-E. (Emphasis added.) 
79 [1973] 129 CLR 460. 
8° Kilby supra at 465. Emphasis· added. 
81 Other academics, like Murphy, are just as puzzled about the basis of the rule. In fact 
he goes so far as to state: 'It must be confessed that if ever there was some reasoned 
basis for the exception about to be discussed it has become well hidden in the mists of 
time.' See Peter Murphy Murphy on Evidence 5 ed (1995) at 452. 
82 See discussion of the cautionary rule at 5.2.2 infi·a. 
83 Lord Reid in DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 729 defines the concept 
corroboration in the following words: 
There is nothing technical in the idea of corroboration. When in the ordinary 
affairs of life one is doubtful whether or not to believe a particular statement 





















Hiemstra in S v M84 that there is no ground of admissibility in our law of evidence 
such as 'consistency',85 and that it is in essence nothing other than 'admissible self-
corroboration. '86 Van der Merwe supports the view of Hiemstra CJ regarding the fact 
that consistency is not a recognised ground for admissibility in the law of evidence. 
He maintains however that consistency is to be distinguished from self-
corroboration. 87 In support of his argument he states that the previous consistent 
statement made by the victim cannot be considered as corroboration of the victim's 
testimony because it is not emanating from an independent source. But this is exactly 
why the complaint should not be considered as admissible evidence. To prove that 
something is consistent with something else said or done, is nothing other than 
circumstances relating to the particular matter; the better it fits in, the more 
one is inclined to believe it. The doubted statement is corroborated to a greater 
or lesser extent by the other statements or circumstances with which it fits in. 
See also Peter Murphy op cit at 495 who states that the word corroboration 'means 
support or confirmation'. 
84 1980 (1) SA 586 (BH). 
85 See the judgment by Ridley J in Rex v Osborne [ 1905] 1 KB 551 in particular at 
558 wherein the court held: 
Such complaints are admissible not merely as negativing consent but because 
they are consistent with the story of the prosecutrix. In all ordinary cases 
indeed the principle must be observed which rejects statements made by 
anyone in the prisoner's absence. Charges of this kind form an exceptional 
class and in them such statements ought under proper safeguards to be 
admitted. 
The learned judge examines the rule further and then states at 560: 
These complaints are to be admitted not only because they bear on the 
question of consent but also because they bear on the probability of her 
testimony in a case in which without such or other corroboration reliance 
might not be placed on her testimony. 
86 Self-corroboration can be defined as corroboration emanating from the source itself. 
See DPP v Kilbourne supra at 456: 
We must be astute to see that the apparently corroborative statement is truly 
independent of the doubted statement. If there is any real chance that there has 
been collusion between the makers of the two statements we should not accept 
them as corroborative. And the law says that a witness· cannot corroborate 
himself (Emphasis added) 
If corroborative material must flow from an independent source then it is submitted 
that cases of self-corroboration are not meeting the admissibility requirement of 
emanating from an independent source and is merely a repetition by the witness 
himself. See People v Williams [1940] IR 195 at 200 where Sullivan CJ formulated 
corroborative material as 'independent evidence of material circumstances tending to 
implicate the accused in the comission of the crime with which he was charged.' 
87 See S E van der Merwe 'Die Toelatingsgrond en Bewyswaarde van Klagtes in 




















looking for support for the statement of the complainant. Once considered as 
'support'88 for the credibility of the complainant's statement, it can be nothing but 
corroboration of the complainant's testimony. It appears that other academics, like 
Labuschagne, 89 support the view that the previous consistent statement fulfils a 
corroborative function. 90 If this is so, then the rule inherently violates the general rule 
of admissibility of evidence, which excludes self-corroborated testimony and should 
not be supported on any premise. It is submitted that the rule should be abrogated 
through legislative reform. In Canada, for example, the adverse effects of this rule 
were abrogated by legislation that improved the treatment meted out to sexual 
1 · · 91 comp amants m court. 
5.2.2 Cautionary rule 
Another example, which illustrates the law's distrust of rape victims, is the cautionary 
rule as applied by our courts until recently. Much of the suffering of rape victims 
88 See DPP v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 315 where Lord Morris said: 
The purpose of corroboration is not to give validity or credence to evidence 
which is deficient or suspect or incredible but only to confirm and support that 
which as evidence is sufficient and satisfactory and credible ... (Emphasis 
added). 
89 See J M T Labuschagne 'Versigtigheidsreels by Seksuele Sake: Opmerkings oor die 
Mensregtelike Begrensing van die Bewysreg' 1992 Obiter 131 at 134. 
90 Ibid at 134. The author chooses however to rely on the Canadian case of Trimm v R 
(1981) 59 CCC (2d) 396 (SC) in support of his argument. In the aforementioned case 
the court held as follows: 
That exception was recognised as necessary to negate the adverse effect the 
alleged victim's silence might have on her credibility when relating the 
circumstances of the offence and if essential to the commission of the offence 
or simply averred by the victim the victim's credibility when asserting absence 
of consent. That possible adverse effect is predicated upon the assumption that 
the true victim of a sexual offence will under normal circumstances complain 
at the first reasonable opportunity. Early complaint evidence seeks to negate 
the inference that could otherwise be drawn from the victim's silence as a 
result of that assumption.(At 402) 
91 Sees 277 of the Canadian Criminal Code, which provides for the abrogation of 
rules relating to the evidence of recent complaints in sexual cases. Whilst some may 
argue that such a provision will be detrimental to the case of the complainant because 
the prosecution will no longer be in a position to tender such testimony, others may be 
of the view that such an abrogation of the rule is to the advantage of a complainant 
because no longer will she have to justify why she did not respond immediately by 
making a report after the rape. See the comparative analysis undertaken by J Temkin 















could be ascribed to the operation of this infamous rule that subjected victims to the . 
experience of having the truth of their complaint doubted. To understand this 
phenomenon it is necessary to look at the history of the rule, and to consider certain 
myths and attitudes associated therewith.92 
The cautionary rule is a rule of practice that developed over many years. According to 
this rule courts should exercise caution in evaluating certain kinds of evidence.93 One 
of its applications was in the evaluation of the testimony of complainants in sexual 
offences. This 'corroboration warning' 94 by the courts made the cautionary rule 
extremely questionable.95 It required that the evidence of complainants be treated with 
92 For a discussion of the some of the myths, prejudices and attitudes that existed with 
regard to women that cry rape - see Louise Fryer 'Law versus prejudice: views on rape 
through the centuries' (1994) 1 SACJ 60. 
93 The rule is generally followed in the ·evaluation of the following witnesses for 
example: single witnesses, accomplices, child witnesses, complainants in sexual cases 
and in cases of evidence of entrapment. For a discussion of the rule see Schwikkard et 
al op cit at 388-392; Hoffmann and Zeffertt op cit at 572-584; Schmidt op cit at 121-
131. See S v Avon Bottle Store (Pty) Ltd and Others 1963 (2) SA 389 (A) and the 
dictum of Botha JA: 
It is clear that the cautionary rule requires no more than an appreciation by the 
trier of fact of the risk of false incrimination ... (At 393F-H) 
94 This 'corroboration warning' derived from the English common law requirement 
that trial judges warn juries of the dangers of convicting on the uncorroborated 
evidence of accomplices and sexual complainants. It was however finally abrogated 
by s 32 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in the United Kingdom. 
See Murphy op cit at 496-497. 
95 Questioning the justification for this common law approach, Susan Estrich in her 
book Real Rape at 54 and 55 states the following: 
The cautionary instruction is the final example of the institutionalisation of the 
law's distrust of women victims through the rules of evidence and procedure. 
Juries are always told .... that they must be convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the defendant's guilt. In rape cases since the 19th century they have 
also been told sometimes in Hale's own words that they must be especially 
suspicious of the woman victim. In a fairly typical version of the instruction 
the jury is told 'to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness 
with special care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the 
difficulty of determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities 
carried out in private'. All women who are forced to have sex therefore have 
an 'emotional involvement' in the event and are not to be totally trusted in 

















caution; and because the majority of complainants are overwhelmingly women, they 
in consequence suffered unfair discrimination.96 
In S v J97 the South African Supreme Court of Appeal was given an opportunity to 
reconsider its approach to the controversial question of the cautionary rule that 
hitherto has been applied in sexual offences cases. An examination of the rule as 
applied in these cases shows that it was traditionally founded on the belief that the 
normal rules of evidence and procedure, designed to prevent an incorrect conviction, 
were considered insufficient to protect the accused against the wiles of complainants 
in sexual cases, and, in particular, rape cases. Over the years, a number of reasons 
were proffered for upholding the rule: the belief that complainants in sexual offence 
cases are inclined to use this easily laid charge to further their own ends, or that 
complaints are based on events that are the imagined product of a hysterical mind. 
Many of these claims referred back to the infamous statement of Lord Chief Justice 
Matthew Hale98 some three centuries ago, that bringing a rape charge was 'easy' and 
that the charge was 'difficult to refute' .99 All the blame cannot, however, be pinned on 
the Lord Chief Justice, because even Sigmund Freud was of the opinion that women 
unconsciously want to be raped: 
[A] woman's need for sexual satisfaction may lead to the unconscious 
desire for forceful penetration, the coercion serving neatly to avoid the 
guilt feelings which might arise after willing participation. 100 
Wigmore in a similar vein stated: 
96 See S v D 1992 (1) SACR 143 (Nm) at 146f-h. See Dawie Fouche 'Die 
versigtigheidsreel in gevalle van seksuele wangedrag: S v D and Another in oenskou' 
(1993) 6 Consultus 50. Fouche argues that the rule is not discriminatory in nature and 
although the article was written by him before the judgment delivered in S v M l 992 
(2) SACR (W) he is in full support of the view held by the court in M. 
97 1998 (2) SA 984 (SCA). 
98 Although the cautionary rule that existed in most Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions derived 
from Hale's view, Anna Clark, in a study of rapes of the 18th and 19th century in 
England, maintains that some of the mistrust and myths that existed regarding women 
can be attributed to the fact that seduction was confused with rape. See Anna Clark 
Women's Silence Men's Violence (1987) at 4. 





















The unchaste (let us call it) mentally finds incidental but direct 
expression in the narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the 
narrator is the heroine or the victim. On the surface the narration is 
straightforward and convincing. The real victim, however, too often in 
such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy naturally 
felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy credit to 
such plausible tale. 101 
These and similar statements led our courts to believe that they should be on the 
lookout for a 'multiplicity of motives' that might inspire a complainant to lay a 
false 102 charge of rape. These perceived motives ranged from an attempt to conceal 
consensual intercourse from disapproving parents, revenge for the rejection of sexual 
overtures; the financial incentive to implicate a man able to provide adequate support 
for the child of the pregnant complainant; to being 'overcome by feelings of shame, 
disgust or remorse', sexual frustration and even 'flights of fancy' to which women 
are, stereotypically, supposedly prone. 103 
An examination of the realities of laying a charge of rape and of following it through 
to its conclusion in court, reveals that these 'motives' are themselves best described as 
flights of fancy. In dealing with the preposterousness of the corroboration warning in 
cases of sexual assault, Ian Dennis writes: 
100 See note 'Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and 
Objectives of the Consent Standard' (1952) 62 Yale LJ 55 at n85. 
101 Op cit para 924A. Citing the discoveries of 'modem psychiatry' Wigmore op cit at 
736 warned that women's testimony is untrustworthy: 
Their psychic complexes are multifarious distorted partly by inherent defects 
partly by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts partly by bad social 
environment partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions. One 
form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false charges of sexual 
offences by men... . Judging merely from the reports of cases in the appellate 
courts one must infer that many innocent men have gone to prison because of 
tales whose falsity could not be exposed. 
102 Recent research has shown that the proportion of false rape charges is negligible 
and perhaps as low as 2% a figure that is comparable to other criminal offences. See 
David P Bryden and Sonja Lengnick 'Rape in the Criminal Justice System' (1997) 87 











It is truly extraordinary to say that all female victims of sex crimes are 
presumed to be perjurers or fantasists unless the jury is convinced 
otherwise ... As a result of [Bagshaw] women victims are treated less 
favourable by the law of evidence than mental patients, to whom a 
genera! corroboration requirement does not apply. 104 
Bringing a rape charge is by no means an 'easy' thing to do. A rape victim who has 
suffered what the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Chapman 105 has described as 'a 
humiliating, degrading and brutal invasion of the privacy, the dignity and the person 
of the victim', would undoubtedly be reluctant to approach the authorities to be 
subjected to repeated, prying questions of potentially insensitive police officers and 
the harsh, invasive medical examination that must follow any allegation of rape. 
Should a victim nevertheless have the courage to proceed with the charge and the 
matter subsequently comes to trial, she will then once again have to relive the trauma 
through a distressing court process. 106 Not too long ago the South African Law 
Commission noted the following criticism against the application of the rule: 
This rule discriminates against the female sex and testifies to an 
insulting and false assumption that by its very nature a woman's 
evidence must automatically be approached with suspicion. If it is 
borne in mind that a complainant is often the only witness to rape, the 
application of the rule is a telling example of the alleged second 
victimisation since the complainant is clearly subjected to the 
experience of having her word doubted. 107 
Notwithstanding this criticism, the Law Commission in its report recommended that 
103 See R v W 1949 (3) SA 772 (A) at 788; S v M 1992 (2) SACR 188 (W) at l 90f; S v 
Balhuber 1987 (1) PHH 22 (A) at 44; S v F 1989 (3) SA 847 (A) at 854H-I. 
104 Ian Dennis 'Corroboration Requirements Reconsidered' 1984 Criminal LR 316 at 
326. 
105 1997 (2) SACR 3 (SCA) at 5b. 
106 See S v J supra at 1008e-g in support of this view and Catherine MacKinnon 
Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (1989) at 179. 
107South African Law Commission Project 45 Report on Women and Sexual Offences 






















there be no changes to the cautionary rule 108as applied by the courts. It is submitted 
that the recommendation to retain the rule in its conventional form and the statement 
that the rule is in no way related to or partially responsible for the trauma experienced 
by rape complainants, were extremely short sighted and without foundation. 109 
Despite the realities highlighted above the courts have persisted in their belief that 
various grounds might motivate complainants to implicate an accused falsely. 110 
Courts have adhered to this rule in a very rigid manner. Non-compliance with the rule 
resulted more than once in convictions being overturned on appeal. Before the 
decision in S v J it was required that trial courts should acknowledge the need to 
adopt a cautious approach to the testimony of this class of witnesses and, in addition, 
that judgments should reflect that the testimony had indeed been cautiously evaluated 
and that the court had not merely been paying lip service to the rule. 111 This resulted 
in the application of a 'double' cautionary rule where the complainant was (as is so 
often the case) a single witness for the state. Consequently, complainants testifying in 
these matters had to overcome an onerous burden premised on mistrust. No such 
burden was imposed on any other witness testifying on behalf of the state in any other 
criminal trial. 
Fortunately S v J has finally changed this invidious position. 112 The important facts 
of S v J were these: The complainant, a 17 year old schoolgirl, testified that she was 
spending the afternoon with her sister and friends when they met the appellant, a 
108 Op cit para 3.69-70. 
109 Cf. S v J supra at 1009e-g. 
110 See for example Schreiner JA in Rautenbach 1949 (1) SA 135 (A) at 143: 
It is not only the risk of conscious fabrication that must be guarded against; 
there is also the danger that a frightened woman especially if inclined to 
hysteria may imagined that things have happened which did not happen at all. 
Further the dictum of Lewis AJA in R v J 1966 (1) SA 88 (R) at 92A-B: 
In the case of all females alleging sexual assaults the need for similar caution 
in the absence of corroboration flows from the fact that such charges are easily 
laid and difficult for the accused to disprove and a multiplicity of motives may 
exist for their being falsely laid. This has been recognised since time 
immemorial and a classic example of such false charge can be found in the 
Biblical story of Potiphar's wife and Joseph. 
111 Cf. S v F supra at 852h-853c; S v S 1990 (1) SACR 5 (A) at 9b-d; S v M supra at 
190d-e; S v Mayiya 1997 (2) BCLR 386 (C) at 393e. 
112 Not only was the decision welcomed by academics and other writers but it was 
also welcomed by organisations such as Rape Crisis. See B Pithey 'Sexual Assault and 























policeman known to the complainant. The appellant then gave driving lessons to 
some of the girls in the group. These 'lessons' led to the appellant and complainant 
ending up alone in his car. They then had a few glasses of beer and he started to kiss 
her. She pulled away but he overpowered her and succeeded in throwing himself 
upon her. She tried to fight him off but succcedd only in scratching him on the 
forehead. He persisted and had sexual intercourse with her. However, her shouting 
and screaming soon made him desist and that gave her an opportunity to jump out 
and run away. 
The complainant later told her sister and friend in a hysterical state that she had been 
raped by the appellant. This accusation was repeated to the appellant when he 
returned to the group: he denied the accusation. Both the complainant and the 
appellant were examined by the district-surgeon subsequent to the charge being laid. 
The complainant's version was corroborated by her sister. Testimony of the district 
surgeon also provided some corroboration of the evidence of the complainant in that 
it confirmed a slight degree of penetration. 
The appellant's version of the events differed from what complainant stated in all 
material aspects. He denied that he had exposed himself to her or that he had 
attempted to rape her. When the appellant was examined by the district-surgeon 
scratch marks were found on his forehead and right ear. This he explained away as 
having being inflicted by his wife when she heard of the complainant's accusations 
against him. According to the district-surgeon the complainant was shocked when 
examined and experienced the examination as painful. He could not confirm full 
penetration but confirmed finding abrasions, which he considered reconcilable with 
unlubricated sexual intercourse. The regional court magistrate rejected the 
appellant's evidence as untrue and unreliable and accepted the complainant's 
version. On appeal to the Provincial Division the appellant argued that the regional 
magistrate had not properly applied the cautionary rule and therefore had not treated 
the evidence of the complainant with sufficient scepticism. The Provincial Division 
accepted this argument but confirmed the conviction on different grounds not 


















Before the Supreme Court of Appeal the state defended the original judgment of the 
regional magistrate but argued that the cautionary rule should be rejected. It 
challenged the cautionary rule on the basis that it discriminates against women, and 
that it furthermore unjustifiably increases the burden of proof on the state in proving 
the guilt of an accused in cases of a sexual nature. After reviewing academic and legal 
literature on the development of the rule Olivier JA, writing for the Court, found that 
the rule was based on outdated stereotypes and expressed his disapproval of the 
cautionary rule. 113 Importantly too, Olivier JA acknowledged that there is no 
empirical evidence to support the suggestion that false charges are laid more often in 
rape cases than in other types of cases. The Court, after analysing various sources 
from other jurisdictions, came to the conclusion that 'the fact is that such empirical 
research as has been done refutes the notion that women lie more easily or more 
frequently than men, or that they are intrinsically unreliable witnesses' .114 Judge 
Olivier set out the approach that should be adopted by the courts for the evaluation of 
witnesses generally. 115 This in essence seems to be that courts should not treat a 
witness's evidence with caution unless there is some indication, specific to the 
particular case, that there is a reason to do so. 116 It would appear then that caution 
would for example be called for if a possible motive for false testimony is objectively 
demonstrated. Furthermore it should be borne in mind that the cautionary rule does 
not alter the burden of proof, but is merely a rule of practice intended to remind, a 
presiding officer to exercise a common sense approach when analysing the evidence 
of certain witnesses. 117 
Whilst the legal community has long awaited the decision of a nationally authoritative 
court on the continued existence of the cautionary rule and more specifically on the 
constitutionality of the rule, this was not the basis on which the Court decided the 
case. Although the Court referred on several occasions to the fact that the cautionary 
rule operates unfairly towards, and discriminates against, women, it did not make a 
I 
13 At 1009f-g. 
114 At 1008a-b. 
115 At 1009-1010. 
116See S v J supra at 1010d-e quoting Lord Taylor's guidelines as set out in R v 
Makanjuola: R v Easton [1995] 3 All ER 730 (CA) at 733c-d. 
117 Cf. S v Artman and Another 1968 (3) SA 339 (A) at 341; S v Mayiya 1997 (2) 





















single reference to the Constitution, which is unquestionably the ultimate repository 
and shield of citizens' rights. Legal commentators cannot be blamed for being 
optimistic that our highest court would make a declaration of some kind regarding the 
constitutionality of the rule. Hopes had previously been raised by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in S v Chapman 118 that the rule would be rejected on constitutional 
grounds, for it had hinted (without deciding) that the cautionary rule might be struck 
down by a constitutional bludgeon. It seemed therefore likely that the court in S v J 
would deal with the cautionary rule in the context of the right to equality, particularly 
in light of the recent judgment of S v Chapman. 119 However it failed to seize the 
opportunity. The Namibian High Court had already led the way with S v D, 120in 
which the Court held that the cautionary rule infringes upon the right to equality. 121 
More recently the Cape High Court had echoed this with similar pronouncements in S 
v M122 in which Davis AJ had emphasised that the cautionary rule should be applied 
in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. It was these 
pronouncements that had indicated to the legal community that the Supreme Court of 
Appeal was ready to deal with the constitutionality of the rule. But Rome was not 
built in a day and it should be borne in mind that this watershed judgment was 
delivered by the very same judge who not so long ago, in circumstances similar to 
those in this case, considered correctional supervision an appropriate sentence for two 
appellants convicted of the rape of a 19 year old virgin. 123 
Despite these criticisms it is submitted that that the Supreme Court of Appeal is 
deserving of praise for finally addressing its past errors by ruling that the testimony of 
victims of sexual offences should not be treated in the same manner as accomplices 
and children. It is a break with the past that finally grants 'sexual complainants' the 
same 'status' as any other witness who testifies on behalf of the state. The gist of the 
judgment of S v J is perhaps best captured in these words of Olivier JA: 
118 1997 (2) SACR 3 (SCA). 
119 S v Chapman supra at 4f-g. 
120 1992 (1) SA 513 (Nm). 
121 S v D supra at 516H-I. 
122 1997 (2) SACR 682 (C) at 685e-j. 

























In my view, the cautionary rule in sexual assault cases is based on an 
irrational and out-dated perception. It unjustly stereotypes 
complainants in sexual assault cases ( overwhelmingly women) as 
particularly unreliable. In our system of law, the burden is on the State 
to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt - no more 
and no less. The evidence in a particular case may call for a cautionary 
approach, but that is a far cry from the application of a general 
cautionary rule. 124 
The judgment should have a maJor impact on existing practices requmng 
corroboration in cases of a sexual nature. Presiding officers no longer have to apply 
the cautionary rule in evaluating the evidence of complainants on the sole basis that 
complainants in sexual offences have a motive for falsely incriminating the accused. 
What is required of presiding officers is that in determining the credibility of a 
witness they evaluate the testimony of such witnesses within the context of all the 
evidence available to the court. Any treatment of sexual complainants as witnesses, 
other than that meted out to ordinary witnesses, is no longer justified. To ensure that 
complainants in sexual cases receive equal treatment is an approach that is rational, 
sound and justifiable in terms of the protections guaranteed in the Constitution. 
The Court's decision in J heralds a new era in South African law of evidence 
pertaining to the testimony of victims of sexual assault. In future accused persons in 
sexual offence cases will receive the same protection against false evidence as 
accused people in all other cases; the difference will be that complainants, who were 
treated with unjustified suspicion through the application of this rule in the past, will 
now receive proper and fair treatment. 
5.2.3 Sexual history evidence 
A discussion of the evidential rules pertaining to rape victims would be incomplete 
without an analysis of the procedures that mandate protection of the complainant's 
unrelated sexual past. Like so many other aspects of the offence it is again the nature 
of the offence that distinguishes it from others, and which exposes victims to 
























and interrogations 126 of an intimate character. Victims may be required to 
answer questions about their unrelated sexual history which constitutes yet another 
impediment in the criminal process of bringing justice to rape victims. Personal 
questions about their sexual history impinge upon these witnesses in ways that differ 
from the ordinary rigor~ cf being a witness in court. Professor Berger127 depicts the 
awkwardness and the intimacy of the questions in the following words: 
For many people (especially in our society, women) the trauma of 
baring one's intimate past to the eyes of the world-turning one's 
bedroom into a showcase-overshadows the usual discomfort of 
testifying, or having others testify, to one's biases, lies or even 
convictions of criminal acts. 128 
Once again the focus is on the character of the complainant, and it becomes extremely 
important for two reasons: first to determine whether she consented to the act, and 
secondly, to determine whether she is a credible witness. It is submitted that in more 
than one way it is the credibility of the complainant in a sexual case that shapes the 
ultimate decision in a rape trial. Let me put it differently: if the complainant appears 
to be a credible and trustworthy witness then it is very likely that the offender will be 
125 It is acknowledged that the phase most feared by rape victims is the phase of cross-
examination. As McEwan commented: 'It appears to be thought legitimate to quiz 
them upon the way they care for their children what underwear they were wearing at 
the time of the alleged rape whether they use make-up and take trouble with their hair 
and upon the details of their menstrual cycles for no apparent reason other than to 
humiliate and embarrass them.' See Jenny McEwan Evidence and the Adversarial 
Process - The Modern Law 2 ed (1998) at 127. Justice Thomas op cit at 371, 
especially the discussion of rape victims' experiences in court. He describes cross-
examination of rape victims as harrowing and a painful ordeal by which it will be 
required of these victims to keep on recalling the details of each incident over and 
over agam. 
126 It is submitted that fear of such interrogation is one of the many reasons that so 
many rapes go unreported. See Shacara Boone 'New Jersey Rape Shield Legislation: 
From Past to Present - The Pros and Cons' (1996) 17 Women's Rights Law Reporter 
221 at 223, stating that this fear of divulging their sexual past undoubtedly deterred 
the reporting of rape in the United States. It is however not only the United States that 
experiences low reporting levels but also Canada, Australia and New Zealand. See 
Susan M Edwards Sex and Gender in the Legal Process ( 1996) at 331. 
127 See Vivian Berger 'Man's Trial Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the 
Courtroom' 1977 Columbia LR 1. 
























convicted of the charge. At first blush this seems quite an easy obligation to fulfil: if 
the complainant is telling the truth then the state will succeed in proving its case. The 
realities however prove to be quite different. 
The aforesaid is confirmed by a review of sexual history evidence in common law 
jurisdictions which supports the notion that throughout these jurisdictions such 
victims were treated with suspicion and distrust. 129 Because these victims were 
cloaked with distrust and suspicion, evidence of their prior sexual history was not 
only relevant as evidence but was considered material to the issues of consent and 
credibility. These concerns were succinctly described by Madam Justice L'Heureux-
Dube in the Canadian case of R v Seaboyer130 
At common law, the pnor sexual history of the complainant was 
admissible on two issues, one material and one collateral. It was 
thought that 'unchasteness' was relevant to the material issue of 
consent and the collateral issue of credibility. In other words, women 
who had consensual sex outside of marriage were thought, in essence, 
to have a dual propensity: to consent to sexual relations at large and to 
lie.131 
As a result of these rules regarding relevance which developed in the common law, 
defence counsel under the guise of relevance were permitted to delve into the moral 
character of the complainant by adducing evidence of her sexual past. 132 This process 
of interrogation about her conduct once again effectively placed the complainant 'on 
129 See 5.2.2 supra for a discussion of some of the myths that surrounded women who 
cried rape and the mistrust of these women. 
130 [1991] 66 CCC (3d) 321. 
131 Seaboyer supra at 346b-d. 
132 The pedigree of the presumptions claiming that a complainant's sexual past is 
relevant to the issue of consent dates back to Hale who stated: 
The party ravished may give evidence upon oath and is in law a competent 
witness but the credibility of her testimony and how far forth she is to be 
believed must be left to the jury and is more or less credible according to the 
circumstances of fact that concur in that testimony. For instance if the witness 
be of good fame if she presently discovered the offence and made pursuit after 
the offender showed circumstances and signs of injury ... these ... give greater 



















trial' rather than the accused. Once more, the common law failed these witnesses. 
Their only hope was that judges would exercise their discretion in such a manner that 
they would be protected against irrelevant and prejudicial sexual history evidence 
adduced by the defence. That judges failed to offer protection to these complainants is 
well put by Sheehy: 133 
What is clear... is that no common law system of discretion can 
possibly achieve the legislative objectives ... The best, we can hope for 
will be diverse interpretations of the circumstances in which certain 
evidence is 'relevant' and constitutes a 'constitutional exemption'. 
These interpretations will vary from trial judge to trial judge across the 
country. The worst we might receive are expansive interpretations of 
'relevance' which will be detrimental to women both individually and 
collectively. This is a particular concern, given the abysmal record of 
the Canadian judiciary under the common law, and under the modified 
common law regime of the old s 142, which was the impetus for the 
revocation of judicial discretion by Parliament. 134 
It is in this context that I will look at the measures and procedures adopted in Canada, 
the United Kingdom and the United States to shield rape victims from unnecessary 
questions about their sexual past and compare them to the protection offered by South 
African law. 
(a) Canada 
In Canada various amendments were passed over the past two decades to grant greater 
protection to complainants in sexual cases. One of the first amendments of these was s 
142 of the Canadian Criminal Code, 135 which was aimed at alleviating some of the 
See Matthew Hale History of the Pleas of the Crown (1836) 1971 ed at 633. 
133 See Elizabeth Sheehy 'Canadian Judges and the Law of Rape: Should the Charter 
Insulate Bias' (1_989) 21 Ottawa LR 741. 
134 Op cit at 782. 




















problems experienced by enquiries into the complainant's sexual past. 136 Section 142 
is an excellent example of legislation that was well intended but flawed in its 
application by the judiciary. The Canadian case law demonstrates that the judicial 
interpretation of the provision in practice stripped these complainants of any benefit 
that might have accrued to them. 137 In R v Forsythe the Court went so far as to hold 
136 Section 142 has since been re-enacted ass 276 of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
The current provision reads as follows: 
276. (1) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 
155 or 159, subsection 160(2) or(3) or section 170,171,172,173,271,272 or 
273, evidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether 
with 
the accused or with any other person, is not admissible to support an inference 
that, by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant 
(a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms 
the subject-matter of the charge; or 
(b) is less worthy of belief. 
(2) In proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection ( 1 ), no 
evidence shall be adduced by or on behalf of the accused that the complainant 
has engaged in sexual activity other than the sexual activity that forms the 
subject-matter of the charge, whether with the accused or with any other 
person, unless the judge, provincial court judge or justice determines, in 
accordance with the procedures set out in sections 276.1 and 276.2, that the 
evidence 
(a) is of specific instances of sexual activity; 
(b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and 
( c) has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed 
by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration 
of justice. 
(3) In determining whether evidence is admissible under subsection (2), the 
judge, provincial court judge or justice shall take into account 
(a) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a 
full answer and defence; 
(b) society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault 
offences; 
( c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist 
in arriving at a just determination in the case; 
(d) the need to remove from the fact-finding process any 
discriminatory belief or bias; 
( e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of 
prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury; 
(f) the potential prejudice to the complainant's personal dignity and 
right of privacy; 
(g) the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal 
security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and 
(h) any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice 
considers relevant. 























that a complainant in a sexual offences case is compelled to attend the in camera 
inquiry to be held by the judge in terms of s 142. This meant that whereas 
complainants under the common law system had to face an interrogation during the 
trial, they were now faced with having to be interrogated twice by the defence if 
called upon by the defence to do so. 
So, instead of minimising the agony of complainants the section effectively added to 
their distress and trauma. 138 The Canadian legislature however persisted in its 
endeavour to alleviate the victimisation of rape victims and responded by 
promulgating further reforms in 1982. The goal of this reform was the eradication of 
discriminatory rules and practices towards complainants in sexual offences cases. The 
principles of the 'new' reform as expressed by Jean Chretien, the Minister of Justice 
and Attorney-General at that time, reflect an incisive understanding of some of the 
difficulties rape victims have to face once they have turned to the criminal justice 
system for recourse. These are his words: 
The inequality of the present law has placed an unfair burden on 
female victims of sexual assault. It has added to the trauma, stigma and 
embarrassment of being sexually assaulted, and has deterred many 
victims from reporting these serious crimes to the police ... Bill C-53 
would alleviate the legal impediment, which allows this to occur ... I 
am pleased to note that there appears to be widespread support for the 
four basic principles underlying the bill, namely the protection of the 
integrity of the person, the protection of children and special groups, 
the safeguarding of public decency, and the elimination of sexual 
discrimination. 139 
Section 142 was eventually repealed by ss 276 and 277 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code. These two sections became controversial because they severely curtailed the 
138 See dissenting judgment of Justice Wilson in R v Konkin ( 1983) 3 CCC (3d) 289 at 
295 where she refers to s 142 in stating the following; 'in effects 142 instead of 
minimizing the embarrassment to complainants increased it'. 
139 See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice 
and Legal Affairs Issue No 77 22 April 1982 at 77:29 as quoted by Justice L Heureux-
















accused's ability to adduce evidence of sexual reputation and sexual history. 140 The 
aims of the reform were commendable but did not pass constitutional scrutiny. In R v 
Seaboyer 141 the Supreme Court of Canada declared s 276 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code to be of no force and effect on the ground that it was in conflict with the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 142 The matter was finally addressed by 
enacting a new s 276, 143 which altered the old system of controlling evidence of 
sexual history. It allows for a discretion to be exercised by the judge in determining 
the relevance of the evidence being adduced. It is an improvement upon the old 
common law situation in that certain safeguards are included, limiting the discretion 
exercised by judges to prevent some of the injustices of the past. Some of these 
safeguards are that evidence of sexual activity will be inadmissible to support an 
inference that the complainant is likely to have consented to sexual activity on the 
140 The sections that were challenged as being unconstitutiorn:il provided as follows: 
276(1) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 271,272 or 273 
no evidence shall be adduced by or on behalf of the accused concerning the 
sexual activity of the complainant with any person other that the accused 
unless 
(a) it is evidence that rebuts evidence of the complainant's sexual activity or 
absence thereof that was previously adduced by the prosecution; 
(b) it is evidence of specific instances of the complainant's sexual activity 
tending to establish the identity of the person who had sexual contact with the 
complainant on the occasion set out in the charge; or 
( c) it is evidence of sexual activity that took place on the same occasion as the 
sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge where that evidence 
relates to the consent that the accused alleges he believed was given by the 
complainant. 
(2) No evidence is admissible under paragraph (l)(c) unless 
(a) reasonable notice in writing has been given to the prosecutor by or on 
behalf of the accused of his intention to adduce the evidence together with 
particulars of the evidence sought to be adduced; and 
(b) a copy of the notice has been filed with the clerk of the court. 
(3) No evidence is admissible under section (1) unless the judge provincial 
court judge or justice after holding a hearing in which the jury and the 
members of the public are excluded and which the complainant is not a 
compellable witness is satisfied that the requirements of this section are met. 
277. In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 271,272 or 273 
evidence of sexual reputation whether general or specific is not admissible for 
the purpose of challenging or supporting the credibility of the complainant. 
141 R v Seaboyer supra nl30. 
142 Specifically ss 7 and 11 ( d) of the Canadian Charter. 
143 The reform was brought about by Amendment Act S.C. 1992, c.38, s 2. See n136 






















occasion because she is less worthy of belief; 144 and that the evidence must be of 
significant probative value, which is not substantially outweighed by the danger or 
prejudice to the proper administration of justice. 145 The Canadian example gives much 
food for thought in the way that it limits the discretion exercised by judges. No longer 
do they have an unfettered discretion in determining whether sexual history evidence 
is admissible but are forced to take into account146 the rights and needs of the 
complainants. 
(b) United Kingdom 
Rape law in the United Kingdom was considerably reformed after objections to the 
fact that defence counsel may almost cross-examine rape victims without the 
procedure being controlled were submitted by the Advisory Group on Rape to the 
Heilbron Cornmittee. 147 The Committee in its report found inter alia that rape victims 
had to suffer a considerable deal in testifying and that sexual history evidence was 
frequently used to prejudice the jury against these victims. 148 The Committee held that 
the existing laws were in an unsatisfactory state and that they should be revised in line 
with the principle that in general the previous sexual history of a victim with other 
144 Sees 276(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
145 Sees 276(2)(c) of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
146 Section 273(3) of the Canadian Criminal Code provides that a judge shall take into 
account: 
(a) the interest of justice including the right of the accused to make a full 
answer and defence; 
(b) society's interest in encouraging reporting of sexual offences-clearly 
women will be less than anxious to report offences if they know their sexual 
past will be analyzed in court; 
( c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in 
arriving at a just determination of the case; 
(d) the need to remove from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief 
or bias; 
( e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice 
sympathy or hostility in jury; 
(f) the potential prejudice to the complainant's personal dignity and right of 
pnvacy; 
(g) the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal security 
and to the full protection and benefit of the law; 
(h) any other factor that the judge considers relevant. 
147 See the Criminal Law Revision Committee's Fifteenth Report on Sexual Offences, 


















men (including evidence of bad reputation) ought not to be introduced as evidence. It 
was proposed that evidence relating to such past sexual history be firmly controlled. 
Its recommendation then resulted in the enactment of s 2 of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act of 1976 which provides as follows: 
(1) If at any trial ar1y person is charged with a rape offence to which he 
pleads not guilty, then, except with the leave of the judge, no evidence 
and no question in cross-examination shall be adduced or asked at the 
trial, by or on behalf of any defendant at the trial, about any sexual 
experience of a complainant with a person other than that defendant. 
(2) The judge shall not give leave in pursuance of the preceding 
subsection for any evidence or question except on an application made 
to him in the absence of the jury by or on behalf of a defendant; and on 
such an application the judge shall give leave if and only if he is 
satisfied that it would be unfair to that defendant to refuse to allow the 
evidence adduced or the question to be asked. 
(3) In subsection (1) of this section 'complainant' means a woman upon 
whom, in a charge for a rape offence to which the trial in question 
relates, it is alleged that rape was committed, attempted or proposed. 
( 4) Nothing in this section authorises evidence to be adduced or a 
question to be asked which cannot be adduced or asked apart from this 
section. 
Scholars, like Adler, 149maintain that although the legislature offered rape victims 
greater protection through the enactment of s 2 of the Sexual Offences Act, such 
protection only existed in theory. The practice showed that evidence of sexual history 
was still admitted on doubtful grounds and that the decision-making in this area of the 
law was still tainted with prejudices against these victims. 
148 Op cit at para 91. 
149 See Zsuzsanna Adler 'Relevance of Sexual History Evidence in Rape: Problems of 

























The case law does not reflect a more positive picture. In fact it shows that the 
interpretation adopted by the courts has not ruled out all questions that primarily 
relate to the credibility of the witness and not to an issue of the trial as required by 
s 2 of the Sexual Offences Act. 150 An evaluation of the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Viola 151 demonstrates that the legislative refonn did not imprcve the 
situation of victims because the final decision regarding the admission of their sexual 
past still remains with judges who initially contributed to the situation in which sexual 
history evidence was freely tendered in rape trials. Further, the courts have had a hard 
time distinguishing between matters of credibility and matters relating to the issues of 
the trial. The confusion relating to the distinction between matters of credibility and 
matters relating to the trial is manifest in the following passage quoted from the case 
of Viola: 
If the proposed questions merely seek to establish that the complainant 
has had sexual intercourse with other men to whom she was not 
married, so as to suggest that for that reason she ought not to be 
believed on oath, the judge will exclude the evidence ... In other words, 
questions of this sort going simply to credit will seldom be allowed .... 
On the other hand, if the questions are relevant to an issue in the trial 
in the light of the way the trial is being run, for instance relevant to the 
issue of consent, they are likely to be admitted, because to exclude a 
relevant question on an issue in the trial as the trial is being run will 
usually mean that the jury are being prevented from hearing something 
which, if they did hear it, might cause them to change their minds 
about the evidence being given by the complainant. 152 
Although the intention of adopting a provision like s 2 was to place an embargo on the 
use of sexual history evidence, the interpretation adopted by the courts reveals that it 
has not achieved its goal because the defence may apply to the judge, in the absence 
of the jury, for leave to include the very same evidence that was supposed to be 
excluded by virtue of s 2. In fact, the leading case of Viola raises more questions than 
150 Section 2 of the Sexual Offences Amendment Act of 1976. 
151 [1982] 3 All ER 73 (CA). 






















answers. Judges are still left with a discretion to finally decide upon the fairness of 
excluding the sexual history evidence, which is not a solution to a ccmplex problem. 
Some judges have even held that past moral character is immaterial to the issue of 
consent and material only to the credibility of the witness, while others have held that 
the past moral character of the complainant goes to the very heart of the issue. 153 
(c) United States 
In the United States of America the trend towards legal reform also began as early as 
1970, when laws were passed that not only varied from state to state, but also varied 
in substance c:1nd complexity. A common approach is however noticeable in all the 
legislative amendments; and that is that they seek to limit the defence's ability to 
question the victim about her sexual past. The procedures adopted range from 
virtually an absolute prohibition on asking questions about the complainant's sexual 
past to an unfettered judicial discretion. 
Most notable of all these enactments is the Federal Rape Shield Statute. 154 Since its 
enactment forty-six states 155 have enacted similar rape laws by incorporating the 
153 See Lawrence and Another 1977 Criminal LR 492 as quoted by Susan M Edwards 
op cit at 348 for the formulation of the test to be applied in exercising the discretion. 
May J formulated it as follows at 493: 
The important part of the statute which I think needs construction are the 
words 'if and only if he [the judge] is satisfied that it would be unfair to that 
defendant to refuse to allow the evidence to be adduced or the question to be 
asked'. And in my judgement before a judge is satisfied or may be said to be 
satisfied that to refuse to allow a particular question or a series of questions in 
cross-examination would be unfair to a defendant he must take the view that it 
is more likely than not that the particular question or line of cross-examination 
if allowed might reasonably lead the jury properly directed in the summing-up 
to take a different view of the complainant's evidence from that which they 
might take if the question or series of questions was or were allowed. 
154 See American Federal Rule of Evidence 412 that provides as follows; 
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible. 
The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding 
involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) 
and (c): 
(I) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other 
sexual behaviour. 





















Federal Rule of Evidence into their respective statutes, with varymg degrees of 
restrictiveness. Professor Berger156 uses the laws of Louisiana and to some extent also 
Michigan's statutes, as examples of states with rape shield laws that favour the 
victims. The law of Michigan shows that the exercise of defendant's rights should be 
balanced with those of the victims, or risk being struck down as unconstitutional. The 
Michigan rape shield law157 prohibits a defendant from introducing at a trial evidence 
(1) In a criminal case the following evidence is admissible if otherwise 
admissible under these rules: 
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behaviour by the alleged 
victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the 
source of semen injury or other physical evidence; 
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behaviour by the alleged 
victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct 
offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and 
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional 
rights of the defendant. 
(2) In a civil case evidence offered to prove the sexual behaviour or 
sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise 
admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially 
outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to 
any party. Evidence of alleged victim's reputation is admissible only if it 
has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim. 
(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility. 
( 1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b) must: 
(A) file a written motion least 14 days before trial specifically describing 
the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered unless the 
court for good cause requires a different time for filing or permits filing 
during trial; and 
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim or when 
appropriate the alleged victim's guardian or representative. 
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must conduct a 
hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a right to attend and 
be heard. The motion related papers and the record of the hearing must 
be sealed and remain under seal unless the court orders otherwise. 
155 For a discussion of these states see Elizabeth Kessler 'Pattern of Sexual Conduct 
Evidence and Present Consent: Limiting the admissibility of Sexual History Evidence 
in rape Prosecutions' ( 1992) 14 Women's Rights Law Reporter 79 at 81-82. 
156 See Berger op cit at 33. 
157 Michigan Statute provides as per 750.520j of the Mich. Comp. Laws: 
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct opinion 
evidence of the victim's sexual conduct and reputation evidence of the victim's 
sexual conduct shall not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g unless and 
only to the extent that the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is 
material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial 
nature does not outweigh its probative value: 



















of a rape victim's past sexual conduct, subject to exceptions. In Michigan v Lucas, 158 
for example, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the refusal to admit 
evidence of previous sexual conduct between the complainant and the defendant, 
because the defendant failed to notify the prosecution as required by the 'rape shield' 
statutory provision, was not necessarily unconstitutional. 159 Justice O'Connor hdd: 
Accelerating the disclosure of this evidence did not violate the 
Constitution ... because a criminal trial is not 'a poker game in which 
players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until 
played. 160 
( d) South Africa 
In an evaluation of the South African situation it should be noted that the character of 
a complainant is only relevant to the extent that it relates to her credibility. Because 
the credibility of complainants plays such a pivotal role in dealing with their 
testimony it means that questions 161 concerning their character may lawfully be put to 
them. The only 'shield' that exists is that once they have answered questions relating 
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or 
origin of semen pregnancy or disease. 
(2) If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection (l)(a) 
or (b) the defendant within 10 days after the arraignment on the information 
shall file a written motion and offer of proof. The court may order an in 
camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible 
under subsection (I). If new information is discovered during the course of the 
trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (l)(a) or (b) 
admissible the judge may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the 
proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1). 
158 500 us 145 (1991). 
159 In Michigan v Lucas supra at 150 Justice O'Connor stated the following: 
We have upheld notice requirements in analogous settings. In Williams v 
Florida 3 99 US 78 (1970) for example this Court upheld a Florida rule that 
required a criminal defendant to notify the State in advance of trial of an alibi 
witnesses that he intended to call. The Court observed that the notice 
requirement 'by itself in no way affected [ the defendant's] crucial decision to 
alibi witnesses ... At most the rule only compelled [the defendant] to accelerate 
the timing of his disclosure forcing him to divulge at an earlier date 
information that [he] planned to divulge at the trial'. 























to collateral issues, 162 the answers remain final and no further questions may be put to 
them on that point. 
Earlier in this study I criticised the South African Law Commission for not 
condemning the cautionary rule in its report, yet scme other recommendations of the 
Commission were more useful and have led to legislative change that has improved 
the position of rape complainants testifying in court. One of its recommendations has 
resulted in the adoption of s 22i 63 of the CPA, which prohibits evidence of a 
woman's sexual history being led, subject to certain exceptions. One of these 
161 See chap 3 supra for a di:;cussion of questions put to complainants during cross-
examination. 
162 The true test for determining a collateral issue was laid down in the old English 
decision of Attorney General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch. 91; 154 ER. 38. In this case 
the court defined the test for determining a collateral issue as follows at 42 of 154 
ER: 
.... the test whether the matter is collateral or not is this: if the answer of a 
witness is a matter which you would be allowed on your part to prove in 
evidence - if it have (sic) such a connection with the issue that you would be 
allowed to give it in evidence - then it is a matter on which you may contradict 
him. 
Wigmore lac cit paraphrases this test as follows at 657: 'Could the fact as to which 
error is predicated have been shown in evidence for any purpose independently of the 
contradiction?' See S v Sinkankanka and Another 1963 (2) SA 531 (A); S v Damalis 
1984 (2) SA 105 (T). 
163 Section 227 reads as follows: 
( 1) Evidence as to the character of an accused or as to the character of any 
female against or in connection with whom any offence of an indecent nature 
is alleged to have been committed shall subject to the provisions of subsection 
(2) be admissible or inadmissible if such evidence would have been admissible 
or inadmissible on the thirtieth day of May 1961. 
(2) Evidence as to sexual intercourse by or any sexual experience of any 
female against or in connection with whom any offence of a sexual nature is 
alleged to have been committed shall not be adduced and such female shall not 
be questioned regarding such sexual intercourse or sexual experience except 
with the leave of the court which leave shall not be granted unless the court is 
satisfied that such evidence may be adduced and such female may be so 
questioned in respect of the offence which is being tried. 
(3) Before an application for leave contemplated in subsection (2) is heard the 
court shall direct that any person whose presence is not necessary may not be 
present at the proceedings and the court may direct that a female referred to in 
subsection (2) may not be present. 
( 4) The provisions of this section are mutatis mutandis applicable in respect of 
a male against or in connection with whom any offence of an indecent nature 

















exceptions164 is that questions relating to a complainant's sexual history may be asked 
when leave is granted by the court. From an examination of the content of s 227 of the 
CPA it appears that the character of the complainant in a rape trial will still remain 
relevant, in two instances: with regard to the chastity of the complainant and with 
regard to the issue of Gonsent. 165 As such, despite the fact that the section is an 
improvement on the common law position, it still does not afford the same protection 
given to complainants in sexual offence cases in jurisdictions like Canada and the 
United Kingdom, 166 notwithstanding the fact that these provisions are themselves far 
from perfect from the perspective of victim protection. 
Commentators, like Engelbrecht, are of the opinion that s 227 of the CPA offers 
sufficient protection to complainants and their character if the evidentiary principles 
of South African law are properly applied and adhered to by the courts. 167 The reality, 
it would seem, is that courts do not adhere to these rules of evidence strictly and 
properly. As a result complainants still have to face questions regarding their 
unrelated sexual pa,st without the invocation of protection. 168 
(e) Evaluation of rape shield laws 
Notwithstanding the greater protection afforded to victims of rape in the 
abovementioned jurisdictions, I am not convinced that the promulgation of similar 
laws will suffice to solve the problems that rape victims have to face in giving 
testimony in the South African context. The first criticism that may be levelled at 
these laws is that they fail to distinguish between the different purposes for which 
164 Sees 276(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code discussed supra. 
165 See SE van der Merwe et al Evidence (1983) at 95. For a discussion of the 
protection granted by s 22 7 of the CPA see Johan Engelbrecht 'Die karakter van die 
klaagster in verkragting en soortgelyke sake' 1984 De Rebus at 319. 
166 Sees 2 of their Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 supra. 
167 See Engelbrecht op cit at 321: 'Binne die reels van die bewysreg is daar egter 
voldoende beskerming vir die klaagster. Indien die beginsels korrek en streng 
toegepas word behoort die aflegging van getuienis geen vrees vir die klaagster in te 
hou nie. Haar karakter word voldoende beskerm.' 
168 See Sharon Stanton, Margot Lochrenberg and Veronica Mukasa Improved Justice 
for Survivors of Sexual Violence? Adult survivors' experiences of the Wynberg Sexual 

















evidence may be tendered in court. Whilst most of the legislation tries to address 
evidence of sexual activities, this is not the true issue that should be addressed in 
order to afford better protection to these victims. What should be addressed is the 
issue of the abuse of evidence of the sexual history of complainants for irrelevant and 
misleading purposes. Although one does not want to prevent the liccused [: um 
defending himself against a charge that has been laid, one does not want the accused 
to abuse the process of cross-examination in order to get back at the complainant or to 
use her sexual past as a means of embarrassing her and putting her on trial. 
Another criticism of the rape shield laws has been voiced by Justice McLachlin. 169 
She feels that such legislation adopts a 'pigeon-hole' -approach, 170 which is not 
capable of dealing adequately with the evidentiary problem at stake, viz which 
evidence is relevant and not merely irrelevant. In her majority judgment in 
Sea boyer, 171 Justice McLachlin criticises the legislation as attempting to predict or 
forecast relevancy on the basis of a series of categories (pigeon-holes). Such an 
approach is inconsistent with the views of most scholars, who are of the opinion that 
the prediction of relevant evidence on the basis of defined categories, is impossible, 
because each decision regarding relevancy will depend on the merits of each 
individual case as it occurs. Given the criticisms that have been levelled at rape shield 
laws it is clear that the enactment of such laws in South Africa cannot be considered 
without a proper evaluation and analysis of all underlying evidentiary concepts that 
come in to play during a rape trial. Should legislative intervention be considered to 
improve the position of victims, it should be done with great circumspection and only 
once all the implications for victims have been evaluated. Finally it should be borne in 
mind that this kind of legislation is very prone to be unconstitutional 172 unless 
experiences of rape survivors when being cross-examined about their sexual past and 
their relationships. 
169 See Seaboyer supra at 397e-g. 
170 See David H Doherty 'Sparing the Complainant "Spoils" the Trial' (1984) 40 CR 
(3rd) 55 at 57 as cited by McLachlin J in R v Seaboyer supra at 388 in which he 
characterizes s 276 of the Canadian Criminal Code as calling for a mechanical 
'pigeon-holding' approach to the question of admissibility based on criteria which 
may in a given case have little to do with the potential of the evidence 
171 See Seaboyer supra nl30. 
172 See Professor H Galvin 'Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: 



















carefully designed not to impinge on the accused's right to challenge evidence173 in a 
court of law. 
5.3 The Wynberg Sexual Offences Court 
It is considered that the legal discussion can be complemented by the practical 
experiences of the Wynberg Sexual Offences Court pilot project. The question that 
has remained unanswered hitherto is whether any special treatment should be 
accorded to rape victims over and above the procedural improvements proposed 
above. I have already pointed out that the system is not tailored to the needs of these 
victims; nevertheless victims in the Western Cape are far better off than those in the 
rest of the country. The significant change to the position of rape victims in the 
Western Cape was brought about by the establishment of the Sexual Offences Court 
in Wynberg. 
It is submitted, without denying any of the specific role-players any credit that is due 
to them with regard to their endeavours to offer a better service to the victims of 
sexual offences, that the court would not have been initiated without pressure from the 
public and feminist lobby groups. 174 Much of the changed treatment, for rape victims 
in particular, is due to the efforts of the Wynberg Sexual Offences Court. 175 An 
has the following to say regarding a blanket exclusion with reference to the 
'Michigan-model': 
... many of the statutes fail to afford the accused the opportunity to present 
sexual conduct evidence which is indisputably relevant and necessmy to the 
presentation of a legitimate defense the01y. On one level the problem is simply 
a failure to codify a sufficient number of exceptions; the case law amply 
demonstrates the need to amend many of these statutes by providing more 
bases for admitting sexual conduct evidence. More significant however is the 
fact that the common element linking each of these relevant uses of sexual 
conduct evidence seems to have escaped the notice of the drafters-none 
requires reliance on the invidious common-law notions that a woman's 
consent to sexual relations with one man implies either consent to relations 
with others or lack of credibility. (Emphasis added) 
173 This right is provided for ins 35(3)(f) of the Constitution. 
174 Rape Crisis has played a major role in the creation of special services for rape 
victims in the Western Cape . 
175 Already in September 1992 a Task Group was set up to identify the problem areas 
in the treatment of rape victims at the hands of the police, district surgeons, 


















overview of the history of this court is important in order to understand the . 
shortcomings in the system both before its inception and thereafter. Two cases 
triggered the development of a special system designed for rape victims: The first was 
a trial in which the district surgeon, who had examined an eight-year old victim, 
ignored a subpoena to come to court. The second case was an incident, in the same 
year, in which a magistrate made the comment - whilst sentencing the accused - that 
the victim was unlikely to have suffered much psychological damage because she was 
no longer a virgin at the time of the rape. 176 Both these cases sparked a lot of public 
criticism. 
Proposals for reform were led by the Attorney-General of the Cape177 working in 
liaison with women's movements, other non-governmental organisations 178 and also 
other governmental organisations 179 in the Western Cape. The Attorney-General 
decided to create a new system which would aim to provide better assistance to and 
support of rape victims throughout the pre-trial and trial process and which would 
also ease the procedures at court for adult and child victims. 180 The Department of 
had been considered by government agencies including the Attorney-General of the 
Western Cape, the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Welfare and 
the Cape Provincial Administration. 
176 See 'Rape court can't handle all the cases' Weekly Mail and Guardian 4 November 
1994 at 10. 
177 Adv F W Kahn SC. 
178 These organisations included inter alia Nicro Rape Crisis, Institute of Criminology 
at UCT, F AMSA, Lawyers for Human Rights and others. 
179 Through this initiative certain police policies were designed in handling of rape 
victims: a special comfort room was established where complainants could be 
examined at Victoria Hospital and not at the district surgeon's impersonal surgery. 
Further to this the Attorney General also issued general guidelines to all prosecutors 
setting out the new policies and urging them to be sensitive to the needs of these 
victims and to use the Wynberg court whenever necessary. See Attorney-General 
Circular 1/5/3 dated 26 April 1993. 
180 The following was said by Adv F W Kahn SC Attorney-General Western Cape as 
quoted in a paper delivered by EJS Steyn titled Child abuse within the South Afi'ican 
criminal justice system 10th International Congress on Child Abuse and Neglect 10 -
13 September 1994, Malaysia at 3: 
One can always legislate to protect the victims of such rapes and sexual abuse 
but the really important issue is to ensure that one creates a system whereby 
competent prosecutors and defence counsel and sensitive presiding officers 
create an atmosphere where such victims are willing to come forward and 

















Justice considered the aim of the court to be 'to effect more sympathetic and 
specialised treatment of plaintiffs and prosecutions.' 181 
In order to create a workable system special attention was paid to the dynamics of a 
multi-disciplinary team approach. What makes this court so special is that the 
prosecutions ~n this court are handled by a special team of prosecutors, who are 
identified and appointed not only on the basis of their experience but also on their 
ability to relate to victims of sexual abuse. In addition the court received more 
prosecutorial personnel 182 than other courts in order to attend to the needs of sexual 
victims. This was something that could not be done for other witnesses in the system 
due to personnel constraints. 183 Whereas prosecutors normally spend every day in 
court and conduct their consultations with witnesses in between appearances, the 
arrangement at the Sexual Offences Court was that prosecutors spend one day in court 
and the next day in the office to consult with witnesses and then prepare for their 
trials. 184 Another factor that makes this court unique compared to other criminal 
courts185is that it deals exclusively with sexual offence cases and that it is located on a 
different level to all the other regional courts. The location of the court is further 
distinguished by the fact that victims are given a special waiting room where they can 
wait in private before they are called upon to testify. This arrangement saves them the 
ordeal of facing the perpetrator before they have to testify. More importantly, the 
management of this court received constant monitoring from other professions and 
181 See Annual Report of Department of Justice dated 1/7/92-30/6/93 at 97. 
182 Two prosecutors were assigned to this court and were assisted by a qualified 
probation officer from the Department of Welfare who served in the role of a victim 
assistance co-ordinator. The role of this officer was essential in the smooth running of 
the court because she referred victims for counselling and if the victim was a minor 
the necessary intermediaries were also organised by the officer if it was required. 
183 Most of this information was gained through my experience as Senior Public 
Prosecutor at Wynberg Court in the period 1992 to 1995. 
184 See San Vivier 'Wynberg Sexual Offences Court: impressions after a year in 
operation' 1994 De Rebus 569 at 569; 'Sexual Offences Court established' 1993 De 
Rebus 350. 
185 In general criminal courts hear all criminal cases that fall within their jurisdiction 
area, provided that the courts have substantive and punitive jurisdiction to hear these 
matters. For jurisdiction sees 19 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959; ss 89 and 90 






















other non-governmental organisations through a special rape forum that met each 
quarter to discuss all obstacles and advances made through the term. 186 
Whilst the Sexual Offences Court has provided for an improvement of the services to 
rape victims, it is by no means perfect. 187 In fact, shc,rtly after its establishment it 
struggled to cope
188 
due to an increase in the caseload referred to it by courts from 
other jurisdictions. 189 The reason for transferring these cases was to ease the burden 
on the victims at other courts where no special facilities existed. The relocation of 
these cases is not above criticism because the women have to be transported from 
other areas, something which makes the court less accessible to these victims. It is 
thus an endeavour that is not without costs or inconveniences for victims. Suffice it to 
say that it has been a far better system than that which existed before and that the 
ideal would be to have special sexual offences courts in each and every jurisdiction 
country-wide to be used by rape victims. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
From the discussion above it should be apparent that rape cases impose inordinate 
demands on the prosecution's ability to prepare and present these cases to the courts. 
If this discussion, which is not comprehensive in its coverage of the topic, would at 
the least lead to attitudinal changes on the part of the prosecution, defence and 
judiciary in dealing with rape victims in future, then the criminal justice system will 
be an improved system for rape victims in which they will no longer feel that they are 
'on trial' for behaving in a certain manner. 
On a more substantive level, I believe that a change or a recasting of the definition of 
rape is needed to include all victims irrespective of their gender. Another reform that 
186 For a discussion of the usefulness of this Forum see Sharon Stanton and Margot 
Lochrenberg Justice for Sexual Assault Survivors? (1994) at 4. 
187 For a critical evaluation of the court see Stanton et al op cit at 4. 
188 Problems of the court are identified and set out in a study published by the Institute 
of Criminology - University of Cape Town. Seen 186 supra. 
189 A jurisdiction which referred a large number of rape cases to Wyn berg was 
Mitchells Plain. The facilities at Mitchells Plain Court were appalling, hence the 
referral of these cases to Wynberg. See 'Rape not the only horror courts are too -





















has been mooted is that the issue of consent be addressed in the reformulation of the 
definition of the crime. Consideration should be given to adopt reform similar to or 
along the lines of the New South Wales Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act of 
1981, which makes the issue of consent irrelevant in certain prescribed circumstances. 
A more pressing concern is the procedures that affect these complainants. It requires 
urgent consideration by either the courts or legislature. Cross-examination of rape 
victims is a major concern and throughout this study it has been demonstrated that 
rape victims are severely traumatised by the experience of cross-examination. It is 
time that the legislature puts an end to this ordeal. It is proposed that in order to 
alleviate the trauma of these victims, an accused be denied the opportunity to directly 
cross-examine a victim of a sexual offence, 
In suggesting such reform I am not challenging any of the accused's rights to a fair 
trial; rather I am arguing that a provision akin to s 170A of the CPA be adopted, or 
that s 170 of the CPA be amended, 190 to grant all complainants in sexual cases the 
opportunity to use an intermediary system. A study of other jurisdictions reveals that 
similar provisions have been enacted to protect complainants from any direct cross-
examination by the accused himself. 191 Although s 158192 offers witnesses the 
opportunity to testify via closed circuit television it does not offer a complainant the 
opportunity to be questioned through a person appointed by the court and falls short 
of affording sufficient protection to victims. It is submitted that the proposed reform 
would survive constitutional scrutiny on the same grounds that that s 170A of the 
CPA survived constitutional challenge. 
Finally, it should be recognised that the rule allowing the admission of previous 
consistent statements should be abandoned. This rule has become superfluous in the 
light of the abandonment of the cautionary rule and there is no reason for its retention 
in our law. It is contended, in conclusion, that if the rules affecting rape victims, 
discussed in this chapter, would be changed in future, such changes together with a 
190 Section 170A currently only makes provision for young witnesses to testify 
through an intermediary and to be questioned by the intermediary. For a discussion of 
the provision see chap 6 infra. 
























more sensitive approach towards these victims would serve to affect an improvement 
of the system that is currently available for victims of sexual offences. Furthermore, if 
the rules affecting rape victims would be changed in future then such changes could 
also bring about changes in the views held by the society at large regarding women 
and their moral behaviour. 



















6. Child Witnesses 
6.1 Introduction 
'Let the jury consider their verdict,' the King said for about 
the twentieth time that day. 
'No, no!' said the Queen. 'Sentence first - verdict afterwards.' 1 
Polemical as these words might seem, they capture the feelings of most people when 
confronted with the desperate situation of child witnesses in the system. Throughout 
this thesis I have striven to demonstrate that giving testimony in a court is not only a 
difficult experience for most witnesses but a terrifying one as well. In the discussion 
of child witnesses2 in this chapter it will become even more apparent that the 
problems that witnesses encounter by testifying in court are much more acute when 
these witnesses are young and vulnerable. 3 
It will be shown that from the moment when children become involved with the 
system, problems begin to arise, which then gain momentum with the trial and 
escalate as the trial proceeds. Research has shown, for example, that the performance 
of children in court depends upon a number of factors such as the manner in which the 
1 See Lewis Carroll Alice's Adventures in Wonderland re-issued ed (1994) at 134. 
2 Whenever the term child witness is used it refers to a person under the age of 
eighteen years, testifying in a criminal court. 
3 See generally D Libai 'The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offence in the 
Criminal Justice System' (1969) 15 Wayne LR 977. The factors influencing the 
children are aptly explained by Libai at 984: 
Psychiatrists have identified components of the legal proceedings that are 
capable of putting a child victim under prolonged mental stress and 
endangering his emotional equilibrium: repeated interrogations and cross-
examination; facing the accused again; the official atmosphere in court; the 
acquittal of the accused for want of corroborating evidence to the child's 
trustworthy testing; and the conviction of a molester who is the child's parent 


















trial is conducted and their understanding of the court process, to name a few. 4 The 
stark atmosphere of a courtroom filled with people dressed in strange clothes and 
asking strange questions of an intimate and embarrassing nature,5 is another factor 
that could affect the testimony of children. This perception is confirmed by 
researchers and clinicians and identified as a major source of anxiety for many child 
witnesses. 6 Most noticeable from the research literature is the universal theme that 
criminal justice systems do not acknowledge the needs of child witnesses. As Bala7 
has pointed out: 
Children are victims of a discriminatory justice system which 
developed rules premised on the notion that children are inherently 
unreliable witnesses whose testimony must be specially scrutinised. 
The legal system has also discriminated against children by failing to 
recognise their unique characteristics and need for distinctive 
treatment. 8 
It is therefore essential to look at the system from the perspective of child witnesses to 
understand how they perceive the criminal process. Only then will one be in a position 
to evaluate the provisions that are made for child witnesses in the criminal justice 
system and to make recommendations that might bring about an improved system for 
them. It will be demonstrated that child victims, like rape victims, run into the same 
societal misperceptions, in that they are frequently thought to fantasize about sexual 
assault experiences and that they are allegedly unable to distinguish innocent 
behaviour from deviant sexual conduct. This chapter will address three major 
problems in the criminal justice system that exacerbate the emotional harm suffered 
by child witnesses, namely the pr_ocedural obstacles, the evidentiary difficulties that 
4 See Anne Mellor and Helen R Dent 'Preparation of the Child Witness for Court' 
(1994) 3 Child Abuse Review 165 at 165. 
5 This statement is based on the premise that the case involves a sexual abuse. 
6 See RH Flin, Y Stevenson and G Davis 'Children's knowledge of court proceedings 
(1989) 80 British Journal of Psychology 285; K Freshwater and Jan Aldridge 'The 
Knowledge and Fears about Courts of Child witnesses, School Children and Adults' 
( 1994) 3 Child Abuse Review 183. 
7 N Bala 'Double victims: Child sexual abuse and the Canadian criminal justice 
system' (1990) 15 Queens Law Journal 3. 

















these children have to overcome and then the impact of certain specific offences in 
respect of which only children are victims. 
In a review of these problems the South African legal system will be discussed. The 
position of witnesses prior to the adoption of s 170A of the CPA and the position after 
this enactment will be considered and evaluated. Problems that arise from the fact that 
child witnesses are not afforded special protection and have to testify in a courtroom 
where they have to face the perpetrator will be examined.9 This kind of victimisation 
has been severely criticised by a number of commentators and fortunately no longer 
prevails in South Africa. 10 However, child witnesses are considered to be 
disadvantaged by the adversarial trial system, aggressive cross-examination, and the 
neutral role exercised by the presiding officers in cases in which children are 
involved. 
With an increase in crime in general child witnesses are today a far more common 
phenomenon than ten or fifteen years ago. Their involvement in the criminal justice 
process can stem from being victims of crime themselves or being eye-witnesses to 
crimes that are committed in their communities. 
It is possible that using scarce resources to assist and protect child witnesses could be 
questioned by the public at large, particularly when other socio-economic needs, like 
housing and education, are borne in mind. The fact that South Africa has ratified the 
· United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 11 on 16 June 1995 12 clearly 
requires the government to fulfil its duty towards all children. The ratification created 
9 In terms of s 15 8 of the CPA, all criminal proceedings must take place 'in the 
presence of the accused'. Cf. S v Motlala 1975 (1) SA 814 (T); S v Radebe 1973 (4) 
SA 244 (0). 
10 See J J A Key 'The child witness: the battle for justice' 1988 De Rebus 54 at 55; M 
Reddi 'The child witness in the criminal justice system. Suggestions for reform' 
(1993) 18 Journal for Juridical Science 124; N Reddi 'The Child as a Witness' in 
Laura Pollecut et al (eds) The Legal Rights of Children in South Africa (1995) 128; J 
Engelbrecht 'Kindermolestering en verkragting: die howe se rol' (1995) 8 Consultus 
20. 
11 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). 
12 See G van Baeren (ed) International Documentation on Children (1993). Cf. W 























an expectation that the government will demonstrate its commitment to the objectives 
of this Declaration, by ensuring that the best interests of children will prevail. These 
should include the protection of children in the criminal justice system. It is an 
obligation that is reinforced when this human rights document is read with the 
Constitution and the protection that it affords. Section 28 13 of the Constitution, and 
s 28(2) in particular, can be seen as constituting, as it were, a mini-charter of rights for 
children and child witnesses. The phrase 'every matter concerning the child' is 
broadly stated. It is therefore argued that the provision should include child witnesses 
1 
even though there is no express provision that it provides specifically for the 
protection of child witnesses in the criminal justice system. 
It is widely recognised today that child witnesses experience multifarious problems 
\ 
upon entering the criminal process. The South African Law Commission has 
13 Section 28 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
(1) Every child has the right -
(a) to a name and a nationality from birth; 
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when 
removed from the family environment; 
( c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services; 
( d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; 
( e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices; 
(f) not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that -
(i) are inappropriate for a person of that child's age; or 
(ii) place at risk the child's well-being, education physical or mental 
health or spiritual, moral or social development; 
(g) not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in 
addition to the rights a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the 
child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of time, 
and has the right to be -
(i) kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and 
(ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the 
child's age; 
(h) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at 
state expense, in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial 
injustice would otherwise result; and 
(i) not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected 
in times of armed conflict. 
(2) A child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child. 























emphasised the following problems as worthy of examination m cases of sexual 
offences against children: 14 
(a) the secondary abuse suffered by children who are required to 
give testimony in adversarial courts, which are designed for adults; 
(b) difficulties associated with the functioning of the courts, including 
lack of appropriately trained personnel at all phases of the investigative 
and judicial processes; 
( c) the endless delays and remands due to the congestion of the court 
system; 
( d) problems experienced with the law of evidence; 
( e) the lack of independent (legal) representation for the child victim; 
(f) the absence of effective policies and procedures for bail and 
sentencing; 
(g) the lack of provision to enable victims and their families to survive 
and to ensure their safety if they pursue criminal charges; and 
(h) lack of the backup resources needed to enable the courts to make 
orders which are in the best interest of children and their families. 15 
Many of the problems emphasised are not unique to sexual offences but relate to all 
cases in which children have to testify. Finally, the problems relating to competency, 
out of court statements of children and cross-examining procedures will be 
investigated. It will be recommended, in conclusion, that legislative reform such as a 
special hearsay rule exception for children, special competency tests designed for 
children and the compulsory use of s 170A of the CPA in cases causing undue stress 
for the child witness, be adopted. These proposed reforms should be implemented in 
such a way that they do not deprive the accused of the right to a fair trial. 
14 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 10 Project 108 Sexual Offences 


















6.2 Statutory protection of child witnesses 
6.2.l Hearings in camera 
It is significant that the CPA acknowledges the need for child witnesses to testify in 
the absence of the public. Courts may direct that the criminal proceedings be held in 
camera in instances where the witnesses are younger than eighteen years. 16 Whilst it 
is vital that criminal justice should be administered publicly and openly, 17 it is also 
essential that young witnesses be protected from the public's presence in certain 
instances. The purpose of insisting on a public trial is generally to enable members of 
the public to be fully informed of the evidence, as far as it is possible to do so, and to 
allow them to evaluate any judgment. 18 The need of the public to see that justice is 
administered in court, however, must balanced against the right of child witnesses to 
be protected and the right of the accused to a fair trial. Whilst the enshrinement of the 
requirement of a public trial ensures that secret trials employed by totalitarian states 
will not be tolerated, it does not serve as an absolute guarantee that members of the 
public are entitled to be physically present in the courtroom at all times. In fact, 
s 15 2 of the CPA provides for criminal proceedings to be conducted in open court 
'except where otherwise expressly provided'. 
The need for criminal trials to be conducted publicly is succinctly stated by Brennan J 
in the matter of Richmond Newspapers: 19 
Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the 
trial process. Open trials assure the public that procedural rights are 
respected and that justice is afforded equally. Closed trials breed 
susp1c10n of prejudice and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns 
disrespect for law. Public access is essential, therefore, if trial 
15 Supra n14 at para 3.4.1. 
16 Sees 153(5) of the CPA. 
17 See s 152 of the CPA, which provides for all criminal proceedings to be conducted 
in an open court. 
18 See S v Leepile and Others(4) 1986 (3) SA 661 (W) at 6651-J. 























adjudication is to achieve the objective of maintaining public 
confidence in the administration of justice. 20 
It is submitted that what lies at the core of this requirement of a public trial is the 
assurance that justice will be fairly administered in our courts. Section 153(5) of the 
CPA remains therefore a useful statutory tool that can be used by courts in order to 
afford protection to young witnesses that are afraid of, or embarrassed by, giving 
testimony in an open court. An application of the provision does not per se render the 
accused's trial unfair. 
From the perspective of child witnesses s 153 of the CPA can, however, be criticised 
in that an in camera hearing does not follow as of right when a child has to testify. 
The way this section is worded makes it possible that child witnesses may have to 
testify in an open court. Better protection would be afforded to these witnesses had the 
provision compelled courts to hear matters involving child witnesses behind closed 
doors. A second shortcoming of the provision is that it does not provide for the 
removal of the parent or the guardian or the person in loco parentis, who sometimes 
may be the very cause of the fear and embarrassment of these witnesses. 21 So, despite 
an order by the court that a hearing should be conducted in camera the child may be 
intimidated by the presence of the parent 'assisting' him or her in court to the extent 
that the very purpose of an in camera hearing may be defeated. 
6.2.2 Use of intermediaries and certain non-verbal expressions 
During 1988 the Minister of Justice requested the South African Law Commission to 
conduct an investigation relating to the protection of children with regard to court 
proceedings. In its investigation the Law Commission considered a number of 
systems, including the system followed in Israel. It has been recognised that child 
witnesses experience significant difficulties in dealing with the adversarial 
environment of a courtroom and furthermore that they experience difficulty in fully 
comprehending the language of legal proceedings and the role of all the 'court 























participants'. Moreover, the adversarial procedure system that involves confrontation 
and extensive cross-examination exacerbates trauma suffered by these witnesses when 
testifying. For these reasons other procedures and mechanisms had to be developed to 
facilitate the reception of the evidence of child witnesses in criminal proceedings. 
From the recommendations rr.ade by the South African Law Commission in its report 
it appeared that, as a result of its examination of the procedures for child witnesses in 
the system, it considered the ordinary procedures of the criminal justice process to be 
inadequate to meet the needs and requirements of child witnesses. 
As a result of the Law Commission's R'eport on the Protection of Child Witnesses, ss 
1, 2 and 3 of the 1991 Criminal Law Amendment Act22 were enacted. These 
amendments to the CPA came into operation on 30 July 1993 and effectively meant 
that children would testify via a live television channel, whilst being in a room 
separated from the courtroom. Section 170A of the CPA w~s therefore designed to 
provide protection for young witnesses by providing the assistance of an intermediary. 
Provision is made for the demeanour of these witnesses to be observed by means of 
closed-circuit television monitors. 
Section 170A of the CPA provides as follows: 
( 1) Whenever criminal proceedings are pending before any court and it 
appears to such court that it would expose any witness under the age 
of eighteen years to undue mental stress or suffering if he testifies at 
such proceedings, the court may, subject to subsection (4), appoint 
a competent person as an intermediary in order to enable such witness 
to give his evidence through that intermediary. 
(2) (a) No examination, cross-examination or re-examination of any 
witness in respect of whom a court has appointed an intermediary 
under subsection (1 ), except examination by the court, shall take place 
in any manner other than through that intermediary. 
21 See J A Robinson The Law of Children and Young Persons in South Africa (1997) 
at 179. 



















(b) The said intermediary may, unless the court directs otherwise, 
convey the general purport of any question to the relevant witness. 
(3) If a court appoints an intermediary under subsection (1 ), the court 
may direct that the relevant witness shall give his evidence at any 
place-
(a) which is informally arranged to set that witness at ease; 
(b) which is so situated that any person whose presence may upset 
that witness, is outside the sight and hearing of that witness; and 
( c) which enables the court and any person whose presence is 
necessary at the relevant proceedings to see and hear, either directly 
or through the medium of any electronics or other devices, that 
intermediary as well as that witness during his testimony. 
( 4 )(a) The Minister may by notice in the Gazette23 determine the 
person or the category or class of persons who are competent to be 
appointed as intermediaries. 
23 The Minister of Justice has in Government Notice R1374 Government Gazette 
15024 of 30 July 1993, as amended by Government Notice R360 Gazette 17822 of 28 
February 1997, determined that the following categories or classes of persons are 
competent to be appointed as intermediaries: 
(a) Medical practitioners who are registered as such under the Medical, Dental 
and Supplementary Health Service Professions Act, 1974 (Act No. 56 of 
1974), and against whose names the speciality paediatrics is also registered. 
(b) Medical practitioners who are registered as such under the Medical, Dental 
and Supplementary Health Service Professions Act, 1974, and against whose 
names the speciality psychiatry is also registered. 
( c) Family counsellors who are appointed as such under section 3 of the 
Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act, 1987 (Act No. 24 of 1987) and who 
are or were registered as social workers under section 17 of the Social Work 
Act, 1978 (Act No. 110 of 1978), or who are or were classified as teachers in 
qualification category C to G, as determined by the Department of National 
Education, or who are or were registered as clinical, educational or counselling 
psychologists under the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service 
Professions Act, 1974. 
(d) Child care workers who have successfully completed a two-year course in 
child and youth care approved by the National Association of Child Care 
Workers and who have four years' experience in child care. 
( e) Social workers who are registered as such under section 17 of the Social . 
Work Act, 1978, and who have two years' experience in social work. 
(f) Teachers who are classified in qualification category C to G, as determined 



















(b) An intermediary who is not in the full-time employment of the 
State shall be paid such travelling and subsistence and other 
allowances in respect of the services rendered by him as the Minister, 
with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, may determine. 
Although courts are authorised by law to appoint intermediaries from at least seven 
categories of persons, in practice intermediaries are predominantly appointed from the 
category of social workers. It is submitted that the appointment of psychologists 
would offer better assistance to child witnesses because of their specialised expertise. 
Experience has proven, however, that it is not always practical to acquire the services 
of psychologists, who are mostly in private practice, and that prosecutors therefore 
have to depend on social workers to act as intermediaries. 
An analysis of the provision shows that the intimidation that existed in the past 
through severe cross-examination of the child is now tempered by the use of an 
intermediary. Children no longer ever have to hear any of the questions put by the 
defence because the intermediary relates all questions to them. The intermediary, who 
wears headphones, listens to the court proceedings and conveys 'the general purport 
of any question' to the witness. 24 In real terms it means that the intermediary will use 
his or her own words in questioning the child during the trial. 25 It should be noted that 
a court may not direct, in terms of subsection (3), that a witness shall give evidence in 
a separate room unless it makes an order that the witness be assisted by an 
intermediary in terms of subsection (1). The effect is that a witness who reasonably 
needs to give evidence in a separate room will also have to be examined and cross-
examined through an intermediary, even though the witness may not be exposed to 
undue mental stress and suffering if he or she testifies without the intermediary's 
assistance. 
experience in teaching and who have not at any stage, for whatever reason, 
been suspended or dismissed from service in teaching. 
(g) Psychologists who are registered as clinical, educational or counselling 
psychologists under the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service 
Professions Act, 1974. 
24 Section l 70(2)(b) of the CPA. 
25 For a discussion of the intermediary system see San Vivier 'Wynberg sexual 





















An examination of s 170A of the CPA shows that the provision is not limited in its 
application, and that it applies to all criminal proceedings. What should, however, be 
considered in our new constitutional order is whether cross-examination by means of 
intermediaries is in conflict with an accused's right to a fair trial, more specifically his 
right to adduce and challenge evidence.26 In Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO 
and Others27 an expert witness submitted a statement to the court in support of the 
appointment of an intermediary. It was contended by this witness that in cases of 
criminal prosecutions for sexual offences the language used in court becomes an acute 
problem for children because 'it is overlaid by a range of emotional stresses and fears 
which flow from the traumatic events about which the child is called to testify' .28 The 
witness was at pains to explain to the court that a young victim of sexual abuse, 
assault or rape experiences secondary victimisation in the form of the trial due to the 
following reasons: 
In the first instance the victim is required to relate in open court in 
graphic detail the particular abusive acts perpetrated upon them. This 
occurs in the presence of the alleged perpetrator. Thereafter the victim 
of the abuse is subjected to intensive, and at times protracted and 
aggressive, cross-examination by the accused or his legal 
representative. This experience instils fear, anxiety and high levels of 
stress in the witness. Under normal circumstances within court 
proceedings the capacity of the prosecutor or the presiding officer to 
intervene to curtail cross-examination and thereby to protect the 
witness is extremely limited. This further serves to emphasise the 
isolation and vulnerability of the witness in the circumstances. 
Seconda,y victimisation may, consequently be as traumatic and as 
damaging to the emotional and psychological well-being of the victim 
as the original victimisation was. It is for these reasons, in essence, that 
various jurisdictions, including South Africa, have introduced 
26 See s 35(3)(i) of the Constitution. 
27 1996 (3) BCLR 402 (SE); 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E). 




















procedures and mechanisms to facilitate the reception of the evidence 
of young witnesses in proceedings involving sexual offences.29 
Despite the challenge made to s 170A of the CPA, the Court held - in Klink30 that the 
section does not preclude an accused from challenging the testimony of a child 
witness, and that the provision does not infringe an accused's right to challenge 
evidence in a court of law. Thus s 170A is not per se unconstitutional. In coming to 
its finding the Court equated the position of an intermediary with that of an 
interpreter, in as much as the intermediary interprets the testimony of the child 
witness without disturbing the fairness of a trial. Interpreters have fulfilled an 
important function in courts and have been widely used in this country.31 Having said 
this, the Court looked at the offender's right to cross-examine and the possible 
curtailment thereof32 and considered the dictum of Doherty JA, as stated in Regina v 
Toten33an appeal case before the Ontario Court of Appeal: 
The public adversarial process is, however, a means to an end - the 
ascertainment of truth - and has virtue only to the extent that it serves 
that end. Where the established process hinders the search for the truth, 
it should be modified unless due process or resource-based 
considerations preclude such modification.34 
These remarks emphasise that any attempt to modify established rules of procedure 
and evidence should be done in a manner that does not deny an accused the right to 
have a fair trial. Considering the rationale for an exceptional procedure, such as is 
provided by s 170A of the CPA, it is submitted that the procedure is not aimed at 
violating the accused's right to challenge the testimony of the child victim. There is 
nothing in the provision that precludes an accused from questioning a young witness. 
29 Klink supra at 41 0J-411 C. (Emphasis added.) 
30 Supra n27. 
31 Klink supra at 41 lH-l. 
32 For criticism of Klink see discussion by Murdoch Watney 'Aspekte van getuienis 
aflegging deur kindergetuies deur bemiddeling van tussengangers' (1998) 61 THRHR 
423. 
33 (1993) 16 CRR (2d) 49. 























What is precluded is the potentially harmful effect of defence counsel's forceful 
questions, which is blunted when an intermediary interposes between the questioner 
and the young witness. It is finally submitted that the impact of s 170A(2)(b) can be 
controlled by the court, which in tum should see to it that an intermediary does not 
frustrate the process of fair cross-examination. 35 
Besides the contention that s 170A of the CPA infringes the right of an accused to 
challenge evidence, there is the issue of the child being removed from the accused and 
court during the trial. This issue raises constitutional concerns due to the fact that 
different interests are at stake from the perspectives of the accused and the accuser. 
The United States Supreme Court considered such constitutional challenges in two 
well-known cases. In the case of Maryland v Craig36 the majority of the Court held 
that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the USA did not absolutely prohibit a 
procedure whereby the witness could testify in another room. The Court in Coy v 
Iowa37held, however, that the right of an accused to confront witnesses against him 
includes the right to actually, physically face the witness whilst questioning such 
witness. 38 In the case of Maryland v Craig39 O'Connor J, in dealing with the issue, 
remarked as follows: 
We likewise conclude today that a State's interest in the physical and 
psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently 
important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to 
face his or her accusers in court. That a significant majority of States 
have enacted statutes to protect child witnesses from the trauma of 
giving testimony in child abuse cases attests to the widespread belief in 
the importance of such a public policy.40 
35 See Du Toit et al op cit at 22-32. 
36 110 S Ct 31577 (1990). 
37 101 L Ed 2d 857 (1988); 487 US 1012 (1988). 
38 See Coy supra at 1016 where the Court stated: 'We have never doubted that the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses 
afpearing before the trier of fact.' 
3 Supra n36. 























It is interesting to note that Justice O'Connor abandoned the approach followed by the 
court in Coy, to require face-to-face questioning, and opted for a much more 
functional approach to confrontation, in which the state was permitted to use one way 
closed circuit television. The functional approach adopted by the majority of the Court 
in M2ryland is suggestive of a departure from the established confrontation clause 
jurisprudence and can be considered as an extension of the right to challenge 
evidence. If one compares the competing views expressed in Maryland and Coy, the 
Maryland decision is to be preferred because experience has shown that direct 
confrontation by the accused in a court may have the effect of diminishing the 
reliability of the testimony of children, which will not enhance the fairness of the 
criminal trial for the accused at all. Most psychologists support this view because they 
claim that an adversarial setting in particular discourages children from testifying 
truthfully. 
In the United Kingdom, it seems that the procedure to admit testimony from outside 
the courtroom in the case of young children was sparked off by a Report by Judge 
Pigot QC in 1987 which stated the following: 
In other parts of the world where the quality of justice is not inferior to 
our own, listening to what very small children have to say and 
providing the suitable means for children to describe their experience 
outside the public arena of the courtroom is not regarded as unusual, 
unreasonable, or a threat to the principle that the prosecution must 
discharge the burden of proof.41 
An examination of the procedural requirements set by s 170A of the CPA 
demonstrates that our courts have interpreted s 170A as providing for the appointment 
of an intermediary only after an application is lodged by the state. The appointment 
will not follow mero motu, but must be supported by evidence that the witness will 
suffer undue harm or stress by testifying in an open court or by being confronted by 
41 Para 5.13 of the Report of the Advisory Group on Video Evidence (1989) hereinafter 

























Youthfulness alone is not sufficient to warrant the use of an 
intennediary.
43 
Scholars, like Pretorius, are supportive of the view that the wording of 
42 Cf. S v Stefaans 1999 (1) SACR 182 (C). The Court considered it apt to proffer 
guidelines for the invocation of the provision. The following were laid down as 
guidelines at 187i-188j: 
1. A court faced with an application for the provisions of s 170A to be invoked 
should be mindful of the dangers which are inherent in the use of an 
intermediary which might prejudice the right of the accused to a fair trial. 
These are: 
1.1 that cross-examination through an intermediary may be 
less effective than direct cross-examination of a witness 
(Klink's case supra, at 409F-410B (BCL report); 441i-422e 
in SACR); 
1.2 that an accused prima facie has the right to confront his 
accusers and be confronted by them; 
1.3 that human experience shows that it is easier to lie 
about someone behind his back than to do so to his face. 
2. The provisions of the section will find application more readily in cases 
involving a physical or mental trauma or insult to the witness than in other 
types of cases. 
3. The giving of evidence in court is inevitably a stressful experience. In order 
to find application, the section requires the court to be satisfied that such stress 
will be 'undue' i.e. something in excess of the ordinary stresses. In this regard, 
it seems fair to say that the younger (and more emotionally immature) the 
witness, the greater the likelihood that such stress will be 'undue'. 
4. A witness who is known to the accused and who knows the accused and is 
still prepared to testify is less likely to be unduly stressed by the need to testify 
before the accused than one who is unknown to the accused and may fear 
intimidation. This factor, of course, needs to be balanced by the factor referred 
to in para 3 above. 
5. If the application to involve the section is not opposed, it may be more 
readily granted. 
6. An unrepresented accused should have his right to oppose the application 
carefully explained to him by the presiding judicial officer, and, as is in the 
case of a plea of guilty, if any doubt exists as to the accused's understanding 
of the matter the application should be treated as opposed. 
7. If the application is opposed, the presiding judicial officer should require 
that appropriate evidence be adduced to enable him to exercise a proper 
discretion as to whether the section should be invoked or not. Such evidence 
may, in the case of a younger witness in a matter clearly involving mental or 
physical trauma, consist of nothing more than evidence of the nature of the 
charge and the age of the witness. In other matters, evidence of a suitably 
qualified expert, whether that be a social worker, psychologist or psychiatrist 
may be necessary. 
8. If the section is invoked the presiding judicial officer should be aware of the 
risk that the efficacy of cross-examination may be reduced by the intervention 
























s 170A of the CPA qualifies mental stress as sufficient to invoke the use of an 
intermediary.44 Moreover an accused should have the opportunity to address the court 
when it is deciding upon the appointment of an intermediary.45 
In cases of witnesses under the age of eighteen years, the 1991 Criminal Law 
Amendment Act46 further provides that demonstrations, gestures and a nod of the 
head shall be deemed to be viva voce evidence. In this regard the use of anatomical 
dolls proved to be useful in adducing the evidence of these witnesses. These dolls are 
'male' and 'female' dolls and are made to reflect the sexual organs with accurate 
detail. These dolls are mostly used during pre-trial interviews to assist those children 
that are often too traumatised to tell what has happened. By using these dolls they can 
act out the events that they have experienced. Some scholars submit that such play 
allows a pre-verbal or traumatised child to communicate with less stress.47 
6.3 Evidentiary rules and child witnesses 
What follows is a discussion of the rule relating to children's competency and the 
infamous cautionary rule48 that finds application in our law in evaluating the 
testimony of children. 
prepared to intervene to insist that the exact question rather than the import 
thereof, be conveyed to the witness. 
43 See S v Mathebula 1996 (2) SACR 231 (T) at 234c-f. The Court relied in particular 
on the view expressed by Kriegler in Hiemstra: Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses at 433: 
Jeugdigheid as sodanig is nie voldoende nie. Die hof sal horn deur 'n 
verskeidenheid faktore laat lei, byvoorbeeld die intelligensie, ouderdom, 
geslag en persoonlikheid van die getuie, die aard van die getuienis en dies 
meer. Dit sal, ooreenkomstig gevestigde beginsels, nodig wees om die partye 
te ken voordat 'n besluit geneem word. 
44 See JP Pretorius op cit at 348. 
45 Mathebula supra at 234d. 
46 Act 135 of 1991. 
47 See J R Christiansen 'The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and the 





















6.3.1 Competency of child witnesses 
Throughout this study it has been emphasised that, without the participation of all 
witnesses, the criminal justice system will come to a halt and there will be no justice. 
It is therefore important that courts hear the testimony of all people, including 
children, that can offer their testimony in solving the case. It is fundamental and in the 
interests of justice that child witnesses should not unnecessarily be excluded as 
witnesses on the basis of competency. Rigid competency requirements can 
consequently lead to valuable evidence being lost because witnesses that are too 
young are prevented from testifying in court. It is submitted that the reason why 
ccrnrts require that witnesses testifying in court should be competent is basically to 
ensure that the witness is capable of giving reliable testimony. The Pigot Committee 
in its investigation of child witnesses labelled the requirement of competency as a 
requirement 'founded upon the archaic belief that children below a certain age or 
level of understanding are either too senseless or too morally delinquent to be worth 
listening to at all'. 49 
An examination of competency tests in most Anglo-American jurisdictions shows that 
what these tests aim to establish is the likelihood that the child has an accurate 
memory of the event to be recalled and whether it is possible for the child to 
communicate the recalled information accurately. Courts, however, have persisted in 
being sceptical with regard to child witnesses' abilities to recall events accurately, 
notwithstanding the fact that research has rebutted such a view. 50 
An examination of the South African criminal justice system reveals that there is no 
universal test, which is used by the courts in determining whether a child witness is 
sufficiently competent to testify.51 What is however discernible fro~ an analysis of 
South Africa's competency rule, is that age is not a decisive factor in the 
48 See discussion of the rule in chapter 5 supra. 
49 Pigot Report op cit at para 5.12. 
50 See Helen L Westcott 'The 1991 Criminal Justice Act: research on children's 
testimony' (1992) 16 Adoption and Fostering 7 at 7. 
51 Courts are obliged in terms of s 193 of the CPA to decide upon the competency of 
witnesses before they testify. Parties are not permitted to consent to the admission of 





















determination of the child's competency as a witness. 52 Section 164 of the CPA 
provides that children will be competent to testify if they can appreciate and 
understand the duty to speak the truth. 53 This implies that the court will have to 
determine on the facts54 of each case, whether the child is sufficiently intelligent to 
testify and whether the child has sufficient mental capacity to testify.55 Various tests56 
have been employed by our courts to determine whether a child is capable of giving 
an intelligent and truthful account of the events.57 It is these 'tests' which have led 
scholars, such as Schwikkard, to believe that a presumption of incompetence58 applies 
to child witnesses. Whilst her theory is problematic, because of the notion of the 
52 See Schwikkard et al op cit at 281. Cf. Wigmore op cit at para 505, who states with 
reference to the common law that no rule defines any particular age as conclusive of 
incapacity. 
53 See s 164( 1) of the CPA and s 41 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 
1965. Cf. Hoffmann and Zeffertt op cit at 375-376; Schwikkard et al op cit at 281; 
Schmidt op cit at 210. 
54 This means that a court will have to enquire whether a child witness understands the 
oath and whether the child understands what it means to speak the truth. See 
Henderson v S (1997) 1 All SA 594 (C) at 597d-g. · 
55 See Chaimowitz v Chaimovitz(J) 1960 (4) SA 818 (K); S v L 1973 (1) SA 344 (C); 
S v T 1973 (3) SA 794 (A). 
56 Criteria applied are: the child's ability to narrate events in a meaningful way;.the 
ability of the child to distinguish between right and wrong; and the ability of the child 
to recollect the events. Cf. Hoffmann and Zeffertt op cit at 376. 
57 See Woji v Sanlam Insurance Co Ltd. 1981 (1) SA 1020 (A). More specifically the 
Court defined the terms of the competency enquiry regarding the child's competency 
as follows: 
The question which the trial Court must ask itself is whether the young 
witness' evidence is trustworthy. Trustworthiness, as is pointed out by 
Wigmore in his Code of Evidence para 568 at 128, depends on factors such as 
the child's power of observation, his power of recollection, and his power of 
narration on the specific matter to be testified. In each instance the capacity of 
the particular child is to be investigated. His capacity of observation will 
depend on whether he appears "intelligent enough to observe". Whether he 
has the capacity of recollection will depend again on whether he has sufficient 
years of discretion "to remember what occurs" while the capacity of narration 
or communication raises the question whether the child has "the capacity to 
understand the questions put, and to frame and express intelligent answers" 
(Wigmore on Evidence vol II para 506 at 596). 
(At I 028 B-D) 
Cf. S v V 1998 (2) SACR 651 (C) at 652e-f where the Court held that the capacity to 
understand the difference between truth and falsehood is a prerequisite for the oath, 
affirmation and an admonition in terms of s 164 of the CPA. 
58 See P J Schwikkard 'The abused child: A few rules of evidence considered' 1996 
















presumption on which it is based, it is supported on the basis that an inference can be 
drawn from the perspective of competency that child witnesses are in an inferior 
position vis-a-vis adult witnesses who can rely on a presumption of competency.59 
What is disturbing about such analysis is that South African courts, in their 
application of the 'competency test', have regularly used illusive concepts such as 
truth and falsehood to determine the competency of child witnesses. It is submitted 
that our courts have been much too rigid and conservative in their determination of 
the competency of young witnesses, without due consideration of each witness's 
mental faculties and powers of recollection. 60 An examination of the test shows that it 
operates restrictively and that children of tender age are excluded from giving 
testimony because they cannot draw a clear distinction between the concepts of truth 
and falsity, despite the fact that they can give a coherent and accurate account of 
incidents shortly after the event happening. 61 Scholars, like John Spencer, have argued 
for some time that very young children should be able to give testimony in some 
59 See discussion supra at 2.1. 
60 See S v N 1996 (2) SACR 225 (C) at 226i-227b for the following test used by the 
court: 
Mnr Du Toit, sal u asseblief die kind vra, dit wil se J B vra of sy skoolgaan?-
Ja. 
Watter standerd is u ?- Standerd 1. 
Standerd 1. Gaan u kerk toe ook J?- Ja. 
Wat is die naam van die kerk?- Ek weet nie. 
Die dominee se naam is?- Pastoor ons se net pastoor, dis al. 
J, ek wil net vir u vra, soos die magistraat, u is bewus mos u is in die hof ne? 
Tussenganger: Ek kan nie die vraag hoor nie, kan u net herhaal asseblief? 
Hof: Is sy bewus dat sy nou in die hof is?- Ja. 
J, wat gebeur in 'n geval waar u nou gevra is iets, deur u pa of u ma, en u nie 
die waarheid praat nie, wat gebeur dan daama aan u? - Hy sal my pak gee. 
After these questions were put to the witness the Court was satisfied that the witness 
was able to distinguish between the truth and falsehood, was a competent witness, and 
was given an admonition to speak the truth. Considering the questions put to the 
witness and the response by the witness it is evident that the questions were not 
sufficient to support any conclusion of competency, much less an understanding of the 
nature of the oath that was admonished. Cf. S v Mashava 1994 (1) SACR 224 (T) and 
S v Seymour 1998 (1) SACR 66 (N). 
61 See M Reddi 'The child witness in the criminal justice system: suggestions for 

















form, otherwise all offences committed against them will be impossible to 
prosecute. 62 
English law has developed in a similar way to South African law in that it has 
depended for some time on the child's competency to give evidence. English law also 
distinguished between sworn and unsworn testimony of children. The 1991 Criminal 
Justice Act, abolished the competency requirement for child witnesses. English judges 
therefore no longer have to determine solely whether the child can distinguish 
between lies and truth; rather they have to determine whether the child witness can 
give a coherent and comprehensible account of the events.63 In England the Pigot 
Committee considered the following reasons as cogent to abandon the 'competency' 
requirement applicable to the testimony of children: 
In principle it seems wrong to us that our courts should refuse to 
consider any relevant understandable evidence. If a child's account is 
available it should be heard .... Once this evidence is admitted juries 
' will obviously weigh matters such as the demeanour of the witness, his 
or her maturity and understanding and the coherence and consistency 
of the testimony, in deciding how much reliance to place upon it. ... 
62 See J Spencer 'Child Witnesses and Video-Technology: Thoughts for the Home 
Office' 1987 Journal for Criminal Law 677; 'Reforming the Competency 
Requirement' 1987 New Zealand Law Journal 147. 
63 See R v Hampshire (1995] 2 All ER 1019 (CA). In Hampshire the Court held, that: 
(a) the question of competence should be dealt with at the earliest possible 
moment and not after the evidence has been given; 
(b) it is a matter of the judge's perception of the child's understanding as 
demonstrated in the course of the ordinary discourse (rather than as a result of 
an adversarial examination and cross-examination); 
( c) where there has been an application under s 32A of the 1998 Act to rely on 
video-recorded evidence and the interview has been properly conducted, the 
judge's pre-trial view of the recording should normally enable him or her to 
decide the issue of competence, but if in doubt the judge should conduct an 
investigation; and 
( d) the investigation, whether or not additional to an earlier view of a video 
recording, should be conducted in the presence of the accused but not the jury, 
because the jury function is to assess the child's evidence, and its weight, if 





















The present approach therefore appears to be founded upon the archaic 
belief that children below a certain age or level of understanding are 
either too senseless or too morally delinquent to be worth listening to 
at all. It follows that we believe the competence requirement which is 
applied to potential child witnesses should be dispensed v,ith and that it 
should not be replaced. 64 
In accordance with the recommendations of the Pigat Committee, s 33A was inserted 
into the Criminal Justice Act 1988.65 What is required of judges now is to discover 
whether the child understands the difference between truth and lies. The test is now 
intelligibility rather than an understanding of the importance to tell the truth. English 
case law shows that what would be required of the court is to determine whether the 
child can communicate and . give a coherent and comprehensible account of the 
matters in relation to their testimony.66 
A country that requires that child witnesses appreciate the solemnity of the court 
situation is New Zealand. Whilst young witnesses in New Zealand no longer have to 
take the oath before testifying, there is still a legislative concern that they should be 
'competent' witnesses in terms of knowing the importance of telling the truth and 
being able to do so. Regulations67 made in terms of the Evidence Amendment Act 
determine that the Act will find application where the offence is of a sexual nature and 
Cf. G v DPP [1997] 2 All ER 755 (DC) where the court held that no expert testimony 
is required in order to determine whether a child is capable of giving intelligible 
testimony. 
64 Para 5 .12 of the Pi got Report. 
65 The amendment to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 was by virtue of s 52 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991. This section reads as follows: 
52(1) Afters 33 of the 1988 Act there shall be inserted the following section-
Evidence given by children 
33A- (1) A child's evidence in criminal proceedings shall be given unsworn. 
(2) A deposition of a child's unsworn evidence may be taken for 
the purposes of criminal proceedings as if that evidence had been 
given on oath. 
(2A) A child's evidence shall be received unless it appears to the court 
that the child is incapable of giving intelligible testimony. (Inserted by 
s 168 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.) 
(3) In this section 'child' means a person under fourteen years of age. 





















the child complainant is under the age of 17 years. It also requires that the child 
examiner should determine competency by establishing the following: that the 
complainant understands the necessity to tell the truth and as such to obtain from the 
complainant a promise to tell the truth, where the complainant is capable of giving, 
and willing to give, a promise to this effect.68 
Looking at American law it appears that the state of Washington69 has succeeded in 
designing a competency test that reflects a method to determine both the reliability 
and communicative competency of the child. This test, which at best can be described 
as a five-tier-test, includes the following: 
(I) An understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness 
stand; 
(2) The mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which 
he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; 
(3) A memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the 
occurrence; 
( 4) The capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; 
and 
(5) The capacity to understand simple questions about it. 
It is also determined by statute that persons 'who appear incapable of receiving just 
impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined, or ofrelating them truly, 
are not competent to testify' .70 
67 See the Evidence Amendment Act (1989). 
68 See discussion of the position of child witnesses in New Zealand by M Pipe et al, 
'Perceptions of the legal provisions for child witnesses in New Zealand' 1996 New 
Zealand Law Journal I 8. 
69 Washington's test was first articulated in State v Allen 70 Wash 2d 690,692,424 
P 2d 1021, 1022 (1967). This test is still the basis for determining competency. See 
State v Hunsacker 39 Wash App 489,491, 693 P 2d 724 (1984); Dependency of 




















6.3.2 Credibility of child witnesses 
It is trite law that the testimony of children must be treated with circumspection and 
that their evidence, if not corroborated, be accepted with great caution.71 Some of the 
3rgumer:t!:; on this issue will tum on how much credence should be given to the 
evidence of small children. Before one can judge the reliability of their testimony it is 
important to understand the unique processes of children's memory. 
I consider it therefore appropriate for purposes of this discussion to begin with the 
definition of memory in order to understand the storing of data by a child. Memory is 
defined as a function of two components: the capacity to take in and retain accurately 
images, sounds and other elements of experience which are the raw material of 
memory; and the skill to recall these items and express them meaningfully to others.72 
To understand memory in the context of children it is important to note that the 
former is a natural attribute, whilst the latter is a learned skill. Psychologists tend to 
distinguish between 'semantic' memory, which is a retained verbal expression 
presenting an experience, and an 'episodic' memory, which is a memory of the 
concrete sensory detail of the actual experience.73 It has been contended by experts 
like Johnson and Foley that the cognitive skill used to recall memories develops only 
between the ages of five and ten. 74 
The second issue to be considered is that once children have developed the skill to 
recall memory, how do they recall specific memories, relating to specific incidents? 
Researchers maintain that one method of recalling memory is by giving the child a 
cue that would trigger the memory that should be recalled. This then brings me back 
to the courtroom situation where leading questions might be used as cues to help a 
70 Sees 5.60.050(2) of the Washington Revised Code. 
71 See CW H Schmidt and D T Zeffertt The Law of South Africa Vol 9 Evidence (rev 
ed by DP van der Merwe) (1997) at para 156. Cf. R v Sikurlite 1964 (3) SA 151 (SR); 
R vManda 1951 (3) SA (A). 
72 See M Johnson and M Foley 'Differentiating fact from fantasy: The Reliability of 
Children's Memory' (1984) 40Journal of Social Issues 33 at 34-36. 
73 See R Brown 'The Development of Memory: Knowing, Knowing About Knowing, 
and Knowing How to Know' (1975) 10 Advances in Child Development and 
Behaviour 136. 




















child recall a memory out of his reach75 without knowing whether the memory is a 
suggested memory or a true memory of the child. This problem is compounded by the 
fact that a cross-examiner with a preconceived idea of what has happened might 
wittingly and even unwittingly impose an idea on the child and suggest certain 
answers to the child in order to discredit the child's testimony in court.76 
It is also possible that contamination of a child witness's memory may happen at the 
pre-trial stage during consultation. If the interviewer is not skilled or well trained in 
child psychology, he might be contaminating the child's testimony by putting certain 
suggestions to the child. There is therefore the risk that this contamination might 
falsify the child's memory of the event either in part or in whole. It will be suggested 
at the end of this discussion that it is in the interests of justice that trained and 
qualified personnel should conduct all interviews of child witnesses. 
6.3.3 The hearsay rule and child witnesses 
In an examination of systems used in other countries it has been noted that in a 
country such as Israel, hearsay testimony is used to protect the child from the 
courtroom trauma. The law in Israel is designed to keep children under the age of 
fourteen years out of court, in cases involving sexual offences.77 Under the Israeli 
statute a youth examiner makes a report which is admissible in court in lieu of the 
child coming to court to testify. If the court or the defence wants to put other 
questions to the child, the youth examiner shall decide whether such questions will 
cause psychological harm to the child and if so may refuse to re-examine the child. 78 
75 See R Brown op cit 115; L Berliner and MK Barbieri 'The testimony of the child 
victim of sexual assault' (1984) 40 Journal of Social Issues 129. 
76 See GS Goodman and VS Helgeson 'Child Sexual Assault: Children's memory 
and the law' (1985) 40 University of Miami LR 181 at 188-191 and 195. 
77 See Israeli 'Amendment to the Law of Evidence' passed by the Knesset on ih June 
1955, called the Law of Evidence Revision (Protection of Children) 5715-1955. The 
law came into operation on 20 September 1955. See J Y Parker 'The Rights of Child 
Witnesses: Is the Court A Protector or Perpetrator' (1982) 17 New England LR 643 at 
680. 
























The approach adopted by the Israelis is however severely criticised by McEwan79 who 
considers the system as being too prejudicial towards an accused in that it denies an 
accused the opportunity to challenge evidence against him.80 
The most progressive and usefol piece of legislation governing hearsay testimony of 
children is the one drafted and created by the Washington legislature which has since 
served as a blueprint for a number of states in the United States of America. The 
Washington exception provides for evidence which is sufficiently reliable to be 
admitted if the child later testifies and is subjected to cross-examination.81 It further 
provides that where a child is unavailable or does not testify, that corroborating 
evidence is needed. The corroboration requirement may be fulfilled through the 
adducement of other physical evidence like witnesses' statements, other independent 
79 See Jermy McEwan 'Child Evidence: More proposals for Reform' 1988 Crim LR 
812at820. 
80McEwan maintains that the Israeli system is in contravention of art. 6.3( d) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Article 6.3( d) of the Convention provides 
that 'anyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to examine witnesses 
against him and to obtain some attendance and examination of witnesses on his 
behalf.' (Emphasis added) 
81 Sees 9A.44.120 of the Revised Washington Criminal Code that provides as 
follows: 
A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of 
sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, or describing any 
attempted act of physical abuse of the child by another that results in 
substantial bodily harm as defined by RCW 9A.04.110, not otherwise 
admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in dependency 
proceedings under Title 13 RCW and criminal proceedings, including juvenile 
offense adjudications, in the courts of the state of Washington if: 
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the 
jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide 
sufficient indicia of reliability; and 
(2) The child either: 
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or 
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided, that when the child is 
unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is 
corroborative evidence of the act. 
A statement may not be admitted under this section unless the proponent of the 
statement makes known to the adverse party his or her intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the 
proceedings to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to 






















evidence and admissions or confessions. A court that has to decide upon the reliability 
of a hearsay statement \vill look at the following factors: 82 
(1) whether there is an apparent motive to lie; 
(2) the general character of the declarant; 
(3) whether more than one person heard the statements; 
(4) whether the statements were made spontaneously; 
(5) the timing of the declaration and the relationship between 
the declarant and the witness; 
( 6) the statement contains no express assertion about past fact; 
(7) cross-examination could not show the declarant's lack 
of knowledge; 
(8) the possibility of the declarant' s faulty recollection is remote, and 
(9) the circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is 
no reason to suppose the declarant misrepresented defendant's 
involvement. 
Legislatures in the USA have authorised the prosecution to permit the parties to play 
videotape recordings of statements, depositions and the preliminary hearing of the 
child victim, at the trial instead of tendering viva voce testimony of the child. 83 The 
importance of out of court statements is succinctly stated by the court in the case of 
82 These factors are more commonly referred to as the 'Ryan factors'. See State v 
Ryan 103 Wash 2d 165, 175-76, 691 P 2d 197,205 (1984). 
83 See discussion by Michael H Graham, 'Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face 
Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions' ( 1985) 40 
University of Miami LR at 21, particularly where he states the following: 
State legislatures have dealt with reform of the rules of evidence in two basic 
ways. First, legislatures have created a hearsay exception for child abuse 
prosecutions that makes out of court statements of the victim admissible under 
certain prescribed circumstances. Second, legislatures have authorized the 
prosecution to permit the parties to play videotaped recordings of statements, 
depositions, or preliminary hearing testimony of the child victim at trial 
instead of eliciting viva voce testimony. They also have authorized the child 
witness to testify at trial over closed circuit television or in a special designed 
children's courtroom. The purpose of such reforms is to allow the child to 
testify without having to come face to face with the accused in open court 




















State v Myatt: 84 
Often the child victim's out-of-court statements constitute the only 
proof of the crime of sexual abuse. Witnesses other that the victim and 
perpetrator are rare as people simply co not molest children in front of 
others .... Most often the offender is a relative or close acquaintance 
who has the opportunity to be alone with the child .... Depending on 
the type of sexual contact, corroborating physical evidence may be 
absent or inconclusive .... The child may be unable to testify at trial due 
to fading memory, retraction of earlier statements due to guilt or fear, 
tender age, or inability to appreciate the proceedings in which he or 
she is a participant. Therefore, these hearsay statements are usually 
necessary to the proceedings as the only probative evidence 
available. 85 
The state of Kansas has also enacted a hearsay exception, which finds application 
only when the child is unavailable and once a specific finding has been made 
regarding the child's trustworthiness. 86 
84 237 Kan 17, 697 P 2d 836 (1985). 
85 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
86 Kansas Stat Ann s 60.460(dd) provides as follows: 
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying 
at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, is hearsay 
evidence and inadmissible except: 
(dd) Actions involving children. In a criminal proceeding or a proceeding 
pursuant to the Kansas juvenile justice code or in a proceeding to determine if 
a child is a child in need of care under the Kansas code for care of children, a 
statement made by a child, to prove the crime or that a child is a juvenile 
off ender or a child in need of care, if: 
(1) The child is alleged to be a victim of the crime or offense or a child 
in need of care; and 
(2) the trial judge finds, after a hearing on the matter, that the child is 
disqualified or unavailable as a witness, the statement is apparently 
reliable and the child was not induced to make the statement falsely 
by use of threats or promises. 
If a statement is admitted pursuant to this subsection in a trial to a jury, the 
trial judge shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight 
and credit to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it 
shall consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, the 























It is submitted that in South Africa legislative reform is required as a matter of 
necessity to create a special exception to the hearsay rule that will provide for the 
testimony of child witnesses out of court This proposal may be seen as a drastic 
provision and one that runs counter to the right of the accused to challenge evidence 
in court. 87 However, the rights of child victims are so important in any open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom that it should be 
possible to invoke the limitation clause88 of the Constitution with success. The 
formulation of such a special exception to the general rule against hearsay should, 
however, be narrowly drafted, taking full recognition of the risks of hearsay 
testimony. 
Such reform is required despite the provisions of s 3 of the Evidence Amendment Act 
45 of 1988.89 Experience has shown that our courts interpret this provision too 
promises that might have been made to the child to obtain the statement and 
any other relevant factor. 
87 See s 35(3)(i) of the Constitution. 
88 See s 36 of the Constitution. 
89 See s 3 of Act 45 of 1988 provides as follows: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of any other law, hearsay evidence shall not be 
admitted as evidence at criminal or civil proceedings, unless-
(a) each party against whom the evidence is to be adduced agrees to the 
admission thereof as evidence at such proceedings; 
(b) the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence 
depends, himself testifies at such proceedings; or 
( c) the court, having regard to-
(i) the nature of the proceedings; 
(ii) the nature of the evidence; 
(iii) the purpose for which the evidence is tendered; 
(iv) the probative value of the evidence; 
(v) the reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose 
credibility the probative value of such evidence depends; 
(vi) any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might 
entail; and 
(vii) any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into 
account, is of the opinion that such evidence should be admitted in the 
interests of justice . 
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not render admissible any evidence 
which is inadmissible on any ground other than that such evidence is hearsay 
evidence. 
(3) Hearsay evidence may be provisionally admitted in terms of subsection (1) 
(b) if the court is informed that the person upon whose credibility the 
























restrictively, thus making it impossible to use as an exception in instances of child 
abuse and neglect.90 
An esteemed academic such as John Spencer91 has criticised the hearsay rule as silly, 
'ncedle:dy complicated' and 'a disaster for justice in cases where children are 
concerned'. According to him the rule is responsible for the prevention of the best 
available evidence being presented to the court.92 
6.4 Focus on special offences committed against children 
Whilst this thesis is not a study of the substantive law it once more requires an 
analysis of one of two specific offences which are inherently committed against 
children. Cases of incest93 have a special dimension to them in that they are 
committed by those people who are in a position of trust in relation to the children. In 
most cases the offender has a strong bond with the child. Oates argues that children 
who are victims of incest have to deal with a variety of psychological factors if they 
have to incriminate their parent in court. It is suggested that one of their biggest fears 
is that the parent will always hold it against them for speaking out.94 
Without denying the trauma caused by any violent abuse of a parent towards a child I 
want to submit that the trauma caused by incest is more severe and harmful than the 
physical violence directed at the child. Using one's child for sexual gratification must 
be the worst distortions of parenthood and betrayal of trust that can exist. 
proceedings: Provided that if such person does not later testify in such 
proceedings, the hearsay evidence shall be left out of account unless the 
hearsay evidence is admitted in terms of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) or is 
admitted by the court in tem1s of paragraph (c) of that subsection. 
9° For an interpretation by the South African courts of the provision see S v Mpofu 
1993 (2) SACR I 09 (N); Hewan v Kourie 1993 (3) SA 233 (T); Mnyama v Gxalaba 
I 990 (I) SA 650 (C). 
91 See generally JR Spencer and R Flin The Evidence of Children - The Law and 
Psychology 2 ed (1993). 
92 Op cit at I 59-160. 
93 Incest is defined in our law as unlawful and intentional sexual intercourse between 
two persons who on account of consanguinity, affinity or adoptive relationship may 




















Presently our law is not aimed specifically at the protection of the child witnesses and 
they have to depend on the courts either to detain the offenders or to set special bail 
conditions. The other possibility is an application for an interdict under the Prevention 
of Family Violence Act,95 in terms of which the offender may be restricted or even 
prohibited from entering the aggrieved family member's home. Neither of these 
options is aimed at children specifically. In cases of severe abuse, however, the child 
may be protected by a protection order of the court, which then places the child under 
the care of the Department of Welfare.96 However, such order may not be in the 
interest of the child in that he or she may perceive this 'placement' away from their 
family and friends as punishment for the complaint. 
A much better system of dealing with these offences is the more innovative method 
proposed by Dr Giaretto.97 The aim of this programme, which is used in California 
and other American states is to stop the offence from continuing in the future and to 
stop the 'addiction' of the offender. The programme provides for a speedy process, as 
opposed to a slow process offered by the prosecution of the offence in court. Rapid 
pre-trial diversion of the offender into a reparative programme is designed to remove 
the offender from home and to stop the ongoing abuse. The offender is ordered to stay 
in the programme and to face what he has done in the company of other incest 
offenders. While he is being treated the child and mother are also rehabilitated. 
Statistical measures suggest that the programme is highly successful; the pre-trial 
diversions in cases of father and daughter incest, have resulted in a 90% rate for 
confessions and the programme is now used in 150 child abuse centres. 98 
It is submitted that this programme should be considered as a possible solution to 
alleviate the trauma suffered by child abuse and incest victims. It is supported for the 
following reasons: it spares the child the ordeal of a court case; it gives the child 
94 See R K Oates op cit at 132. 
95 Section 2 of the Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993. 
96 Sees 15 of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983. 
97 See H Giaretto Integrated Treatment of Child Sexual Abuse: A Treatment and 
Training Manual (1982). 





















immediate protection without the shame and trauma of having a parent in gaol; and, 
finally it addresses the offensive behaviour that caused the abuse in the first instance. 
6.5 Special courts 
In chapter 5 I have discussed the Wynberg Sexual Offences Court,99 which not only 
deals with the testimony of rape victims but which also serves as a special court to 
hear cases of child sexual abuse. Shortly after the inception of the Wynberg Sexual 
Offences Court another special court was opened in Cape Town, with the difference 
that the Cape Town court was initiated to deal exclusively with the testimony of 
young children. The court is referred to as Court 32. In most respects the Cape Town 
court matches the Wynberg Court except that the facilities available to this court are 
not as spacious as those at Wynberg. The court is run in the same manner as Wynberg 
and staffed by specially trained prosecutors. Both courts aim at making the court 
experience an unintimidating and more comfortable experience for children by 
familiarising them with court procedures and by taking care of the special needs of 
these children. 
Perhaps one of the most distressing things to know about children that have to appear 
in court as witnesses is that not all the courts have special facilities to accommodate 
these witnesses, be that a special screen to use in court or any television facility to 
hear the testimony of these young witnesses. So despite the advantages that 
procedures like s 170A of the CPA may have to offer young witnesses, not all of these 
witnesses will benefit from these procedures, because of insufficient facilities. An 
even more disturbing feature is that most courts do not even have a Victim Support 
Services Co-ordinator to assist child witnesses and to refer them for counselling or 
treatment. 100 
99 See 5.3 supra. 
100 Ms Shifra Jacobson, director of Resources Aimed at the Prevention of Child Abuse 
and Neglect (Rapcan) supports the idea of more courts with facilities for child 
witnesses. She maintains in a recent article that if the Department of Justice wants to 
improve the system for child witnesses then special courts should be put in all areas of 
the Peninsula and throughout the country. See 'Putting the law on the side of the 




















6.6 Possibilities for reform 
In the course of this chapter it has been argued that much of the trauma that children 
have to endure by testifying in court can be attributed to the fact that they have to 
submit themselves to being cross-examined by the defence. Most practitioners will 
agree that cross-examination is a powerful weapon in the hands of each opposing 
party and that most witnesses testifying in court fear it. Children are no exception. 
This brings me to the question of whether an inquisitorial system would not 
accommodate child witnesses more effectively. 101 An inquisitorial system has the 
advantage that it would deal with their testimony in a less confrontational manner. An 
examination of all the existing procedures applicable to child witnesses' testimony 
should entail a thorough investigation into all different methods of trial, including the 
methods primarily associated with an inquisitorial trial process. 
Something else that should be considered as a matter of urgency is the effect of delays 
on children. Whilst most witnesses are affected by the delay of a trial, children, 
because of their vulnerability, are affected particularly severely by these delays. 
Delays in the disposal of criminal trials that involve child witnesses contribute to the 
stress that these witnesses have to experience. 102 Common sense dictates, and 
psychiatrists confirm, that 'rehabilitation' of a traumatised child can only become 
successful once the child is able to face up to the horrible and traumatic event that has 
happened, and be in a position to come to terms with the trauma experienced. Dr Key 
illustrates the distressing effect of inordinate delays on child witnesses. 103 Her 
criticism of the system is based on a sexual abuse case that extended over two years. 
She found that this process of delay was a 'developmental disaster' for the child 
concerned, as it would be for any child. It is therefore submitted that if the criminal 
justice system requires the testimony of young witnesses, then the emotional trauma 
suffered due to delays of the trial should be considered as a factor impacting on these 
witnesses and a time limit should be considered for the conclusion of these trials. This 
101 Jenny McEwan op cit at 821 supports an inquisitorial system as opposed to a 
s6;stem of a lay intermediary and video recorded testimony. 
1 2 Spencer et al op cit at 81. 


















proposal is not farfetched, other jurisdictions, like Scotland, have a 110-day rule in 
dealing with child abuse cases. 
Whilst it has been argued generally above that more witnesses should be shielded 
from harsh cross-examination it is now suggested that such protection could be 
achieved by an amendment to s 170A of the CPA. It is proposed that s 170A( 1) of the 
CPA be amended to offer protection to all witnesses by the mere deletion of the words 
'under the age of eighteen years' .104 Such an amendment will not only benefit 
severely traumatised victims, 105 but will also be to the advantage of those witnesses 
who do not have the same mental capacity as adults. Witnesses who have the mental 
capacity of children under the age of eighteen are currently excluded from the use of 
the intermediary system and are thus exposed to the ordinary procedures that exist for 
all witnesses. It is submitted that such an amendment would not necessarily impact on 
the fairness of the trial, because in each case the court will exercise its discretion 
104 Such an amendment to s 170A could be drafted as follows: 
s 170A (1) Whenever criminal proceedings are pending before any court and it 
appears to such court that it would expose any witness to undue mental stress 
or suffering if he testifies at such proceedings, the court may, subject to 
subsection ( 4 ), appoint a competent person as an intermediary in order to 
enable such witness to give his evidence through that intermediary.(Empahsis 
added) 
105 I consider it to be fitting to refer to two cases that caused a lot of dissatisfaction 
amongst some prosecutors at this Special Court in time that I served as Senior Public 
Prosecutor at Wynberg. In the first matter, S v F Case No SHG 130/94, the accused 
was charged with rape. The complainant a 24 year old woman was raped by him over 
a period of five years. The offence took place about thirteen years earlier when the 
complainant was still a child. She was so traumatised by the experience that she had 
to undergo psychological treatment for a period of twelve months before she could 
testify. She seemed visibly disturbed by the presence of the accused and although the 
offences were committed when she was still a young child she was naturally 
precluded from using an intermediary in the presentation of her testimony. The 
complainant's mental stress was exacerbated by testimony in court, that she at times 
started vomiting and could only manage the trial with support from her counsellor and 
sympathetic guidance from the specialised prosecutors. This case is a prime example 
of victimisation through the court process and is something that could be avoided 
should any changes to s 170A be considered. The second case, S v R Case No SHG 
259/94, has facts similar to the previous case discussed except that in this case the 
complainant was 29 years old and the offence was committed at a time when she was 
already an adult. Once again she suffered severe anxiety by testifying in the presence 
of the accused. If she could have testified in another room through an intermediary, 























based on facts that will support the conclusion that the witness will suffer unduly if an 
intermediary is not appointed. 
A guaranteed way of improving the system and reducing the stress for child witnesses · 
would be to provide for technical assistance in the questioning process of children. 
This should include special training of the police officers questioning the children and 
the prosecution personnel prosecuting these cases. People undertaking the prosecution 
of these sensitive cases should also receive some training in developmental and child . 
psychology. 
6. 7 Conclusion 
It is conceded that the proposals made in this chapter might not solve all the problems 
of these young victims. However some, like the suggestion to use an out of court 
statement for children, do have the potential to make the court experience a less 
daunting one and will be an improvement on the system currently used by the courts. 
Legislative intervention will not be effective unless there is a change in the views of 
the judiciary. Judges, magistrates and lawyers need to be better informed of recent 
developments in psycho-legal research that has disproved many of the traditional 
notions that existed over the years regarding the unreliability of child witnesses. 106 
Training is required as a matter of necessity. 
It should be borne in mind that the issues surrounding child witnesses discussed in 
this chapter cut across many areas of law and raise complex questions that can be 
addressed only in collaboration with other sciences like the social and behavioural 
sciences. This makes it almost impossible to offer quick fix solutions to deal with the 
difficult procedural issues that arise in cases involving child abuse and child neglect. 
What is evident is that adequate resources must be made available to provide 
sufficiently trained and specialised personnel for the criminal justice system. Rushing 
to legislative solutions without due examination of the problem may in the end do 
1
~ See A E Tobey and-GS Goodman 'Children's eyewitness memory: Effects of 























more harm than good. What is needed are more reliable studies about children's 
experiences in the criminal justice system, in order to identify more closely the causes 
of system trauma and to formulate viable solutions. A criminal justice system that 
does not accommodate a class of victims, especially those who are so vulnerable and 























7. The Sentencing Process and Victims 
7.1 Introduction 
The forgotten man is the victim of an offence, who, if still alive, is 
always good enough to attend the trial and give evidence for the State. 
He is often subjected to such gruelling cross-examination at the hands 
of the defence that he begins to wonder whether he is not the one who 
has done wrong. Ultimately sentence is passed and he is forgotten. He 
derives small satisfaction from the imprisonment imposed on the 
accused, and he wonders why the State should be enriched by a fine 
for a loss he has suffered.1 
Words uttered in 1973, but words that will still hold true of sentencing in South Africa in 
1999. The position of the victim as an integral part of the sentencing process has not 
improved over the past twenty-six years. Unlike the offender the victim does not have 
special status or rights at the sentencing phase, even though this stage has the potential to 
give true recognition to victims of crime and to restore justice. 
A focus on the South African sentencing process2 will show that presiding officers are 
concerned with factors such as the personal circumstances of an offender, the nature of 
1 Hiemstra J's paper on 'Compensation for the Victims of Crime' read at the National 
Criminological Symposium on Crime Prevention held at the University of South Africa in 
Pretoria, 28-31 August 1973, as quoted by the Viljoen Commission in its Report on The 
Penal System of the Republic of South Africa RP 78/1976 para 5.1.6.3.2. (Emphasis 
added.) 
2 The sentencing phase is considered to be the phase after the determination of criminal 
liability and is characterised by Ashworth as a public, judicial assessment of the degree to 
which the offender may rightly be ordered to suffer legal punishment. See A J Ashworth 























the crime that has been committed and the interests of society at large in proposing 
sentence.3 Victims it seems are still nothing more than mere witnesses with limited rights 
to restitution in respect of losses or damage caused by the offender. 
It should be acknowledged that sentencing relates to a broad field, including the study of 
penology and criminology. This discussion will not consider sentencing in its broader 
context. It will focus primarily on the procedural processes affecting victims of crime. It 
is inevitable that certain basic principles of sentencing like retribution, deterrence, 
prevention and, to a lesser extent, rehabilitation will be referred to but this will be done 
with the focus on victims and not offenders. 
The South African sentencing process will be criticised on the basis that it does not 
sufficiently focus on the issue of the harm4 suffered by victims, either directly or 
indirectly, as a result of a crime having been committed. It could, of course, be argued 
that our courts do give recognition to the rights of victims, albeit indirectly, by 
considering the interests of the community as a factor in the sentencing process. I would, 
however, submit that such recognition is not sufficient if one considers the direct 
consequences caused by an offence. There is a specific relation between the harm 
suffered and the victim, which makes it a moral imperative to recognise the injustices 
suffered by victims. These injustices are equally a legal imperative and warrant 
recognition in the system. It will be argued in this chapter that one method that confers 
such legal recognition of the rights of victims is a sentence which includes a 
compensation order in favour of the victim. Another way of giving recognition to victims 
at the sentencing phase, is to give these victims the legal right to be heard before sentence 
is passed. At present, submissions before sentence are made in terms of s 274 of the 
CPA. 5 Under our current law victims do not have the same right as the accused and the 
3 See generally D Van Zyl Smit 'Sentencing and Punishment' chap 28 in Chaskalson et al 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa ( 1996). 
4 It is envisaged that the following could be considered as harm; bodily injuries; loss of 
property; damage to property; loss of income; psychological and emotional trauma 
suffered. 





















prosecution. Section 274 of the CPA was never aimed at victims, specifically; it gives the 
prosecution the right to address the court on sentence. Prosecutors have many functions 
to fulfil in court, one of which is to place all the facts before the court before sentence, 
and not only those facts in relation to aggravation of sentence.6 They are therefore not 
well suited to fulfil the function of victims' advocates because they have the dual 
responsibility to place all factors before the court including those factors in mitigation 
known to them, in the interest of justice. It is this dual responsibility that makes it 
difficult to focus on the rights of victims. For this reason the process as presently 
designed fails victims of crime dismally. Victims should rather be afforded the 
opportunity to act in their own interest by making statements to the court. It is submitted 
that such victim impact statements could improve the current position of victims at the 
sentencing stage. 
The adoption of such a concept could be achieved through legislative measures, which 
could be fashioned along the lines of models adopted in New Zealand and the United 
States of America. It is submitted that a coherent body of law on victims' rights7 is 
needed to provide special protection for victims. Without such a body of law victims will 
remain second class citizens of the criminal justice system. 
7.2 The South African situation 
Sentencing is difficult and complex. The difficulties are often exacerbated by the absence 
of standards or guidelines on how to punish offenders. 8 It is therefore no easy task to 
274(1) A court may, before passing sentence, receive such evidence as it thinks fit 
in order to inform itself as to the proper sentence to be passed. 
(2) The accused may address the court on any evidence received under subsection 
(1 ), as well as on the matter of the sentence, and thereafter the prosecution may 
likewise address the court. 
6 See Kriegler op cit at 657. Cf. R v Motehen 1949 (2) SA 547 (A). 
7 This submission is based on the premise that the term 'right' is understood to mean an 
enforceable remedy or entitlement to obtain a specific result. 
8 See S v Rees 1984 ( 1) SA 468 (W) at 4 70B-C, where Goldstone J regarded the task of 




















determine the objectives of the courts in passing sentence. The traditional purpose of 
sentencing is captured by Rumpff CJ in the following words: 
. . . . it must be accepted as a fundamental principle that contemporary 
society sees the treatment of a criminal not only in the light of reform of 
the person himself and the protection of society, but also in the light of 
retribution. We are of the opinion that society accepts the following as 
inherent in punishment: ( 1) Protection of society; (2) deterrence of others; 
(3) deterrence of the person punished from repetition of his conduct; (4) 
reform of the criminal; and (5) retribution.9 
South African courts, despite not having specific sentencing guidelines, have formulated 
a near uniform approach to be followed by sentencing officers. The following three 
factors must be taken into account, as was stated by Rumpff JA in S v Zinn: 10 
What has to be considered is the triad consisting of the crime, the off ender 
and the interests of society. 11 
The approach set out by Rumpff JA has been recognised as stating the basic sentencing 
principles that must be considered in determining an appropriate sentence. 12 In addition 
So much by way of an introduction to what is always a painfully difficult 
problem, finding a proper and just sentence. The major cause of this difficulty is 
that the Court, in determining a sentence, must perforce attempt to reconcile 
interests which are often not reconcilable and which are indeed in opposition. The 
interests of society in relation to punishment are frequently in opposition to the 
interests of the offender and a proper punishment for a particular type of offence 
may run counter to both of the aforementioned interests. 
9 See para 1.22 of the Rumpff Report of The Commission of Inquiry into the 
Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters RP 69/1967. 
10 1969 (2) SA 537 (A). 
11 S v Zinn supra at 540G. 
12 These principles have been confirmed in a number of Appellate Division decisions. See 
S v Roux 1975 (3) SA 190 (A); S v Sparks 1972 (2) SA 396 (A);'S v Holder 1979 (2) SA 




















to these basic principles due regard must be paid to the aims 13 of punishment as 
enunciated in S v Rabie: 14 
Punishment should fit the criminal as well as the crime, be fair to society, 
and be blended with a measure of mercy according to the circumstances. 15 
Our courts have also emphasised over the years that cases are unique and that there could 
therefore be some justifiable disparity in the sentences imposed. The uniqueness of each 
offence, despite being classified as one and the same offence, is succinctly stated by 
Kriegler J in S v D16 in the following words: 
Die vakliteratuur, wat die regsgeleerde slegs deur 'n spieel en 'n raaisel 
sien, wil dan ook daarop dui dat daar in 'n geval soos die onderhawige 
breer gekyk moet word as bloot die pleger van die wandaad. Seksuele 
peutering met kinders binne gesinsverband is meermale 'n manifestasie 
van gesinspatologie. Om die pleger se handelinge, sy blaamwaardigheid 
en sy geregtelike lot te bepaal, verg dan nie alleen 'n ondersoek van die 
beskuldigde nie maar ook van die gesin. Bowendien is een van die geykte 
rigsnoere by vonnisoplegging die belange van die gemeenskap (kyk S v 
Zinn 1969 (2) SA 53 7 (A) op 540G - H) en in 'n geval soos die huidige 
staan die gesin in die voorste ry van belanghebbendes. Ook om daardie 
rede moet daar dan gelet word op die gesin, sy samestelling en dinamiek. 
13 In S v Khumalo 1984 (3) SA 327 (A) at 330D-E, the Court held: 
In the assessment of an appropriate sentence, regard must be had inter alia to the 
main purposes of punishment mentioned by Davis AJA in R v Swanepoel 1945 
AD 444 at 455, namely deterrent, preventive, reformative and retributive (see S v 
Whitehead 1970 (4) SA 424 (A) at 436E-F; S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 
862). 
These aims have also been stated in S v Mathee 1971 (3) SA 433 (A). S v Petrus 1969 (4) 
SA 85 (A) at 91E-F; S v Narker and Another 1975 (1) SA 583 (AD) at 586D. 
14 1975 (4) SA 855 (A). Cf. S v Di Blasi 1996 (1) SACR 1 (A); R v Karg 1961 (1) SA 231 
(A). 
15 S v Rabie supra at 862G-H.(Emphasis added) 

























Die rehabilitasie van die beskuldigde en, moontlik nog belangriker, die 
van die betrokke kinders, mag dit noodsaak. Daar kan ook nouliks besin 
word oor die vooruitsigte op rehabilitasie sander sodanige inligting. Dit is 
baas oorbodig om by te voeg dat 'n regsgeleerde horn by sodanige 
ondersoeke sal laat lei deur toepaslik gekwalifiseerde vakkundiges. Dit 
mag ook blyk dat deskundiges op meerdere terreine geraadpleeg moet 
word. Ook daaroor sal die regsgeleerde horn deur deskundiges laat lei. Dit 
staan die landdros natuurlik vry om die deskundige( s) pertinent te versoek 
om bepaalde aspekte wat by vonnisbepaling ter sake sal wees, na te gaan 
en daaroor verslag te doen. In laasgenoemde verband is dit wenslik om tf'. 
illustreer wat bedoel word. In die eerste instansie moet die beskuldigde 
deeglik betrag word. In para 1 van die landdros se memorandum, hierbo, 
word die beskuldigde beskryf as ' 'n welopgevoede man' wie se 
intelligensie 'na die hof se mening heeltemal nomiaal' is en by wie na 
'deurtastende waameming' 'geen afwykings' te bespeur was 'wat verdag' 
voorkom nie. 'n Mens se sogenaamde opvoedingspeil is moeilik 
bepaalbaar en bowendien 'n subjektiewe oordeel. Sy intelligensie is nog 
moeiliker om te bepaal, selfs in 'n kliniese atmosfeer. Die 'bespeuring' van 
'verdagte afwykings' val nog minder binne die kennisveld van die 
gemiddelde regterlike beampte. Waar die landdros dan in para 4 van die 
memorandum verdere psigologiese menings uiter aangaande die 
beskuldigde, is dit eweneens 'n oorskryding van sy bevoegdheidsveld. 
Vanselfsprekend is 'n ervare regterlike beampte bevoeg om sekere bree 
indrukke aangaande 'n beskuldigde of 'n getuie te vorm. Mensekennis is 
immers 'n onmisbare komponent van 'n regterlike beampte se mondering 
maar dit veroorloof horn nie om sosiologiese, psigometriese en 
psigologiese opinies te vorm - en daarop te handel - sander vakkundige 
bystand nie. Te meer is dit die geval waar daar te make is met 'n 
komplekse verskynsel soos die onderhawige. Feitelike inligting en 'n 
vakkundige opinie oor die aard en wese van die mens voor die hof moet 























vanwee dergelike optrede nie. Niks is bekend oor die spesifieke 
omstandighede waarin die wandade hul oorsprong gehad het nie. Daar is 
niks bekend oor die frekwensie waarmee die voorvalle plaasgevind het 
nie. Daar is niks bc:kend aangaande die beskuldigde se belewing van sy 
afwykende gedrag nie. Nietemin word bevind dat hy nie omgee wat 
sielkundig met die kinders gebeur nie, dat hy ander kinders op straat kan 
molesteer, dat gevangesetting vir horn as afskrikking sal dien, dat dit die 
enigste gepaste boetedoening vir sy dade sal wees en dat hy in die 
gevangenis 'deeglike behandeling' gegee sal word. Daar is in die karige 
gegewens weinig:, indien enigiets, om enigeen van die gemelde 
opmerkings van die landdros te rugsteun. Vakkundige bystand 
dienaangaande is noodsaaklik. Dit is ook nodig as die klaagsters, hul 
belange en die samelewing se belang by hulle na behore beoordeel moet 
word. Die landdros 'beskou hierdie as een van die afskuwelikste misdade 
wat ooit kan bestaan' (memorandum para 2, tweede paragraaf). 
Vervolgens beskryf hy die 'pyn, lyding en sielewroeging' van die 
klaagsters en veroorloof horn dan 'n sielkundige diagnose en 'n langtermyn 
prognose. Ongelukkig staan geeneen van die stellings op pote nie. Die 
seksuele mishandeling van kinders is ongetwyfeld hedendaags 'n cause 
celebre maar dit betaam 'n regterlike beampte om sy ewewig te behou. 
Geslagsverkeer tussen volwassenes en kinders is ongetwyfeld verwerplik 
in die oe van Blanke Suid-Afrikaners van vandag maar dit was nie altyd 
nie en is bepaald nie nou universeel die beskouYng van regdenkendes nie. 
Daar is gesaghebbende navorsing wat daarop dui dat die verskynsel by die 
antieke Grieke en Romeine en vandag in diverse kultuurgemeenskappe 
teenwoordig was en is ..... Bowendien, en selfs volgens Suid-Afrikaanse 
hedendaagse norme, kan die landdros se hoogs emosionele beskrywing 




















meriete beoordeel word sonder om dit a priori 'n plakkaat om die nek te 
hang. 17 
175 
Since the early 1990's and the enactment of new legislation based on community 
correctional alternatives to imprisonment, the emphasis of sentencing has, however, 
moved from retribution to correction. 18 What is, however, more important is to look at 
the approach of the courts since the adoption of the Constitution to see whether the aims 
of sentencing are still the same and to examine the effect, if any, of the Constitution in 
recognising the rights of victims. The effect of the Constitution can at best be determined 
be examining the decisions of the Constitutional Court. 
In S v Williams and Others 19 Justice Langa stated the following with regard to the aims 
of punishment and sentencing: 
There has been a shift of emphasis with regard to the overall aims of 
punishment. There is a general acceptance, as observed by Schreiner JA in 
R v Karg, that the retributive aspect has tended to give way to the aspects 
of prevention and correction. New and innovative systems and procedures 
have been introduced and some of them has been incorporated into 
legislation. The traditional objectives of punishment, namely prevention, 
17 S v D supra at 714G-716A.(Emphasis added) 
18 SeeSvR 1993 (1) SA476 (A) at487E-F: 
Ons straftoemeting het egter nou 'n heel nuwe fase betree. Korrektiewe toesig is 
weliswaar as nog 'n onbeproefde vonnisopsie maar dit blyk reeds uit die 
magtigende wetgewing dat dit groot potensiaal inhou, Wat veral tref, is die 
veelsoortigheid daarvan. By nadere ondersoek word dit duidelik dat die benaming 
'korrektiewe toesig' nie soseeer 'n vonnis beskryf nie maar 'n versamelnaam is 
vir 'n wye verskeidenheid maatreels waarvan die enkele gemeenskaplike kenmerk 
is dat hulle buite die gevangenis toegepas word. Die ingrypende aard van die 
Wysigingswet is opvallend by die blote aanskoue van die aanhef - dit beslaan 
meer as 'n bladsy. Die belangrikste aspek daarvan is die klemverskuiwing vanaf 
gevangenisstraf na hervorming . 





















retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation, are no doubt still applicable. Still 
applicable, albeit in modified form, are the remarks of Holmes JA that: 
'Punishment should fit the criminal as well as the crime, be fair to the 
accused and to society, and be blended with a m~asure of :uiercy .... 
The element of mercy, a hallmark of civilised and enlightened 
administration, should not be overlooked, lest the Court be in danger of 
reducing itself to the plane of the criminal. ... ' 
While those principles have remained eternal truths with regard to the 
purposes of punishment, the justice and penal systems have been evolving 
towards a more enlightened and human implementation of those 
principles. In keeping with international trends, there has been a gradual 
shift of emphasis away from the idea of sentencing being predominantly 
the arena where society wreaks its vengeance on wrongdoers. Sentences 
have been passed with rehabilitation in mind.20 
It is clear from this quotation that there is doubt as to whether retribution will carry the 
same weight as the other punishment objectives. This move away from retribution is 
continued by the court in the landmark decision of S v Makwanyane and Another. 21 
The court in Makwanyane when grappling with the death penalty as a form of 
punishment, voiced the following opinion: 
Retribution is one of the objects of punishment, but it carries less weight 
than deterrence. The righteous anger of family and friends of the murder 
victim, reinforced by the public abhorrence of vile crimes, is easily 
translated into a call for vengeance. But capital punishment is not the only 
way that society has of expressing its moral outrage at the crime that has 
been committed. We have long outgrown the literal application of the 
biblical injunction of 'an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth'. 
20 S v Williams supra at paras 65 and 66. 






















Punishment must to some extent be commensurate with the offence, but 
there is no requirement that it be equivalent or identical to it.22 
This review of the approaches followed by the South African courts over the past years 
demonstrates cogently that no special regard has been paid to victims and the harm that 
they have suffered. This untenable situation in the system should no longer be tolerated, 
especially in the light of the fact that South Africa has become a signatory to the United 
Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse.23 The 
following principles of this Declaration are related to sentencing and the sentencing 
process: 
• Victims should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity and are 
entitled to prompt redress for harm caused. 
• Judicial and administrative mechanisms s_hould be established and strengthened 
to enable victims to obtain redress. 
• The views and concerns of victims should be presented and considered at 
appropriate stages of the process. 
• Offenders should, where appropriate, make restitution to victims or their 
families or dependants. Where public officials have violated criminal laws, 
victims should receive restitution from the State. 
• When compensation is not fully available from· the offender, States should 
provide compensation to victims or their families in cases of significant physical 
or mental injury. 
• States should consider incorporating into national law norms proscribing abuses 
of power, including political and economic power. They should also provide 
remedies to victims of such abuses, including restitution and compensation. 
22 S v Makwanyane supra para 129. (Emphasis added) 
23 See The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power United Nations Compendium of United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime 




















It is submitted that the South African government has not responded to these obligations 
by way of the sentencing legislation it has introduced hitherto. The Criminal Law 
Amendment Act24 may perhaps indirectly serve the ends of victims in that it mandates the 
imprisonment and the incapacitation of victims' assailants for long periods. But this is not 
redress as envisaged by the United Nations. On the contrary the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act specifically outlaws the suspension of sentences in certain cases which 
foreclose the possibility of making a compensation order as a condition of a suspended 
sentence. Government also passed a new Correctional Services Act,25 which provides for 
a sentencing court to fix a non-parole period, when sentencing the offender. 26 In 1997 the 
South African Law Commission published an Issue Paper27 on Restorative Justice which 
has as its aim the empowerment of victims. The Prevention of Organised Crime Act28 has 
also recently been enacted. This Act provides for a special Criminal Assets Recovery 
Fund controlled by a Criminal Assets Recovery Committee. One of the primary purposes 
of the Criminal Assets Recovery Committee is to assist victims of crime by rendering 
assistance to these victims.29 
Despite the introduction of these recent measures I am nevertheless of the opinion that 
the South African criminal justice system remains inadequate in so far as the recognition 
and protection of victims' rights are concerned. Its inadequacy is illustrated in the lack of 
proper compensation procedures, the lack of victims' participation at the sentencing 
phase and the neglect of victims' rights when predetermined mandatory sentences are 
imposed. I shall now focus on the provisions in South Africa's sentencing process to 
show the inability of the system to give true recognition to victims of crime. 
24 Act 105 of 1997. 
25 Act 111 of 1998. 
26 Sees 73(6) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. Sees 75(4) of the Act, which 
grants a victim the opportunity to make representations to or to attend the Parole Board 
hearing which will entertain the possibility of parole of the offender. 
27 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 7 Project 82 Sentencing Restorative 
Justice - Compensation for Victims of Crime and Victim Empowerment ( 1997). 
28 Act 121 of 1998. 

























The history of victim compensation can be traced back to the Babylonian Code of 
Hammurabi some four thousand years ago, which is often cited as the first legal record of 
victim compensation. In part the Code reads as follows: 
If the brigand has been taken, the man plundered shall claim before God 
what he has lost; and the city and sheriff in whose land and boundary the 
theft has taken place shall restore to him all that he has lost. If a life, the 
city and sheriff shall pay one mina of silver to his people.30 
Today victim compensation is recognised in the United Nations Declaration.31 The South 
African system through the Criminal Procedure Act provides for compensation 
procedures in terms of sections 29i2 and 300.33 These sections will be examined in order 
to determine whether they could sufficiently be used in granting compensation and relief 
to victims.34 Without a special compensation procedure in the criminal process, victims 
are forced to seek redress through the civil process, which could be an expensive 
alternative if compared to the criminal process. It seems rather illogical to expect a law-
abiding citizen to seek compensation through the civil court in instances where a criminal 
offence has been committed and where the citizen has already had to sacrifice by 
participating in the criminal process as a witness. Since it is society that has failed to 
30 See C Edwards The Hammurabi Code ( 1971) at 31. 
31 See 7.2 supra. 
32 Sees 297(1)(a)(i)(aa), (bb) and (hh); 297(1)(b). 
33 Section 300 of the CPA empowers the court to order compensation upon the 
application by the injured person or the prosecutor. 
34 See comment by Kriegler op cit at 755: 
.... daar word aan die hand gegee dat skadevergoeding as voorwaarde van 
opgeskorte straf te dikwels nie oorweeg word nie. Die strafsanksie is 'n 
effektiewe insentief; 'n opskortingsvoorwaarde is uit die staanspoor plooibaar en 
dit kan by latere versuim om te betaal geregtelik aangepas word; die klaer bespaar 
die koste en beslommernis van uitwinning; en les bes, die strafproses demonstreer 

























protect victims against the harm or injury suffered in the first place, it follows logically 
that the harm suffered by a victim as a result of a criminal offence being committed 
should be addressed through the criminal justice system. It is, however, worth noting that 
the Depaiiment of Justice in its vision statement has recognised that victims are 
marginalised35 by the criminal justice system by not receiving due compensation. 
Although the Department has recognised the shortcoming it has not yet produced any 
improvement of the compensation procedures in the system. It is submitted that the 
shortcomings regarding compensation can only be overcome by adopting specific 
provisions regulating compensation in the criminal process. 
An analysis of the practical implementation of s 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
shows that courts in the South African context may order an offender to pay 
compensation to the victim concerned in addition to any other sentence that is imposed. If 
the offender is indigent, then it is highly unlikely that any order will be made.36 
Regardless of the fact that an award of compensation may be made without the victim 
being liable for legal costs, such an award would be meaningless if the accused has no 
money or any assets with which he could compensate the victim. It is inevitable that, in 
making an award, the court should take into account the means of an offender.37 Should 
the victim therefore request to be compensated for any damage or loss suffered and the 
accused has no money, an order will rarely be made in favour of the victim.38 In view of 
Cf.RE Laue 'Sentencing: The victim of crime' (1998) 1 The Judicial Officer 72. 
35 See Department of Justice Justice Vision 2000 - Five Year National Strategy for 
Transforming The Administration of Justice and State Legal Affairs ( 1997) at 63. 
36 It is submitted that the reason why a court would not make a compensation award if the 
accused has no means to pay the victim is that an award of compensation has the same 
effect as any civil judgment. This means that if the compensation is not paid execution 
against the property of the accused may take place in the same way as it would if any 
civil judgment is not adhered to. See Magistrates' Courts Rules 39-43. 
37 See S v Medell 1997 (1) SACR 682 (C) at 686b-c. 
38 An additional problem is foreseen with a compensation award that has been made and 
then not been adhered to by the offender. It is doubted that incarceration for failure to pay 
the 'debt' will follow since such incarceration would be deemed as a civil imprisonment 
for debt, which has been held to be unconstitutional by our courts. See Matiso and Others 
v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and Others 1995 (4) SA 637 (CC); Coetzee 





















the profile of the average South African offender there is a strong likelihood that such an 
award will not be made since it is likely that the offender will come from the poorer parts 
of society,39 be unemployed and without realisable assets. 
There is, however, a way to deal with this unbearable situation. A state compensation 
scheme should be introduced. Such a scheme has the advantage of providing 
compensation to victims, where compensation is due. Consideration should be given to a 
state scheme, which would enable victims of crime to claim compensation for the harm 
suffered.40 
An award in terms of s 300 of the Act would thus be considered as part of the sentence 
imposed on an offender. A review of this section shows that it has very limited 
application41 in our law since it cannot be ordered meru moto by the court and it does not 
provide compensation to be ordered in favour of the survivors of victims. 42 Furthermore, 
it fails to provide for compensation for emotional shock and pain and suffering43 
39 See Lirieka Meintjies-Van der Walt 'Victory For victims? Recent Developments in 
Victim Empowerment' (1998) 11 Acta Criminlogica 38 at 39. 
4° For forceful arguments in favour of a state compensation scheme, see JP J Coetzer 
'Die Slagoffers van Misdaad: 'n Verwaarloosde Groep' (1994) 7 Consultus 28 at 30-31. 
41 See S v Lekgathe 1982 (3) SA 104 (BSC) at 112. 
42 An award in terms of s 300 of the CPA will only be made if the court is requested to 
do so by either the victim or the prosecutor acting on the instructions of the victim 
concerned. 
43 See S v Liberty Shipping and Forwarding (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 281 (D). Didcott J 
interpreted the provision as. excluding compensation for pain and suffering in the 
following words at 284H-285A: 
The proposition that the 'damage' in question is not limited to damage to property 
but encompasses all kinds of damage means, if it is found that a Court convicting 
someone of assault, rape, crimen iniuria or criminal defamation may itself 
proceed to award the victim general damages as compensation for the injury to 
person, dignity or reputation he or she has suffered. Never, as far as I am aware, 
has such an award been made or even sought under s 300(1) or either of its 
predecessors. The likelihood that Parliament had this in mind does not seem 
strong. It postulates an inquiry of the sort and scope making it an unsuitable 
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occurring as result of the commission of the offence.44 The provision would serve justice 
better if it provided for 'any or all damages' resulting from the commission of an 
offence.45 
It is submitted that compensation would be more regularly ordered if the courts were 
compelled to consider compensation in each case; unless requested by the victim not to 
be compensated. In the manner that the provision is currently drafted courts are not 
obliged to consider compensation as part of the sentencing option, they are only required 
to order it if requested to do so. Section 300 of the CPA as it currently stands is not 
victim friendly and should be amended to be of more use and assistance to the very 
people that have suffered as a result of the commission of criminal offences. 
Section 300 of the CPA is not the only mechanism available to the court to apply in order 
to compensate victims of crime. The court would be able to suspend or postpone sentence 
in terms of s 297 of the CPA on condition that an accused either compensate the victim or 
perform some service to the community.46 In R v Bepela47 Hiemstra CJ regarded a 
suspended sentence as a much more practical way of compensating victims. The benefit 
of s 297 of the CPA as a tool to compensate is that there is no monetary limit to the 
amount that the court should order the accused to pay.48 The scope of this provision is 
extremely broad and it could be of great assistance to victims. A review of sentences 
imposed in most of the South African courts demonstrates, however, that courts seldomly 
impose suspended sentences with the aim of compensating the victim.49 It is surmised 
that one of the main reasons why courts do not consider such a condition of suspension of 
44 See s 300(1) that refers specifically to compensation for damages and loss that 
occurred to property. 
45 See s 3 5 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act of 1973 of the United Kingdom that 
makes provision for such an award. The section provides for 'all damages caused' as 
result of the offence. 
46 See generally A St Q Skeen 'Compensating the victim of crime - A useful but limited 
remedy' (1988) 17 Businessman's Law 187. 
47 1978 (2) SA 22 (B). 
48 Ifs 300 is used then the monetary limit for an award in the regional court would be 
R300 000 and in the district court R60 000. See GN R1410 Gazette 19435 of30 October 
1998. 


















the sentence is that the circumstances of the victim are not always on record. Should the 
legislature, however, introduce a method of supplying such data to the court prior to the 
sentence being imposed, victims would be in a position to benefit from the use of this 
secfrm more than what they would benefit from the use of s 3 00 of the CPA. 
7.4 Victim impact statements 
The Criminal Procedure Act does not make provision for victim impact statements to be 
used before sentence is imposed, as is customary in countries like New Zealand and the 
United States of America. This does not mean that the practical implementation and 
possible consequences of victim impact statements should not be investigated as an 
option of giving recognition to the victims of crime. The South African Law Commission 
considered this type of statement as one of the possible solutions for empowering victims 
in the criminal justice system. 50 I shall now examine its value and usefulness. 
What is a victim impact statement and what role, if any, should it fulfil at the sentencing 
phase? Prof Naude defines this statement as a document that is intended to provide 
information to the court concerning the physical, financial, emotional and psychological 
effects of a crime on a crime victim, and, where relevant, his or her family. 51 The purpose 
of such statement would be twofold: first to reintegrate the victim into the court process; 
and secondly, to improve the quality of sentences by balancing the rights of the accused 
with those of the victim. 
Dr Snyman, a former member of the South African Law Commission's Project 
Committee on Restorative Justice, contends that the statement may be used to include 
subjective facts like the victim's feelings about the crime and about the sentence that 
50 See South African Law Commission Issue Paper 7, Project 82 Sentencing Restorative 
Justice - Compensationfor Victims of Crime and Victim Empowerment (1997). 
51 See B Naude 'Dealing with the victims of crime - the role of the legal profession' 























should be imposed. 52 Such statements, so it seems, will have more than one advantage for 
the sentencing process because not only will they give victims the opportunity to be 
active participants in the criminal justice system but they could also serve an useful 
function in collecting relevant data for purposes of sentencing. The victirn impact 
statement could be used as a tool to get important evidence on record without delaying 
the case. The value of a victim impact statement could perhaps be illustrated by reference 
to the case of S v P.53 The presiding officer in this matter requested the submission of 
evidential material to enable the court, to pass an appropriate sentence.54 This serves as 
proof of the necessity of such statements prior to sentence. 
(a) New Zealand 
A country that has succeeded in implementing victim55 impact statements is New 
Zealand. Section 8(1) of the New Zealand Victims Offences Act56provides as follows: 
Appropriate administrative arrangements should be made to ensure that a 
sentencing judge is informed about any physical or emotional harm, or any 
loss of or damage to property, suffered by the victim through or by means 
of the offence, and any other effects of the offence on the victim. 
52 See n49 supra at para 2.30. 
53 1989 (1) SA 760 (C). 
54 In this matter the accused was convicted on a charge of rape, after he pleaded guilty to 
the charge. The court required evidential material, like a statement of the complainant 
and other relevant circumstances pertaining to the case, in order to impose the most 
appropriate sentence. 
55 Victim is specially defined in s 2 of the Act which states: 
Inte,pretation - In this part of the Act, the term 'victim' means a person who, 
through or by means of a criminal offence (whether or not any person is convicted 
of that offence), suffers physical or emotional harm, or loss of or damage to 
property; and, where an offence results in death, the term includes the members of 
the immediate family of the deceased. 

















Subsection (2) of s 8 provides that the information is to be conveyed to the court either 
orally by the prosecutor or by means of a written statement. It is contended that victim 
impact statements adduced in these ways would in most instances, within the South 
African context, constitute hearsay testimony that generally would be excluded as 
inadmissible evidence. This obstacle could, however, be overcome by the creation of a 
new statutory exception to the general hearsay rule with specific reference to victim 
impact statements. Such a provision would then save the victim the burden of re-
appearing at court and of tendering viva voce evidence. It should be borne in mind that 
the primary reason why hearsay evidence is excluded in our law is because it carries a 
high risk of being unreliable as evidence.57 The same risks do not, however, arise in 
admitting victim impact statements if such a provision regulating the admission of such 
evidence would compel the prosecution to submit only victims' statements that 
correspond with the facts proved in each case. Should there be any dispute regarding the 
statement, or if the statement does not correspond with the facts proved in the specific 
case, then viva voce evidence could be tendered. Such a procedure will be fair and will 
ensure that no prejudice will be suffered by the accused. 
It is submitted that if a statement were to exceed the boundaries of admissible evidence it 
would not be helpful to the sentencing judge and it would carry with it the danger of 
influencing presiding officers to impose inappropriate sentences.58 Such danger is indeed 
a real consideration, which is most eloquently stated by Tipping Jin R v F: 59 
A sentencing Judge must hold a fair balance between the interests of the 
person to be sentenced on the one hand and those of the victim and society 
on the other. Care must be taken when holding that balance to avoid the 
57 See Schwikkard et al op cit at 156. It has been argued that hearsay testimony offers no 
opportunity for cross-examination, hence the risk of being unreliable as evidence. Cf. 
Hoffmann and Zeff ertt op cit at 125. 
58 For a critical review of victim impact statements see the discussion by Geoff Hall 
'Victim Impact Statements: Sentencing On Thin Ice?' (1992) 15 New Zealand 
Universities LR 143. 























risk of trial by victim impact statement. Such statements must fully serve 
their statutory purpose but should not be allowed to trespass outside the 
reasonable ambit of that purpose. 
A review60 by John Rowan, a practitioner of Wanganui, reveals that victim impact 
statements are not favoured by all judges in New Zealand. In support of his contention he 
refers to a statement by Justice Holland who said the following with reference to victim 
impact statements: 
I don't believe that any judge, in imposing sentences, isn't aware already 
that people suffer as a result of crime. We sit through jt day after day, 
seeing the people giving evidence. The victim is not in a good position to 
give a reasoned view of what is appropriate. They are after revenge; it's an 
ordinary human reaction. I rather think we get too carried away by what 
victims say we will be influenced in some case by revenge.61 
It is submitted that the judicial comment by Justice Holland reflects a generalisation of 
the emotions of victims and their survivors. Surely fairness should dictate that all factors 
be submitted to the court before sentence, in order to balance all rights; not only those of 
the accused. An improper balance of these rights can only lead to unfair and unjust 
sentences. It is, however, contended that South Africa can learn from the New Zealand 
experience and the methods used by it in giving recognition to victims at the sentencing 
stage. 
(b) United States of America 
Witnesses in the United States have been more fortunate in that they have become a 
major feature of victimological developments over the past thirty years: they are truly 
recognised as participants in the criminal justice system at all stages. All kinds of 





















initiatives were developed in order to improve services offered to victims, including 
services at the sentencing phase. In fact the Reagan administration made victims such a 
priority that a President's Task Force on Victims of Crime was established with its 
emphasis on the prevalence of crime and more particularly the problems of secondary 
victimization of witnesses.62 An important development for victims in the United States 
was the introduction of the Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act.63 This Act is 
important because of the wide powers that it grants to a federal sentencing court to order 
restitution. 64 65 Sentencing courts in the states, by applying the VWP A, have aggressively 
compensated victims of crime through restitution orders, and have showed acceptance of 
quasi-legislative control over the sentencing process.66 
Other legislation that affects the rights of victims at the sentencing phase is the Victims 
of Crime Act of 1984. 67 In 1982 the Victims of Crime Act made victim impact statements 
61 Ibid at 194 and 195. 
62 RI Mawbay and S Walklate Critical Victimology (1994) at 136-137. 
63 The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub L No 98-4 73 of Stat 1987 (1984), 
codified in 18 U.S.C.A, hereinafter referred to as the VWPA. Since 1982 the VWPA has 
undergone seven amendments with the last amendment in 1990. 
64 For a discussion of the restitution powers under the Victim and Witness Protection Act 
of 1982, see LP Fletcher 'Restitution in the Criminal Process: Procedures for Fixing the 
Offender's Liability' (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 505. 
65 See sections 3663 and 3664 of the 18 U.S.C. Section 3663(a) of 18 U.S.C provides as 
follows: 
( 1) The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offence under this 
title or under subsection (h), (i), U), or (n) of section 902 of the Federal Aviation 
Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1472), may order, in addition to or, in the case of a 
misdemeanour, in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant 
make restitution to any victim of such offense. (2) For the purpose ofrestitution, a 
victim of an offense that involves as an element, a scheme, a conspiracy, or a 
pattern of criminal activity means any person directly harmed by the defendant's 
criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. (3) The court 
may also order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the 
parties in the plea bargain. 
66 For a discussion of the judicial application ofrestitution under the VWP A see Lionel 
M Lavenue 'The Corporation as a Criminal Defendant and Restitution as a Criminal 
Remedy: Application of the Victims and Witness Protection Act by the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations' ( 1993) 18 Journal of C01poration Law 441. 




















mandatory in all federal cases where a pre-sentence report was filed at the court. In the 
American context the Act was also seen as a major catalyst in improving compensation 
programmes.68 Today most states have their own legislation providing for the rights of 
victims and regulating victim impact sta.tements.69 Since the State of Washington has 
been in the forefront70 of promoting victims rights, I shall focus on its Crime Victim's 
Bill to show how extensively one can provide for the rights of victims, including their 
right to be heard at the sentencing phase. 71 
68 One of the reasons why it was seen as a major breakthrough for victims, was because it 
lead to the establishment of a Crime Victims Fund, which provides for compensation to 
eligible victims. 
69 See RI Mawbay and S Walklate op cit at 138. 
70 See Ken Eikenberry 'The Elevation of Victim's Rights in Washington State: 
Constitutional Status' (1989) Pepperdine LR 19 at 24. 
71 Sees 7.69.030 of the Wash Rev Code that provides as follows: 
There shall be a reasonable effort made to ensure that victims, survivors of 
victims, and witnesses of crimes have the following rights: 
(1) With respect to victims of violent or sex crimes, to receive, at the time of 
reporting the crime to law enforcement officials, a written statement of the rights 
of crime victims as provided in this chapter. The written statement shall include 
the name, address, and telephone number of a county or local crime 
victim/witness program, if such a crime victim/witness program exists in the 
county; 
(2) To be informed by local law enforcement agencies or the prosecuting attorney 
of the final disposition of the case in which the victim, survivor, or witness is 
involved; 
(3) To be notified by the party who issued the subpoena that a court proceeding to 
which they have been subpoenaed will not occur as scheduled, in order to save the 
person an unnecessary trip to court; 
(4) To receive protection from harm and threats of harm arising out of co-
operation with law enforcement and prosecution efforts, and to be provided with 
information as to the level of protection available; 
(5) To be informed of the procedure to be followed to apply for and receive any 
witness fees to which they are entitled; 
(6) To be provided, whenever practical, a secure waiting area during court 
proceedings that does not require them to be in close proximity to defendants and 
families or friends of defendants; 
(7) To have any stolen or other personal property expeditiously returned by law 
enforcement agencies or the superior court when no longer needed as evidence. 
When feasible, all such property, except weapons, currency, contraband, property 
subject to evidentiary analysis, and property of which ownership is disputed, shall 



















The rights of victims at the final phase of the criminal justice process are well protected, 
even in cases of capital punishment.72 The rights of victims to submit a statement pre-
(8) To be provided with appropriat~ employer intercession services to ensure that 
employers of victims, survivors of victims, and witnesses of crime will co-operate 
with the criminal justice process in order to minimize an employee's loss of pay 
and other benefits resulting from court appearance; 
(9) To have access to immediate medical assistance and not to be detained for an 
unreasonable length of time by a law enforcement agency before having such 
assistance administered. However, an employee of the law enforcement agency 
may, if necessary, accompany the person to a medical facility to question the 
person about the criminal incident if the questioning does not hindtr the 
administration of medical assistance; 
(10) With respect to victims of violent and sex crimes, to have a crime victim 
advocate from a crime victim/witness program present at any prosecutorial or 
defense interviews with the victim, and at any judicial proceedings related to 
criminal acts committed against the victim. This subsection applies if practical 
and if the presence of the crime victim advocate does not cause any unnecessary 
delay in the investigation or prosecution of the case. The role of the crime victim 
advocate is to provide emotional support to the crime victim; 
( 11) With respect to victims and survivors of victims, to be physically present in 
court during trial, or if subpoenaed to testify, to be scheduled as early as practical 
in the proceedings in order to be physically present during trial after testifying and 
not to be excluded solely because they have testified; 
(12) With respect to victims and survivors of victims, to be informed by the 
prosecuting attorney of the date, time, and place of the trial and of the sentencing 
hearing for felony convictions upon request by a victim or survivor; 
(13) To submit a victim impact statement or report to the court, with the 
assistance of the prosecuting attorney if requested, which shall be included in all 
pre-sentence reports and permanently included in the files and records 
accompanying the offender committed to the custody of a state agency or 
institution; 
(14) With respect to victims and survivors of victims, to present a statement 
personally or by representation, at the sentencing hearing for felony convictions; 
and 
(15) With respect to victims and survivors of victims, to entry an order of 
restitution by the court in all felony cases, even when the offender is sentenced to 
confinement, unless extraordinary circumstances exist which make restitution 
inappropriate in the court's judgment. 
(Emphasis added) 
72 Cf. Booth v Maryland, 306 Md 172, 507 A 2d 1098 (1986) vacated in part and 
remanded, 482 US 496 (1987). In this case the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the 
Maryland Court of Appeals and held that the eighth amendment prohibited a victim's 

























sentence have recently been constitutionally challenged in the State of Washington73 
without success. An examination of the procedures used in tendering these impact 
statements as evidence before the court shows: that victims are either called upon to give 
oral testimony74 or called upon to merely submit written statements regarding the 
damage suffered by them. 
It is important that a court when sentencing a murderer should not lose sight of the 
'victim' who is no longer alive. Personal recognition of such 'victim' is achieved by 
cases of capital punishment it was seen as a setback for victims' rights. The Court's 
opinion is stated at 507 as follows: 
We note, however, that our decision today is guided by the fact that death is a 
'punishment different from all other sanctions,' ... and that therefore the 
considerations that inform the sentencing decision may be different from those 
that might be relevant to other liability or punishment determinations. At least 36 
States permit the use of victim impact statements in some contexts, reflecting a 
legislative judgment that the effect of crime on victims should have a place in the 
criminal justice system ... Congress also has provided for victim participation in 
federal criminal cases ... We imply no opinion as to the use of these statements in 
noncapital cases. 
73 See State v Gentry 125 Wash 2d 570, 617-633, 1134-43 (1995). In this case the father 
of the victim was called to testify. He testified about the victim's interests, and her plans 
for the future before she was killed. He discussed the effects of his young daughter's 
murder on his work, his emotions and his family. In closing argument, the prosecuting 
attorney recalled much of this testimony in noting the lost opportunities of the victim and 
her family and how the crime had affected them. No evidence was admitted regarding 
the victim's family's opinions of the appropriate punishment. The defendant in the matter 
argued that the Court erred by allowing such testimony and argument during his 
sentencing proceeding. Two issues arose with regard to this victim impact evidence: (1) 
Whether the Constitution of the United States bars the introduction of victim impact 
statements at capital sentencing proceedings; and (2) Whether such impact testimony was 
barred by the Washington State Constitution. Considering the issues the Court held that 
there is no federal or state law that per se bar the introduction of victim impact evidence 
in the penalty phase of a capital case and that such evidence is admissible under 
Washington law. It also held that the victim impact statement of the father was in casu 
not violating any of the defendant's due process rights. 
74 A telephonic interview with a prosecuting attorney, William Berg, of the Office of the 
Prosecuting Attorney, King County, Washington, reveals that this 'testimony' by the 
victim or survivor is practically an unsworn statement by the witness stating the impact of 
the crime. The defence has, nevertheless, a right to challenge the statement in terms of 



















affording survivors of those 'victims' to testify before sentence. The importance of such 
personalisation is most succinctly stated by Justice O'Connor in State v Payne: 75 
Murder is the ultim2.tc c1ct of depersonalization. It transforms a living 
person with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away 
all that is special and unique about the person. The Constitution does not 
preclude a State from deciding to give some of that back.76 
This quote so aptly portrays the reason why the testimony of victims and survivors is 
needed in the sentencing process, viz to guard against the chance of these victims 
becoming pieces of evidence instead of people with their own identities. To the point is a 
statement by the venerable Justice Cardozo in Snyder v Massachusetts: 77 
... justice though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The 
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. 
We are to keep the balance true. 78 
7.5 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the answer to some of the problems posed does not lie with a removal 
of the sentencing function from the judiciary, but in providing the judiciary with all 
relevant information before sentence, and by equipping sentencing officers with the 
75 501 US 808, 111 S Ct 2597, 115 L Ed 2d 720 (1991). 
76 S tate v Payne supra at 2612. 
77 291 US 97, 122 78 L Ed 674, 54 S Ct 330 (1934). 























necessary skills to pass sentences which are fair to all. It is regrettable that despite the 
noble objectives of the Department of Justice to transform the criminal justice system to 
be sensitive to the needs of victims, its endeavours have not yet brought about true 
recognition of victims' rights in all phases of a criminal trial. The stark reality is that 
there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Act which compels sentencing officers to 
pay special attention to victims and to their circumstances as a matter of priority. This 
contemptuous disregard of victims' rights should be addressed as a matter of urgency. It 
is submitted that the problem can only be remedied by developing new sentencing 
procedures that will grant victims of crime as of right an opportunity to be part of a 
























The victims of crime are the forgotten link within the American 
criminal justice system. Where every conceivable kind of aid and 
assistance is given to criminal defendants, including free legal 
representation, counseling, rehabilitation, and a host of other services, 
the persons victimized by criminals are, for the most part, left to try 
and function on their own. As many of the victims are elderly or poor 
people, in many cases they are unable to function, and the 
victimization which itself may have only taken a few minutes 
continues on for months and years. I do not criticize the fact that the 
perpetrators are given substantial services at he taxpayers' expense -
such an attitude is, it is said, the mark of an enlightened society. 
However, I do believe that those persons victimized should receive at 
least some assistance at the taxpayers' expense to help them through 
what is often the most traumatic experience of their lives. 1 
Although this statement was made with reference to the American criminal justice system 
in 1979, it could easily have been made about the South African criminal justice system 
in 1999. Some commentators may immediately respond by saying that the reason for the 
emphasis on the rights of the accused, is the protection that the South African 
Constitution affords to the accused. In this study the importance of such constitutional 
guarantees has been recognised. More importantly, however, it has been shown that 
witnesses need not remain the forgotten people of the system. All that the legislature 
needs to do is to adopt the legislative amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act 
1 Statement by Senator P Laxalt, at the 96th Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee 
Hearing. See Congressional Record, 96th Congress, 1 March 1979 as quoted by Alfred S 























proposed in the course of this thesis. Legislative change is required as a matter of 
necessity to make the system more victim-orientated without denying the accused his 
basic rights to a fair trial. 
Throughout this thesis it has been demonstrated that in many aspects of the criminal 
justice process witnesses run the risk of being shortchanged. The analysis of the law 
affecting witnesses revealed that the law either positively discriminates against witnesses 
and victims or at best affords them insufficient protection.2 A focus on the pre-trial 
phases leading to trial showed that witnesses are not always consulted before giving 
testimony and that they suffer psychological harm due to the breakdown of 
communication between the state and themselves.3 It is regrettable that more is not done 
by the Department of Justice to make the process less traumatic for witnesses. Witnesses 
need to be informed of their rights and of how to exercise these rights. It is also important 
to inform them both of how the criminal justice system operates, and why it so operates. 
Witnesses' understanding of why it is that preference is given to the rights of the accused, 
in certain instances, makes the process a less alienating experience for them. The 
advantages of such an information scheme for witnesses were highlighted in a pilot 
project that was conducted at the Wynberg Court during July 1997.4 The response 
amongst the witnesses who participated in the project was overwhelmingly positive. This 
is cogent proof that with a little effort and money a change can be brought about which 
dramatically improves the quality of services rendered to witnesses in the criminal justice 
system. 
Amongst the areas where reform is most urgently needed are: the treatment of witnesses 
before trial, 5 the interests of witnesses at the bail process, 6 the treatment of witnesses in 
2 See discussion of ss 153, 170A, 185, 185A, 189, 300 and 205 of the CPA. 
3 See discussion of bail - chapter 4 supra particularly discussion about the importance of 
communication between witnesses and the prosecution. 
4 Law students handed witnesses' manuals to the witnesses at the court. Before the trial 
the students explained the contents of the manual to each individual witness and offered 
assistance to those witnesses who required further information and/or help. 




















testifying,7 the treatment of rape8 and child witnesses9 and the rights of victims at the 
. h 10 sentencmg p ase. 
Protcctio~ cf witnesses should be given high priority in any criminal justice system. The 
government has made some progress in the provision of witness protection by adopting 
far reaching legislation to afford better protection to witnesses. The legislation is, 
however, not yet in operation and it is seriously doubted whether the Witness Protection 
Act1 1 will ever be successfully implemented by the Department of Justice, due to severe 
budgetary constraints under which the Department operates. The legislation is 
nevertheless applauded as at least it has the potential to address some of the shortcomings 
in the system regarding protection of witnesses. 
It has also been shown.that witnesses remain vulnerable when required to give testimony. 
Their vulnerability is increased by cross-examination techniques which are still permitted 
in our courts and which in many instances can only be described as abusive and 
traumatic. Cross-examination of course remains an integral part of the adversarial system 
and there is no way of escaping the process as long as our system remains adversarial. 
The solution, however, lies with the control of these abusive practices. The legislature has 
responded to the criticisms levelled at thes~ practices by enacting new legislation, which 
is aimed at controlling cross-examination that is unreasonable and unnecessarily 
protracted. 12 The authority of presiding officers to control such cross-examination is 
strengthened by a new statutory provision which empowers them to award costs against a 
party that is responsible for unduly delaying the trial process, either by way of irrelevant 
cross-examination or through any other delaying tactic. 13 The section relating to costs is 
however not yet in operation. Whether courts will firmly control the process in future 
6 See discussion 4.1-4.10 supra. 
7 See discussion 3.1-3.2 supra. 
8 See 5.1-5.4 supra. 
9 See 6.1-6. 7 supra. 
10 See 7.1-7.5 supra. 
11 See discussion of the Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998 at 2.3 .2 supra. 























remains to be seen. It will be recalled that the significance of s 166(3) of the CPA was 
questioned when discussed. This section requires the court to exercise its control over the 
cross-examination, yet at the same time it is expected of the court, in terms of the 
Constitution, to do so without interfering or encroaching upon any foi:::- trial rights of the 
accused. Exercising control over cross-examination is by no means an easy thing to do, 
particularly if it is borne in mind that a very fine line exists between what could be 
considered as justifiable cross-examination of a witness, for example cross-examination 
that is aimed at discrediting a witness, and protracted cross-examination. This could 
somehow explain why courts may be found to be reluctant in pro-actively enforcing 
control over cross-examination. The protection afforded to witnesses in future will 
depend on the way that courts will apply this provision, which could mean that witnesses 
might be just as vulnerable as they were before, despite this amendment to the CPA. 
The discussion of recalcitrant witnesses 14 once again shows that these witnesses are not 
properly informed of their legal rights and the consequences of their refusal to co-operate 
with the state in prosecuting the accused. The proposal regarding recalcitrant witness as 
discussed should not be seen as a proposal that witnesses should not be compelled to 
testify in certain instances but simply that witnesses should be informed of their legal 
position. Recalcitrant witnesses can escape liability only if they have a just excuse for not 
testifying and they should be informed of that fact prior to the trial if they show 
unwillingness to testify. The term 'just excuse' is, however, not definitively or 
inclusively defined in our law, which has lead to arbitrary interpretations by the South 
African courts and which has created legal uncertainty. In view of the severe 
consequences that could follow from a refusal to testify, it is necessary that the concept 
be defined, as this will not only be in the interests of witnesses but will be in the interests 
of justice as a whole. 
Certain witnesses, like rape victims and child witnesses, require special attention in view 
of the psychological harm that these witnesses have to suffer. Rape victims are faced with 


























inordinate victimisation within the system: on a substantive level the definitional limits of 
the offence discriminate between male and female victims; moreover the intimate nature 
of the offence intensifies the ordeal of witnesses testifying in court, and who are obliged 
to reveal intimatP. and perscn~l details to the court. 15 Rape victims cannot claim as of 
right that their trial be heard in camera. It is therefore proposed that s 153 of the CPA be 
broadened to make it compulsory that all rape trials be heard behind closed doors. 
In a focus on the evidential problems that rape victims have to overcome in the system, it 
has been shown that little protection is afforded to these victims in protecting them from 
cross-examination on their unrelated sexual past. It has also been argued that courts have 
placed too much emphasis on the time at which the complaint is lodged. The continued 
use of previous consistent statements of complainants in sexual offences should be re-
examined in light of the fact that no cautionary rule needs to be applied in dealing with 
the testimony of these witnesses. In addition, an analysis of rape shield laws shows that 
although they might improve the protection afforded to victims regarding their sexual 
past they are constitutionally suspect, and that more research should be done before South 
Africa adopts such legislation. 
In so far as child witnesses are concerned, amongst the disadvantages that these child 
witnesses have to face is that they have to testify in a system that is primarily designed 
for adults. The South African system has only recently acknowledged the need for child 
witnesses to give testimony in a more child-friendly environment. Although progress has 
been made in this regard, more reform is required. Children's testimony is affected by 
any delay and the system should be reformed to ensure that matters involving child 
witnesses are disposed of within a short period of time. Such reform will again benefit 
both the child and the system as a whole: the child will be in a position to receive 
counselling or rehabilitation if it is needed, and at the same time the credibility of these 
witnesses will be enhanced by the fact that their memory would not have been affected 
by any delay. Should such a proposal not be feasible in the light of the congested court 


















rolls and the lack of court personnel, then consideration should be given to the courts 
receiving the testimony of these witnesses second hand: either by means of a pre-
recorded videotape of an interview with the child or by way of an interviewer who has 
spoken to the child and who will testify in court. Both these proposals have been 
discussed in detail. 16 
The rights of witnesses are not even recognised at the sentencing process, 
notwithstanding the fact that they have a special interest in the sentence that will be 
imposed. It is proposed that due recognition be given to victims at this final stage of the 
trial, as of right. They should be given the opportunity to explain to the court the impact 
that the crime has had on them. Such evidence could be received through the admission 
of a victim impact statement. This statement could serve a dual purpose: it will give 
recognition to victims at this important stage of the trial and the information provided 
will assist the sentencing officer in passing an appropriate sentence. 
Finally it is proposed that a victim compensation scheme be introduced. At present, 
compensation is only awarded to victims if the accused's financial circumstances permit 
such an award. This means that if the accused is indigent or financially not in a position 
to pay compensation then the court will simply refrain from awarding compensation. 
Justice will be better served if victims as of right will be in a position to claim 
compensation as is the position in other countries that claim concern with the rights of 
victims of crimes, and not only with the perpetrators of crime. 
15 See discussion at 5.2.3 supra. 
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